Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case involves Roger Ouellette, who was convicted of Operating Under the Influence (OUI) following a police stop in his driveway. The police officer had observed Ouellette's vehicle crossing the center line of the road, which led the officer to suspect a violation of traffic laws. Ouellette entered a conditional guilty plea after his motion to suppress evidence obtained from the stop was denied by the trial court.The trial court found that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Ouellette due to his observed traffic violation. Ouellette argued that the stop was unjustified as the officer lacked reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing. However, the court determined that the stop was supported by reasonable articulable suspicion that Ouellette had violated the motor vehicle statute requiring vehicles to be operated within a single lane.On appeal, Ouellette argued that the stop was an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment because it occurred within the curtilage of his home without a warrant and without any applicable exception to the warrant requirement. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court's decision, concluding that the court's failure to grant Ouellette’s motion on that ground did not constitute obvious error and that the stop was justified based on reasonable suspicion. The court also found that Ouellette's argument regarding the stop occurring within the curtilage of his home was unpreserved and did not amount to obvious error. View "State of Maine v. Ouellette" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between MMG Insurance Company (MMG) and the Estate of Philip J. Greenlaw. The dispute arose after the death of Philip Greenlaw, who died while wrestling with his friend, Joseph McNeely. Prior to the incident, McNeely, who operated a landscaping business, had visited Greenlaw's house to provide an estimate for a landscaping project. The visit was part of an informal social gathering where business-related topics were often discussed. After the incident, the Estate filed a wrongful death action against McNeely. MMG, which had issued a business insurance policy to McNeely, sought a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to indemnify McNeely in the wrongful death action.The Superior Court (Cumberland County) granted MMG's motion for summary judgment, determining that McNeely was not covered as an insured under MMG’s business insurance policy because his actions while wrestling with Greenlaw were not related to the conduct of his landscaping business. The Estate appealed this decision, arguing that there were triable issues of fact regarding whether Greenlaw’s death occurred with respect to the conduct of McNeely’s business.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court's judgment. The court found that the insurance policy provision was unambiguous and that McNeely was covered as an insured only with respect to the conduct of his business. The court also agreed with the lower court's determination that there was no genuine issue of material fact and that McNeely’s actions while wrestling with Greenlaw were not related to the conduct of his landscaping business. Despite the business-related discussions and activities that occurred earlier in the evening, the court concluded that McNeely's wrestling actions were not taken with respect to the conduct of his business. View "MMG Insurance Company v. Estate of Greenlaw" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over an employer's vicarious liability under the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA) for an employee's discriminatory behavior towards a customer. The plaintiffs, Tiffany Vargas and Erika Acevedo, alleged that they were subjected to racial discrimination by an employee of Riverbend Management, LLC, at a McDonald's restaurant owned and operated by Riverbend. The employee, Andrew Mosley, used a racial slur against Vargas and Acevedo.The case was initially filed with the Maine Human Rights Commission, which issued a right-to-sue letter, allowing the plaintiffs to commence an action in the Superior Court. Riverbend filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it was not vicariously liable for the race discrimination committed by its employee. The court partially granted the motion, entering judgment in favor of Riverbend on the gender discrimination claim but denied summary judgment on the race-discrimination claim.After a bench trial, the court found that while Mosley violated the MHRA when he used a racial slur against Vargas and Acevedo, Riverbend was not vicariously liable for Mosley’s actions. The court relied on both the Restatement (Second) of Agency and the Restatement (Third) of Agency in reaching its conclusion. Vargas and Acevedo appealed this decision.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court's judgment. The court applied the Third Restatement's standard for determining an employer’s vicarious liability under the MHRA for an employee’s act of discrimination against a customer. The court found that Mosley's discriminatory act reflected an independent course of conduct "not actuated by a purpose to serve" Riverbend, and therefore, Riverbend was not vicariously liable for Mosley’s conduct. View "Vargas v. Riverben Management LLC" on Justia Law

Randall J. Weddle was involved in a major motor vehicle accident in Washington, Maine, which resulted in the death of two drivers. The accident involved five vehicles, one of which was engulfed in flames. Weddle, the driver of a large tractor trailer, was found to be the cause of the accident. Hospital tests revealed that Weddle had alcohol in his system and officers found a three-quarters-full whiskey bottle and a shot glass in his truck several days after the accident.Weddle was charged with two counts of manslaughter, two counts of aggravated criminal operating under the influence, one count of causing injury while operating under the influence, one count of aggravated driving to endanger, one count of driving to endanger, and eight counts of violating commercial motor carrier operator rules. The jury found Weddle guilty of all counts. The court conducted a sentencing analysis and set the basic sentence at twenty years, considering the nature and circumstances of the crime. The court set the maximum sentence at thirty years, weighing mitigating and aggravating factors. The final sentence was set at thirty years, with all but twenty-five years suspended, followed by four years of probation.Weddle appealed his sentence to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court. He argued that his sentence was unconstitutional because it was not proportioned to the offense and that it was excessively harsh. The court affirmed the sentence, concluding that the sentence was not greatly disproportionate to the offense and did not offend prevailing notions of decency. The court also found that the sentence was not excessively harsh, as the court had considered both aggravating and mitigating factors in setting the maximum sentence. View "State of Maine v. Weddle" on Justia Law

The case involves Mark Cardilli Jr., who was convicted of manslaughter after shooting and killing Isahak Muse, the boyfriend of Cardilli's sister. Cardilli claimed he acted in self-defense, fearing that Muse, who was unarmed but physically aggressive, would take his gun and use it against him and his family. The trial court found that Cardilli's belief that deadly force was necessary was objectively unreasonable, leading to his conviction.Cardilli appealed his conviction, arguing that his trial attorneys failed to adequately argue that he acted in self-defense. The post-conviction court agreed, granting Cardilli's petition for post-conviction relief, vacating his conviction, and ordering a new trial. The court found that Cardilli's attorneys did not have a cohesive trial strategy and did not communicate effectively, which could have affected the trial court's fact-finding.The State of Maine appealed the post-conviction court's decision, arguing that Cardilli did not show prejudice resulting from the ineffective assistance of counsel. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court agreed with the State, finding that the trial court's factual findings left no room for any argument that Cardilli's use of deadly force against Muse was justified. The court concluded that the legal argument Cardilli claimed his counsel should have pursued was incompatible with the court's findings about what occurred. The court vacated the post-conviction court's judgment and remanded for the entry of a judgment denying Cardilli's petition for post-conviction relief. View "Cardilli v. State" on Justia Law

Tara L. Watson was charged with three crimes, including unlawful possession of scheduled drugs (cocaine base), refusing to submit to arrest, and violation of condition of release. Watson pleaded guilty to all three charges. The trial court sentenced Watson to a three-year prison term for the drug possession charge, which was the leading charge for sentencing purposes. Watson appealed the sentence, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by disregarding or misapplying sentencing principles.The trial court had held a sentencing hearing where the State argued that Watson was not a good candidate for probation due to her history of possession and use, previous violation of conditions of release, and her delivery of a false name and flight from the officer who stopped the vehicle in which she was a passenger. Watson, on the other hand, argued for a probated sentence so that she could focus on addressing her substance use disorder in a highly supervised residential program.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated the sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. The court found that the trial court had erred in its sentencing analysis by relying heavily on its own personal experiences and beliefs about drug use and crime, rather than on an individualized assessment of Watson's circumstances. The court also found that the trial court had failed to adequately address the sentencing goal of eliminating inequalities in sentences and had not given due consideration to a viable rehabilitative treatment option as an alternative to incarceration. View "State v. Watson" on Justia Law

The case at hand involves a dispute over the interpretation of a will left by Robert Pettengill Beckey, who was survived by his three children, Sandra L. Arthur, Angela M. Beckey, and Timothy E. Beckey. The will included specific instructions for dividing real property located at 848 Allen Pond Rd., Greene, ME, among the three children. However, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court found that the Probate Court erred in its interpretation of the will, particularly regarding Angela's share.Specifically, Angela's share was described in the will as "1/3 of property located at 848 Allen Pond Rd., minus the valuation of a piece of land on water by property line of 'Caron's'". The Probate Court had ruled that this description was ambiguous and that Angela's share therefore fell into the residue of the estate, to be divided equally among the three children. However, the Supreme Judicial Court found that the ambiguity of the "minus" clause was irrelevant because Robert never conveyed any part of the land to Angela. Therefore, Angela was entitled to a one-third share of the Allen Pond Road property’s value without any reduction.The Supreme Judicial Court concluded that the Probate Court's ruling was not consistent with Robert's intent for his children to receive equal shares of the property's value. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Estate of Robert Pettengill Beckey" on Justia Law

The Maine Supreme Court considered a case where Virginia and Joel Parker, a couple who secure some of their food through hunting, challenged the constitutionality of Maine's longstanding ban on Sunday hunting. The Parkers argued that the ban conflicted with the recently enacted right-to-food amendment to the Maine Constitution, which they interpreted as including a right to hunt for food.The Superior Court had dismissed the Parkers' complaint on the grounds that it failed to state a claim. On appeal, the Maine Supreme Court held that the Parkers did present a justiciable claim for a declaratory judgment, and therefore the dismissal by the Superior Court was in error.However, on the question of the constitutionality of the Sunday hunting ban, the Maine Supreme Court found that the ban did not conflict with the right-to-food amendment. The court held that while the amendment does create a limited right to hunt for food, this right does not extend to situations where hunting is illegal. Given that the Sunday hunting ban makes hunting on Sundays illegal, the court concluded that the ban falls within the 'poaching' exception provided in the amendment. Therefore, the court ruled that the Sunday hunting ban is constitutional. The case was remanded to the Superior Court for entry of judgment declaring the challenged statute to be constitutional. View "Virginia Parker v. Department of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife" on Justia Law

The case centers around the dispute over the requirement for a supermajority vote in the Town of Bar Harbor's amendment to its Land Use Ordinance (LUO) concerning vacation rentals. Erica Brooks and Victoria Smith, both property owners in the town, argued that due to a 2-2 tie vote by the Planning Board on the proposed amendment, a two-thirds majority vote was necessary for the amendment to pass. The amendment, however, was enacted with a 60% majority vote. The Superior Court sided with the Town, asserting that the LUO language did not necessitate a supermajority vote.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court's decision but did so on different grounds. The court agreed with the argument put forth by the Maine Municipal Association in an amicus brief, which asserted that irrespective of the LUO's language, under Maine statutes 21-A M.R.S. § 723(4) (2023) and 30-A M.R.S. § 2501 (2023), only a simple majority vote was required for the amendment to take effect, unless the Town's charter provided otherwise, which it did not. Therefore, the court concluded that the amendment was lawfully enacted with a simple majority vote, rendering the Town's supermajority requirement unenforceable. View "Brooks v. Town of Bar Harbor" on Justia Law

In the case before the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, Christopher O’Donnell, as the personal representative of the estate of Erica J. O’Donnell, appealed a judgment from the York County Probate Court. The court had approved a referee's report regarding the distribution of the estate. O’Donnell contested several aspects of the report, including the application of the intestacy succession provisions of Title 18-A of the Maine Revised Statutes to Erica J. O’Donnell's estate and the court’s decision to adopt the referee's report without holding a hearing on O’Donnell's amended objection.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court's judgment. The court concluded that the intestacy succession provisions of Title 18-A, not Title 18-C, applied because Erica J. O’Donnell died before the effective date of Title 18-C. The court also rejected O’Donnell's argument that he was deprived of a hearing on the referee’s report, finding that a hearing was held after the referee's report and O’Donnell's objections were received. The court ruled that O’Donnell's amended objection lacked the required level of specificity to preserve his objection to the plan of distribution. View "Estate of Erica J. O'Donnell" on Justia Law