Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2002 and 2009, the town of Pembroke recorded tax liens against property owned jointly by Brian E. Priest and his wife, Lisa C. Priest. The Priests paid the delinquent taxes, and the town discharged the liens through "municipal quitclaim deeds." After Brian died intestate, a dispute arose among his heirs regarding whether the tax liens had severed the joint tenancy, thus terminating Lisa's right of survivorship.The Penobscot County Probate Court denied Lisa's petition to reform the municipal quitclaim deeds to reflect that the property remained in joint tenancy. The court found no evidence of the transferor's intention at the time the deeds were drafted and dismissed the petition. The court did not address Lisa's alternative request for a declaration that the property was not an asset of the estate.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and concluded that the joint tenancy was not severed because the town never foreclosed on either tax lien mortgage. The court held that the municipal quitclaim deeds served only to discharge the liens and did not affect the joint tenancy. Consequently, Lisa's right of survivorship remained intact. The judgment of the Probate Court was vacated, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Estate of Priest" on Justia Law

Pat Doe filed a complaint for protection from harassment against John Costin on behalf of her two minor children, alleging aggressive behavior by Costin, including blocking their car at school. The District Court issued a temporary order for protection, which was later made permanent for the children but not for Doe. Doe did not request attorney fees within the required time frame.Doe later moved to modify the order, fearing that Costin might access the school after a no-trespass notice expired. The court modified the order to prohibit Costin from entering the school when the children were present and awarded Doe attorney fees. Costin opposed the modification and the attorney fees, arguing the motion was frivolous and untimely.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. The court found the appeal regarding the modified order moot since it had expired. However, it reviewed the attorney fees award, determining that the lower court erred in awarding fees for services provided before the motion to modify. The court vacated the attorney fees award and remanded the case for reconsideration of fees related only to the motion to modify. View "Doe v. Costin" on Justia Law

In November 2021, Lincoln Medical administered a COVID-19 vaccine to the five-year-old child of Jeremiah Hogan and Siara Jean Harrington at a school clinic without obtaining parental consent. Hogan filed a notice of claim in the Superior Court against the doctor, Lincoln Medical Partners, and MaineHealth, Inc., alleging various torts including professional negligence, battery, and false imprisonment on behalf of the child, and emotional distress and tortious interference with parental rights on behalf of the parents.The Superior Court appointed a chair for the prelitigation screening panel, and Lincoln Medical moved to dismiss the notice of claim, citing immunity under the federal Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act. The court granted the motion to dismiss, interpreting the PREP Act to provide immunity to the defendants with no applicable exceptions. Hogan appealed the decision.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. The court held that the PREP Act provides broad immunity to covered persons, including individuals and corporations, from suits related to the administration of covered countermeasures, such as the COVID-19 vaccine. The court found that the federal statute preempts state law that would otherwise allow Hogan to sue, as the claims were directly related to the administration of the vaccine. The court concluded that the defendants were immune from Hogan’s claims under the PREP Act, and the state tort claims were preempted by federal law. View "Hogan v. Lincoln Medical Partners" on Justia Law

Raymond N. Lester was convicted of intentional or knowing murder after a jury trial. The victim's body was found at the Schoodic Institute at Acadia National Park during a retreat. Witnesses testified that Lester had been seen screaming at the victim and driving recklessly while appearing intoxicated the night before the body was discovered. Tire tracks led from the road to the location where the body was found, and the victim died from blunt force injuries.Lester was charged in June 2022 and indicted in August 2022. He pleaded not guilty, and a four-day trial was held in November 2023. During the trial, Lester's attorney objected to the jury instructions on intent, motive, and premeditation, arguing they lessened the State's burden of proof. The court overruled the objection, and the jury found Lester guilty. At the sentencing hearing, the court set the basic sentence at forty years, considering the domestic violence nature of the crime and Lester's intentional conduct. The final sentence was forty-eight years after weighing aggravating and mitigating factors.Lester appealed the conviction and sentence. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and found that the jury instructions on motive, intent, and premeditation were legally accurate and not erroneous. The court also determined that there was no obvious error in the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on intoxication, as there was insufficient evidence that Lester was intoxicated at the time of the crime. Finally, the court held that the trial court did not misapply legal principles in setting the basic sentence at forty years. The judgment and sentence were affirmed. View "State of Maine v. Lester" on Justia Law

Pamela Gleichman, a real estate developer, established four affordable housing developments in Pennsylvania as limited partnerships in the 1990s. Gleichman and her company, Gleichman & Co., Inc., served as the general partners, while Metropolitan and U.S.A. Institutional held limited partnership interests. In 2014, Gleichman’s daughter, Rosa Scarcelli, acquired Gleichman & Co. (renamed General Holdings, Inc.) through a foreclosure auction. In 2018, Metropolitan and U.S.A. Institutional transferred their limited partnership interests to Eight Penn Partners, L.P., without the consent of General Holdings.General Holdings and Preservation Holdings filed a complaint in the Superior Court against Eight Penn, Metropolitan, and U.S.A. Institutional, seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. The case was transferred to the Business and Consumer Docket. The court denied Eight Penn’s motion for summary judgment, finding ambiguity in the partnership agreements regarding General Holdings’ status as a general partner. After a trial, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, declaring that General Holdings remained a general partner with management rights and that the transfer of interests to Eight Penn was invalid without General Holdings’ consent.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s judgment. The court found that the partnership agreements required the consent of both general partners for a valid transfer of limited partner interests. The court concluded that the transfer of General Holdings’ controlling interest at a foreclosure auction did not require the limited partners’ consent. Therefore, General Holdings remained a general partner with management rights, and the transfer to Eight Penn was invalid. The court upheld the declaratory judgment and denied injunctive relief as unnecessary. View "General Holdings, Inc. v. Eight Penn Partners, L.P." on Justia Law

Charles R. Maples and Kathy S. Brown, owners of two condominium units, obtained a judgment against Compass Harbor Village Condominium Association and Compass Harbor Village, LLC for damages due to mismanagement. The judgment awarded Maples $134,900 and Brown $106,801, along with specific performance, declaratory relief, and attorney fees. The judgment prohibited the defendants from imposing special assessments to pay for the judgment. The judgment was affirmed in part by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, but specific performance and the Unfair Trade Practices Act claim were vacated.Maples and Brown recorded writs of execution, obtaining liens against the LLC's and Association's properties. However, the LLC's units were foreclosed by The First, N.A., extinguishing the liens. Maples and Brown then filed a new action in the Superior Court, seeking to enforce the judgment against the remaining seven units not owned by them or foreclosed upon. The case was transferred to the Business and Consumer Docket, where the court dismissed their claims.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and focused on whether the lower court erred in dismissing the claim to enforce the judgment lien against the seven units under the Maine Condominium Act, 33 M.R.S. § 1603-117. The court held that the proper procedure for enforcing such a lien requires a disclosure proceeding in the District Court, which has exclusive jurisdiction over such matters. The transfer to the Business and Consumer Docket did not cure the jurisdictional issue. Consequently, the court affirmed the dismissal of Maples and Brown’s claims, as the Superior Court and the Business and Consumer Docket lacked jurisdiction to issue the necessary turnover or sale orders under the disclosure statutes. View "Maples v. Compass Harbor Village Condominium Association" on Justia Law

Calixte Fleury was convicted of aggravated trafficking, unlawful trafficking, unlawful possession of scheduled drugs, and operating under the influence. On September 18, 2020, Fleury was driving on I-95 when he crashed his vehicle. A responding sergeant found Fleury with a bag of pills containing fentanyl and tramadol, and later discovered more fentanyl and cash on Fleury. Fleury's blood alcohol content was 0.093 grams per 100 milliliters. He was indicted and later charged with multiple counts, including aggravated trafficking and unlawful trafficking of scheduled drugs.The trial court (York County, Martemucci, J.) held a jury trial, resulting in guilty verdicts on all four criminal counts. The court found in favor of Fleury on the criminal forfeiture count. Fleury was sentenced to seven years with all but four years suspended for aggravated trafficking, three years for unlawful trafficking, and 30 days for operating under the influence, with some sentences running concurrently. The court merged the unlawful possession count with the unlawful trafficking count.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. Fleury argued that the application of a repealed definition of "traffick" was unconstitutional. The court disagreed, stating that the repealed statute was rationally related to controlling opioids and its application was not unconstitutional. The court also noted that the amended statute did not apply retroactively to Fleury's case.However, the court found that the trial court should have merged the aggravated trafficking count with the unlawful trafficking and possession counts for sentencing. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing, affirming the convictions in all other respects. View "State of Maine v. Fleury" on Justia Law

Kulmiye Idris was convicted of gross sexual assault after a jury trial in Androscoggin County. The incident occurred on April 2, 2022, when Idris and the victim, who were close friends, attended a party. The victim consumed approximately twelve drinks and went to bed at a friend's house. She later woke up to Idris engaging in vaginal intercourse with her and told him to stop, but he did not stop until he was finished. The next morning, the victim confronted Idris via text, and he apologized, stating he did not remember the incident. The victim reported the assault to the police and underwent a forensic examination, which confirmed the presence of Idris's DNA.The Androscoggin County Grand Jury indicted Idris on one count of gross sexual assault. Idris pleaded not guilty, but after a two-day trial, the jury found him guilty. The court sentenced him to eight years in prison, with all but four years suspended, and four years of probation. Idris appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in its jury instructions regarding the mens rea requirement for the offense.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and determined that the trial court's instruction to the jury to use a "recklessly" standard for the mens rea was not prejudicial, even though the correct standard should have been "criminal negligence." The court found that the jury's verdict would have been the same under the correct standard, as there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction. The court affirmed the judgment and called upon the Legislature to clarify the mens rea requirements for offenses under section 253. View "State of Maine v. Idris" on Justia Law

Christian D., the father of a three-year-old child, appealed a judgment by the District Court (South Paris) that terminated his parental rights. The court found him unfit as a parent and determined that termination was in the child's best interest. The father argued that the court abused its discretion by not making specific findings of fact to support its decision and by not adequately considering a permanency guardianship as an alternative to termination.The District Court found that the father was unfit based on three grounds under 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i), (ii), and (iv). The court noted that the child had been in the custody of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) for 26 of his 35 months and that the child needed permanency, which the father could not provide in a timely manner. The child had been living in a stable and nurturing foster home with his maternal grandparents, who were willing to adopt him.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's judgment. The court held that the District Court properly exercised its discretion and that the record supported the findings that termination of the father's parental rights and adoption were in the child's best interest. The court also rejected the father's argument that Rule 52(a) precluded reliance on inferences or implicit findings, noting that the trial court's findings were sufficient to support the judgment. The court emphasized the importance of permanency for the child and found that the father's inability to provide a stable environment justified the termination of his parental rights. View "In re Child of Christian D." on Justia Law

Michael Zani and Peter Zani, sons of Patricia M. Spofford, appealed a summary judgment from the Lincoln County Probate Court. The court found no genuine issue of material fact regarding Spofford’s testamentary capacity when she executed her will on March 1, 2018. The Zanis argued that there was a genuine issue concerning her testamentary capacity, despite having no direct evidence from the date the will was executed. They contended that other evidence from before and after the will's execution cast doubt on her capacity.The Probate Court granted summary judgment, concluding that Spofford had the requisite testamentary capacity. The court relied on videos of the will’s execution, which showed Spofford understood the nature of her actions, knew the extent of her estate, identified her family members, and expressed clear wishes about her estate's disposition. Additionally, affidavits from Spofford’s attorney and a witness, as well as testimony from her primary care physician, supported the conclusion that she was competent on the day she executed her will.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the Probate Court’s judgment. The court found that the evidence presented by the Zanis, including incidents and medical notes from before and after the will's execution, was too remote to create a genuine dispute of material fact regarding Spofford’s testamentary capacity on March 1, 2018. The court also noted that a diagnosis of dementia or Alzheimer’s disease does not preclude testamentary capacity and that being under guardianship or conservatorship does not automatically negate the ability to execute a will. The judgment of the Probate Court was affirmed. View "Estate of Spofford" on Justia Law