Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Monika McCallion, Brandan McCallion, and Old Bears, LLC (collectively, the McCallions) appealed a judgment affirming the Bar Harbor Board of Appeals' decision to uphold the issuance of a 2023 short-term rental registration to W.A.R.M. Management, LLC. The Town of Bar Harbor requires annual registration of short-term rental properties, classifying them as either VR-1 or VR-2. W.A.R.M. Management, LLC owns two VR-2 properties, one of which is central to this dispute. The property in question is in a district where VR-2s are generally prohibited unless they were registered before December 2, 2021. W.A.R.M. submitted renewal applications and fees for both properties in January 2023, but due to a malfunction in the Town's online portal, one application was lost, and the registration was not renewed by the May 31 deadline. The Town's code enforcement officer (CEO) later issued a registration for the property in October 2023 after determining that W.A.R.M. had timely submitted its renewal application.The McCallions filed an administrative appeal with the Bar Harbor Board of Appeals, arguing that the CEO could not renew the registration after the deadline. The Board upheld the CEO's actions after a de novo hearing. The McCallions then filed a Rule 80B complaint in the Superior Court, which affirmed the Board's decision without addressing the Town's mootness argument. While the case was pending, W.A.R.M. received a 2024 registration for the property, which the McCallions did not contest.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and determined that the appeal was moot because the 2023 registration had been superseded by the 2024 registration, which was not appealed. The court concluded that even if it ruled in favor of the McCallions regarding the 2023 registration, it would have no practical effect since the 2024 registration was final and not subject to review. The court dismissed the appeal as moot, noting that no exceptions to the mootness doctrine applied in this case. View "McCallion v. Town of Bar Harbor" on Justia Law

Damion L. Butterfield was convicted of murder and other offenses after pleading guilty following a trial but before the jury announced its verdict. He sought to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that the court abused its discretion by denying his request and his motion for a new trial. Butterfield also appealed his thirty-five-year prison sentence.The trial court (Cumberland County, MG Kennedy, J.) denied Butterfield's motion to withdraw his plea and his motion for a new trial. The court found that Butterfield had multiple opportunities to discuss his options with counsel and that his plea was made voluntarily and with full knowledge of the consequences. The court also noted that Butterfield did not assert his innocence and that the plea was entered after thorough colloquies. The court sentenced Butterfield to thirty-five years in prison, consistent with the joint recommendation of the parties.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Butterfield's motion to withdraw his plea, as the plea was made voluntarily and with full understanding of the consequences. The court also dismissed Butterfield's appeal of his sentence, noting that discretionary review is unavailable for sentences imposed pursuant to a joint recommendation of the parties. View "State of Maine v. Butterfield" on Justia Law

Raymond Ellis Jr. was convicted of robbery and possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. On August 5, 2023, Ellis, armed with a handgun, and a juvenile accomplice, armed with a sawed-off shotgun, robbed the Big Apple convenience store in Madison. They wore masks, threatened the store clerk, and stole cash from the registers. A third person acted as a lookout. Ellis was sentenced to twenty-five years for robbery, with all but twenty years suspended, and four years of probation, plus a concurrent three-year term for the firearm possession charge.The jury found Ellis guilty of robbery, criminal threatening with a dangerous weapon, and theft by unauthorized taking. The court found him guilty of possession of a firearm by a prohibited person after Ellis waived his right to a jury trial on that count. The court merged the criminal threatening and theft counts with the robbery count for sentencing purposes. Ellis appealed, arguing entitlement to a missing-witness jury instruction and errors in the sentencing process.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. Ellis contended that the jury should have been instructed to infer that a missing witness would not have corroborated the State’s theory. The court reaffirmed its stance from State v. Brewer, holding that no such inference is permissible. The court also addressed Ellis’s claim of double-counting sentencing factors, noting that the sentencing court improperly considered Ellis’s failure to take responsibility as an aggravating factor. The court vacated Ellis’s sentence and remanded for resentencing, affirming the judgment of conviction in all other respects. View "State of Maine v. Ellis" on Justia Law

Peter A. Smith visited Mercy Hospital twice in June 2017 with symptoms indicative of Lyme disease. Dr. John R. Henson misdiagnosed him on both occasions, leading to a lack of appropriate treatment. Smith subsequently developed Lyme carditis and died on July 2, 2017. His parents, Angela M. Smith and Richard T. Smith Jr., as co-personal representatives of his estate, filed a medical negligence lawsuit against Henson, Mercy Hospital, and Eastern Maine Healthcare Systems.The Superior Court (Cumberland County) ruled that Maine’s Wrongful Death Act allowed recovery for pecuniary injuries even if the decedent would not have provided financial support to the beneficiaries. A jury found the defendants liable and awarded damages, including $2 million for pecuniary injury to Smith’s parents, despite no evidence that Smith would have financially supported them.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. The court held that the applicable wrongful death statute authorized recovery for pecuniary injury only when the death deprived one or more of the people identified in the statute of prospective financial gain. The court concluded that damages for such a loss were not available when the loss was asserted only by the estate. Consequently, the court vacated the portion of the judgment awarding damages for pecuniary injury. All other aspects of the judgment were unaffected, and the case was remanded for entry of a modified judgment consistent with the opinion. View "Smith v. Henson" on Justia Law

Katherine Fratello loaned Russell A. Mann $60,000 under a secured promissory note, with Mann agreeing to make monthly payments starting October 15, 2023. Mann provided a cashier’s check for $3,500 on September 29, 2023, claiming it covered the first two payments and other loans. Fratello disputed the validity of the check and considered Mann in default for missing the first two payments. She served Mann with a default notice on November 29, 2023, and filed a complaint on January 5, 2024, alleging Mann’s failure to make the required payments.Mann counterclaimed, asserting that Fratello breached their contract by not cashing the cashier’s check, which he claimed covered the first two payments. He argued that Fratello’s refusal to accept the payment and the subsequent default notice were unlawful. Fratello filed a special motion to dismiss Mann’s counterclaim under Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute, arguing that the counterclaim was based on her protected petitioning activity, namely the default notice and the complaint.The Superior Court (Cumberland County) denied Fratello’s special motion to dismiss, concluding that the default notice was not petitioning activity and that Mann’s counterclaim was not based on Fratello’s filing of the complaint or any other petitioning activity. Fratello appealed the decision.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the denial of the anti-SLAPP motion de novo and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The court held that Mann’s counterclaim was based on Fratello’s refusal to accept the cashier’s check, not on her petitioning activity. Therefore, Fratello did not meet her burden to demonstrate that Mann’s counterclaim was based on protected petitioning activity under the anti-SLAPP statute. View "Fratello v. Mann" on Justia Law

Rochelle Gleason was convicted of aggravated trafficking of a scheduled drug that caused the death of a person. In October 2021, Gleason communicated with the decedent about purchasing fentanyl and heroin. On October 16, 2021, the decedent bought drugs from Gleason, consumed them, and died of acute intoxication from fentanyl and kratom. The Maine Office of the Chief Medical Examiner sent a blood sample to a lab, where several employees conducted tests. A forensic toxicologist, Chelsea Deisher, reviewed the data and documentation and developed a toxicology report indicating the presence of fentanyl and kratom in the decedent’s blood.The State charged Gleason on September 28, 2022, and she pleaded not guilty. During the trial, Deisher testified about the test results, although she did not conduct the tests herself. Gleason objected, arguing that her Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against her was violated because she could not cross-examine the actual testers. The trial court allowed Deisher’s testimony, and the jury found Gleason guilty. She was sentenced to eighteen years in prison, with all but eight years suspended, and four years of probation. Gleason appealed the conviction.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case, focusing on the Confrontation Clause issue. The court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Arizona, issued during the appeal, rejected the rationale that allowed experts to testify based on out-of-court statements not admitted for their truth. The court found that Deisher’s testimony relied on the truth of the data and documentation generated by others, which Gleason could not cross-examine. The court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial to determine whether the statements relied upon by Deisher were testimonial. View "State of Maine v. Gleason" on Justia Law

Kathleen M. Barron filed for divorce from John D. Barron in April 2022. The District Court in Bangor held a contested bench trial where both parties testified and submitted evidence, including proposed calculations for the division of assets. The court ordered John to make a $57,790.17 payment to Kathleen to equalize the division of property, or the marital home, which also houses John's business, would be sold.John appealed the decision, arguing that the court did not make sufficient findings to support the equalization payment. He had filed a post-judgment motion for further findings of fact, which the trial court denied. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court noted that the divorce judgment lacked specific findings regarding the valuation and classification of assets, making appellate review impossible. The court highlighted that the trial court must provide express factual findings based on the record to support its decisions.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment in part and remanded the case for further findings. The court emphasized that the trial court must independently assess the valuation evidence before equitably dividing marital property. The judgment was vacated concerning the distribution of property, while the remainder of the judgment was affirmed. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion, allowing the trial court discretion to reopen the evidence if necessary. View "Barron v. Barron" on Justia Law

Aaron A. Robshaw was convicted by a jury in the Penobscot County Unified Criminal Docket for gross sexual assault (Class A), unlawful sexual contact (Class A), and unlawful sexual contact (Class B) against a minor. The incidents occurred in 2018 and 2019 when the victim was ten and eleven years old. The victim disclosed the abuse to her mother in 2019 and fully revealed the extent of the abuse four years later. During the trial, the State presented expert testimony on child victims' delayed disclosure of sexual abuse, which Robshaw objected to, arguing it would improperly bolster the victim's credibility.The trial court allowed the expert testimony, and after the State rested its case, the court granted Robshaw’s motion for judgment of acquittal on one count of gross sexual assault. The jury found Robshaw guilty on the remaining counts. The court sentenced Robshaw to twenty years' imprisonment followed by twenty years of supervised release. Robshaw appealed the conviction and sentence, arguing improper admission of expert testimony, misapplication of the law in sentencing, and abuse of discretion in imposing supervised release.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the expert testimony, as it was limited to general information about delayed disclosure and did not directly bolster the victim's credibility. The court also found that the trial court properly applied the sentencing analysis, setting the basic term of imprisonment at the legislatively mandated minimum of twenty years and considering aggravating and mitigating factors. The court further held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a twenty-year period of supervised release, as it appropriately considered the need to protect the public and Robshaw’s history of sexual offenses. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment, sentence, and period of supervised release. View "State of Maine v. Robshaw" on Justia Law

Heath G. Demerchant was convicted of domestic violence assault (Class C) after a jury trial. The incident involved Demerchant grabbing his wife's throat and hitting her during an argument about a debit card. The State presented testimony from the victim, witnesses, and police officers. Demerchant argued that his actions were justified under the competing harms justification, claiming he was preventing imminent harm to another person.The trial court denied Demerchant's request for a jury instruction on the competing harms justification, finding insufficient evidence of imminent physical harm to another. The jury found Demerchant guilty, and he was sentenced to five years in prison, with all but three years suspended, and four years of probation.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that there was no evidence of a specific and imminent threat of physical harm to justify the competing harms instruction. The court emphasized that the justification requires evidence of an imminent threat, which was not present in this case. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying the requested jury instruction. View "State of Maine v. Demerchant" on Justia Law

In 1996, Katherine Stovall, while employed at New England Telephone Company, experienced pain in her hands and wrists due to a work-related injury. By 1998, the pain had spread, leading her to take a leave of absence. She returned to work in 1999 but ultimately stopped working in June 2001 due to increased pain. Stovall notified her employer of a new injury/aggravation in August 2001. In 2004, she filed petitions for benefits for both the 1996 and 2001 injuries. In 2006, a hearing officer awarded her benefits for the 2001 injury but not for the 1996 injury, which she had withdrawn.The Workers’ Compensation Board hearing officer found that the 2001 injury was a significant aggravation of the 1996 injury. In 2011, New England Telephone filed a petition to review the benefits, asserting that the 520-week limit on compensation payments had been reached. The hearing officer granted the petition, finding that Stovall had achieved maximum medical improvement and had no permanent impairment from the 2001 injury.Stovall filed a petition for restoration of benefits for the 1996 injury in 2017, nearly eleven years after payments for the 1996 injury had ceased. An ALJ denied the petition as time-barred, concluding that Stovall had not shown that New England Telephone was on notice that its payments for the 2001 injury were related to the 1996 injury. The Appellate Division vacated this decision, ruling that the payments for the 2001 injury tolled the statute of limitations for the 1996 injury.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated the Appellate Division's decision, holding that Stovall failed to prove that New England Telephone was on notice that its payments for the 2001 injury were related to the 1996 injury. The case was remanded for the Appellate Division to affirm the denial of Stovall’s petition as time-barred. View "Stovall v. New England Telephone Company" on Justia Law