Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The parties in this case are the parents of a ten-year-old daughter and share equal residential care for her. Their original 2016 order set a child support obligation for the father, but a 2020 amended agreement reduced this obligation to zero, reflecting their arrangement of equal parenting time. In December 2023, both parties filed motions seeking modification of the parental rights and responsibilities order. During the pendency of these motions, the father had a son with another person, but the son was not covered by the child support order at issue.Following a hearing, the Maine District Court (Biddeford) ordered the father to resume paying child support to the mother and denied his request for a downward adjustment based on his obligation to support his new son. The District Court reasoned that under Maine’s statutory scheme, only a nonresidential parent—rather than a coresidential parent like the father—could receive such an adjustment. The court subsequently denied the father’s motion to alter or amend the judgment.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the statutory interpretation of 19-A M.R.S. § 2006(5)(A) de novo. The Court held that when both parents provide substantially equal care, neither is the “primary care provider” referenced in the statute. Therefore, the statutory provision allowing a child support adjustment for a parent who is not the primary care provider applies. Because the father was legally obligated to support his son in his household and neither party was the primary care provider for their daughter, the Court determined he was entitled to the statutory adjustment. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated the District Court’s child support order and remanded the matter for recalculation consistent with its interpretation. View "Waterman v. Wheeler" on Justia Law

Zakaria Allaf and Stephanie Crosby rented an apartment from Robb Crawford and later from Shoreline Holdings Five, LLC, with the lease requiring a $1,795 security deposit. The tenants experienced a persistent cockroach infestation and, after unsuccessful remediation attempts, agreed with Crawford to terminate the lease early in January 2022. Upon moving out, Allaf and Crosby were assured by Crawford’s agent that the security deposit would be addressed within thirty days, but no response was received. Eventually, Crawford’s attorney informed Crosby that the deposit was being withheld because Crawford did not consider the lease terminated.Allaf and Crosby filed a small claims action in the Maine District Court (Portland), alleging wrongful retention of the security deposit and breach of the implied warranty of habitability. After a trial, the District Court found in their favor, awarding $6,000 in damages (including double damages for the security deposit and damages for breach of habitability), plus attorney fees and costs. Shoreline appealed to the Cumberland County Superior Court, which affirmed the judgment. Shoreline then appealed to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting liability for wrongful retention and arguing that attorney fees should not be awarded in addition to the $6,000 statutory monetary limit for small claims actions.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment. It held that sufficient evidence supported the lower court’s finding that the lease had been terminated by agreement and that Shoreline failed to return the security deposit or provide a written explanation. The Court also held that attorney fees awarded under a fee-shifting statute such as 14 M.R.S. § 6034(2) are considered “costs” and are not included within the $6,000 small claims cap set by 14 M.R.S. § 7482. Thus, the award of attorney fees in addition to $6,000 in damages was proper. Judgment was affirmed. View "Allaf v. Shoreline Holdings Five, LLC" on Justia Law

In this case, the Jewetts obtained a mortgage loan in 1999, which was later assigned to U.S. Bank. The Jewetts stopped making payments before March 2016. U.S. Bank sent a notice of right to cure in July 2018 and initiated foreclosure proceedings against the Jewetts in September 2018, also naming Unifund as a party due to its judgment lien on the property.The District Court (Newport, Larson, J.) conducted a bench trial and dismissed U.S. Bank’s foreclosure action without prejudice, finding that U.S. Bank’s notice of default and right to cure did not comply with statutory requirements under 14 M.R.S. § 6111. The court’s order barred U.S. Bank from recovering attorney fees, costs, and certain charges in any future action, but did not expressly bar claims for unaccelerated amounts due under the note. Unifund then moved to alter or amend the judgment, seeking a judgment in favor of the Jewetts to preclude future claims for unaccelerated amounts, but the court denied the motion.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the matter de novo. It held that when a foreclosure action is dismissed due to a defective notice of default and right to cure, the dismissal is not on the merits, but claim preclusion applies to any amounts that could have been litigated in the action. The court concluded that the District Court was within its authority to dismiss the case without prejudice and was not required to enter a judgment for the Jewetts or explicitly bar future claims for unaccelerated amounts. The judgment of the District Court was affirmed. View "U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Jewett" on Justia Law

Edward Richard obtained a loan from The County Federal Credit Union to purchase a 2022 Ski-Doo Expedition snowmobile. The credit union took a security interest in the snowmobile and filed a UCC1 Financing Statement with the Maine Secretary of State. Over a year later, Richard sold the snowmobile to Michael Madore Jr., who purchased it as a gift for his father, Michael Madore. Richard did not inform the credit union of the sale and assured Madore Jr. that no liens existed. The Madores did not investigate for liens or UCC filings. After Richard defaulted on the loan and failed to cure, the credit union discovered that Madore possessed the snowmobile.The County Federal Credit Union filed a complaint for recovery of personal property in the District Court (Fort Kent, Maine), naming both Richard and Madore as defendants. Richard declared bankruptcy and received a discharge. Following a hearing, the District Court entered judgment for the credit union, ordering Madore to surrender the snowmobile. Madore then requested additional findings, which the court provided, and subsequently appealed.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the appeal. It held that the credit union had a valid security interest in the snowmobile because the signed loan documents met the statutory requirements: they were authenticated by Richard, created a security interest, and described the collateral. The Court rejected Madore’s argument that the absence of Richard’s signature on a separate “Security Agreement” page rendered the security interest unenforceable. Additionally, the Court found that Madore could not claim status as a bona fide purchaser for value without notice under 11 M.R.S. § 9-1320(2), because the credit union had filed its financing statement before the sale. The judgment of the District Court was affirmed. View "The County Federal Credit Union v. Madore" on Justia Law

A Greek and Australian citizen and a U.S. citizen, who married in Australia, had a child together and lived in Australia before relocating to Greece. In late 2022, the family traveled to Maine for a planned vacation. On the day before their scheduled return to Greece, the mother informed the father that she and the child would not return with him. The father returned to Greece alone, while the mother and child remained in Maine, where the child began receiving developmental services and became integrated into the local community. The child was later diagnosed with autism and enrolled in a therapeutic program. The mother filed for divorce in Maine, and the father subsequently sought the child’s return to Greece under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.The Maine District Court found that the mother wrongfully retained the child in Maine as of January 4, 2023, but that the father did not file a petition for the child’s return in a Maine court until April 19, 2024—more than one year later. The court also found that the child was well settled in Maine, with significant family support, stable living arrangements, and access to specialized services. Exercising its discretion, the court denied the father’s petition to return the child to Greece. The father appealed.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court determined that the order was reviewable under the collateral order exception to the final judgment rule. The court held that the District Court did not err in finding the date of wrongful retention, nor in concluding that the father’s petition was untimely under the Hague Convention. The court also affirmed the finding that the child was well settled in Maine and held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for return. The judgment was affirmed. View "Xamplas v. Xamplas" on Justia Law

Two children were placed in the custody of the Department of Health and Human Services after child protection proceedings were initiated against their parents in 2020 and 2021. The Department later filed petitions to terminate the parents’ rights, and the District Court entered judgments terminating those rights in March 2023. The children were placed with licensed foster parents for nineteen months, but were removed from their care in September 2024 following a report from the older child’s school regarding an incident involving the foster father.After the removal, the foster parents filed motions in the District Court (Springvale and Biddeford) seeking to intervene in the child protection case and requesting expedited judicial review of the children’s placement. They argued that their interests as prospective adoptive parents warranted party status. The Department opposed the motions, citing the children’s best interests and the purposes of the Child Protection Act. On November 6, 2024, the District Court summarily denied both motions. The foster parents appealed, and the Maine Supreme Judicial Court directed the parties to address whether the orders were appealable under the relevant statute.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court held that the orders denying intervention and expedited judicial review are interlocutory and not appealable under 22 M.R.S. § 4006, which strictly limits appeals in child protection matters to three types of orders: jeopardy orders, judgments terminating parental rights, and medical treatment orders. The Court clarified that it lacks authority to create judicial exceptions to this statutory limitation, even for denials of intervention. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed. View "In re Children of Krystal W." on Justia Law

A father was charged with multiple offenses after his daughter reported that he had sexually assaulted her repeatedly over many years, with the earliest incident she could recall occurring when she was in second grade. The prosecution focused on three specific incidents of sexual assault that took place when the victim was sixteen, each on a different date and in different locations. The victim provided detailed testimony about these three incidents, and additional evidence included an audio recording made by the victim during one of the assaults. After the victim disclosed the abuse to her mother, law enforcement became involved, and a grand jury indicted the defendant on nine counts: three counts each of gross sexual assault, domestic violence assault, and endangering the welfare of a child, each set corresponding to one of the three incidents.The case proceeded to a jury trial in the Sagadahoc County Unified Criminal Docket. The jury initially reported a partial deadlock but, after receiving a standard instruction for deadlocked juries, returned guilty verdicts on all nine counts. At sentencing, the court grouped the charges by incident date, imposed concurrent sentences within each group, and ordered the groups to run consecutively, resulting in an aggregate sentence of twenty-seven years, with all but seventeen years suspended and three years of probation. The defendant appealed both his convictions and his sentence, arguing that the trial court erred by not giving a specific unanimity instruction to the jury and by double counting the multiplicity of assaults during sentencing.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the judgment. The Court held that a specific unanimity instruction was not required because each count was tied to a distinct incident on a specific date, and the jury instructions sufficiently ensured unanimity. The Court also held that the sentencing court did not err by considering the number of assaults at different points in its analysis, as this was consistent with established sentencing practices and did not constitute impermissible double counting. View "State v. Chase" on Justia Law

A woman was injured while visiting a property owned by a couple who were seeking tenants for a mobile home located on their land. The injury occurred when she stepped into a gap between the entryway stairs and the mobile home, a gap created during ongoing repairs. The couple had a homeowners insurance policy with State Mutual Insurance Company, but the policy’s declarations page listed a different property as the covered premises. The injured woman sued the couple for negligence, and the parties later entered into a settlement and stipulated judgment, with the couple paying part of the judgment and the woman seeking the remainder from the insurer under Maine’s reach-and-apply statute.The Superior Court of Waldo County granted summary judgment in favor of the insurer, finding that the insurance policy did not cover the property where the injury occurred. The court determined that the property was not an “insured location” under the policy and that the injury arose out of a condition of the uninsured premises, thus falling within a policy exclusion. The woman appealed this decision.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case de novo, considering both the interpretation of the insurance policy and the application of the reach-and-apply statute. The court held that the policy unambiguously excluded coverage for bodily injury arising out of a premises owned by the insured but not listed as an insured location. The court also found that the property in question was not an “insured location” because the insureds did not reside there and it was not listed in the policy declarations. Accordingly, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the insurer, holding that the policy did not provide coverage for the injury. View "Rowe v. State Mutual Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Heather M. Hodgson was charged with several offenses following an incident at her home involving her husband and their two children. The dispute began after her husband purchased alcohol, which upset Hodgson. Both consumed alcohol, and an argument ensued. During the altercation, Hodgson pointed a loaded firearm at her husband and fired a “warning shot” at the floor near his feet. The couple’s three-year-old child was present in the home and had come out of the bedroom during the argument. Hodgson was subsequently indicted on multiple charges, including domestic violence reckless conduct with a dangerous weapon, domestic violence criminal threatening with a dangerous weapon, and endangering the welfare of a child.The case was tried without a jury in the Kennebec County Unified Criminal Docket. After the State presented its evidence, Hodgson moved for acquittal on some counts, which the court granted in part. Hodgson testified, claiming self-defense, but the court found her account not credible. The court found her guilty on three counts: domestic violence reckless conduct with a dangerous weapon, domestic violence criminal threatening with a dangerous weapon, and endangering the welfare of a child. At sentencing, the court declined to impose the mandatory minimum one-year sentence for the reckless conduct charge, instead sentencing Hodgson to three years with all but ninety days suspended and probation.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed both Hodgson’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and the State’s appeal regarding the sentence. The Court affirmed Hodgson’s convictions, finding the evidence sufficient. However, it held that the trial court erred by not imposing the mandatory minimum one-year sentence required by statute for domestic violence reckless conduct with a dangerous weapon. The Court vacated the sentence for that count and remanded for resentencing consistent with the statutory requirement. View "State v. Hodgson" on Justia Law

Law enforcement in Maine received a tip from a confidential source about suspicious rental car activity by Calvin Vandine, who was known to use drugs and associate with traffickers. Officers tracked Vandine’s movements and, based on the tip and corroborating information, stopped his car, which was also occupied by Derric McLain. During the stop, officers found drugs and arrested both men. McLain was later identified as having outstanding warrants, including for drug trafficking. The stop lasted about twenty-eight minutes, and a subsequent search revealed significant quantities of controlled substances.Prior to trial in the Penobscot County Unified Criminal Docket, McLain moved to suppress evidence from the stop and statements made during custodial interrogation, arguing lack of reasonable suspicion for the prolonged detention and that he had not waived his privilege against self-incrimination. The trial court (Anderson, J.) denied the motion to suppress, finding the stop justified and the statements admissible. After a jury trial before Justice Murray, McLain was convicted of aggravated drug trafficking and violation of condition of release, receiving a substantial sentence.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the denial of the suppression motion. The Court affirmed the lower court’s findings that the stop, search, and arrest were supported by reasonable suspicion and were not unconstitutionally prolonged. However, the Court held that McLain did not clearly waive his privilege against self-incrimination under article I, section 6 of the Maine Constitution, as his responses during interrogation were ambiguous and officers failed to clarify his intent. The Court vacated the conviction and the suppression order in part, remanding for further proceedings, and established that a clear and unequivocal waiver is required before custodial interrogation may proceed in Maine. View "State v. McLain" on Justia Law