Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Following a domestic dispute on July 28, 2024, Steven A. Truman was arrested in Kennebec County, Maine, for domestic violence aggravated assault involving his girlfriend, A.D., after law enforcement observed physical marks on her. Upon being jailed, Truman was ordered not to contact A.D. and signed a form acknowledging this condition. Despite the order, Truman called A.D. from jail, during which he encouraged her to provide a false explanation for her injuries. The State indicted Truman for victim tampering and improper victim contact. Meanwhile, the original assault charges against him were dismissed before his trial on the tampering charge.The Kennebec County Unified Criminal Docket presided over pretrial motions, including Truman’s requests to inspect the victim witness advocate’s records and exclude references to A.D. as a “victim,” which were denied. At trial, the court admitted jail call recordings over Truman’s objections. The jury heard testimony from the District Attorney’s investigator and the victim witness advocate. Truman’s motions for acquittal and mistrial, based on arguments about the definition of “victim” and alleged prejudicial use of the term, were denied. The jury convicted Truman on both counts, and his post-trial motion for a new trial was also denied.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed Truman’s appeal, which challenged the statutory interpretation of “victim,” evidentiary rulings, denial of in camera review, and alleged prosecutorial error. The Court held that, under Maine law, the State need not prove the underlying crime for a victim tampering conviction; it suffices that the person was the alleged victim in a pending investigation or proceeding. The Court affirmed the trial court’s evidentiary decisions, denial of in camera review, and found no prejudicial prosecutorial error. The conviction was affirmed. View "State of Maine v. Truman" on Justia Law

In January 2011, a sixteen-year-old girl was driven by her thirty-seven-year-old cousin from Fort Kent to Bangor during a family emergency. During the drive, the cousin asked her inappropriate sexual questions and touched her breasts, leg, and genitals over her clothes. Later, at a relative’s apartment, he exposed himself to her and threatened to harm her family if she disclosed the events. More than a decade later, the woman initiated a lawsuit against her cousin for negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED), and intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress (IIED), seeking damages for the harm she suffered.The Penobscot County Superior Court held a bench trial and found in favor of the plaintiff, awarding her one million dollars in damages. The court found the defendant liable on all three claims. The defendant appealed, arguing that the statute of limitations barred the claims and that the plaintiff had not met her burden of proof.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and held, first, that the claims were not barred by the statute of limitations because state law permits actions based on certain sexual acts toward minors to be brought at any time, and the defendant’s conduct met the required statutory definitions. On the merits, the Court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support liability for negligence and NIED, as the plaintiff did not establish the type of physical injury required for negligence, nor did the relationship between the parties rise to the level required for NIED. However, the Court affirmed the finding of liability for IIED, determining that the defendant’s conduct was so extreme and outrageous that severe emotional distress could be inferred. The Court vacated the judgment on the first two counts and affirmed the judgment on the IIED claim. View "Nadeau v. Nadeau" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with unlawful sexual contact and two counts of visual sexual aggression against two children, both under the age of twelve, with whom he had a close family relationship. The criminal acts occurred over a period of several years, involving repeated sexual abuse, grooming behavior to normalize the abuse, and efforts to keep the victims silent. After the children disclosed the abuse, the defendant was indicted and ultimately pleaded guilty to all three charges.The Cumberland County Unified Criminal Docket accepted his guilty plea and conducted a sentencing hearing. The court imposed concurrent five-year sentences for the two Class C offenses and a consecutive eight-year sentence (with all but two years suspended and twelve years of probation) for the Class B offense. The court considered the seriousness of the offenses, the defendant’s grooming behavior, and the impact on the victims and their family in determining the sentence. The defendant applied to the Sentence Review Panel for leave to appeal his sentence, which was granted.The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine reviewed the case and addressed the defendant’s arguments that the sentencing court failed to consider his intellectual functioning as a mitigating factor, improperly double-counted his grooming behavior, abused its discretion by not treating his own history of victimization as mitigating, and imposed a disproportionate sentence. The Court held that there was no constitutional or statutory requirement to treat the defendant’s intellectual functioning as inherently mitigating, found no double-counting in the sentencing analysis, determined there was no abuse of discretion regarding the consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors, and concluded that the sentence imposed was not constitutionally disproportionate. The judgment was affirmed. View "State of Maine v. Murray" on Justia Law

Johnathan R. is the father of two children, aged twelve and nine. The Maine Department of Health and Human Services became involved after the younger child reported feeling unsafe due to Johnathan’s aggressive and erratic behavior. A voluntary safety plan was initially established, placing the children with a resource family. Shortly after, Johnathan threatened to violate the safety plan, prompting the Department to file for a child protection order and preliminary protection, which the District Court granted, placing the children in Department custody.The Ellsworth District Court held a contested preliminary hearing and determined that returning the children to their parents posed immediate harm. Later, during a contested jeopardy hearing, the court heard testimony regarding Johnathan’s substance misuse, including positive tests for alcohol and cocaine, inconsistent participation in treatment programs, and refusal to cooperate with Department efforts. The court found Johnathan’s claims of sobriety and engagement in mental health services not credible due to lack of evidence. The court also noted Johnathan’s combative and aggressive behavior towards family and Department staff, and found that his youngest child was deeply distressed and fearful of him, with both children affected emotionally.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the District Court’s findings for clear error and affirmed the jeopardy order. The Court held that the evidence supported the District Court’s conclusion, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the children were in circumstances of jeopardy to their health and welfare due to Johnathan’s continuing substance misuse, untreated mental health issues, aggressive behavior, and lack of insight into the children’s fears. The Court further declined to address the statutory delay in issuing the jeopardy order, as no remedy was available under Maine law. The District Court judgment was affirmed. View "In re Children of Johnathan R." on Justia Law

Chip and Anne Andrews applied to the Town of Kittery for approval of a conservation subdivision. Their application sought waivers from certain general street design and construction standards, such as requirements for right-of-way width, street length, street grade, and sidewalk width, as outlined in the town’s Land Use and Development Code. The Planning Board held several hearings, received public input, and ultimately granted the requested waivers and approved the subdivision, finding the waivers met the ordinance’s requirements and did not adversely affect public health, safety, the natural environment, or general welfare. Judith Andrews, a neighboring landowner, opposed the waivers, arguing that only the Board of Appeals could grant such relief because, in her view, the street standards functioned as zoning requirements.After the Planning Board’s decision, Judith Andrews sought judicial review in the Maine Superior Court (York County). The court affirmed the Planning Board’s decision, concluding that the street standards at issue were not zoning requirements, but rather subdivision standards that the Planning Board was authorized to waive under the Code. The Superior Court found that the Board acted within its delegated authority and that no variance from the Board of Appeals was required.On further appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the Planning Board’s decision directly, as the trial court had acted in an appellate capacity. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the general street standards in the Code were not zoning requirements, but rather general, town-wide subdivision standards, and therefore could be waived by the Planning Board under its express authority. The Court distinguished these standards from zone-specific zoning requirements, clarified that there was no violation of state law, and affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. View "Andrews v. Town of Kittery" on Justia Law

The dispute arose when a property owner sought to construct a small campground on the rear portion of her land in the Town of Tremont. The property was split between two zones: the front in a Commercial Fishery/Maritime Activity (CFMA) zone, containing a residence and an existing paved access way, and the rear in a Residential-Business (RB) zone, where the campground would be located. While campgrounds are allowed in the RB zone, the issue centered on whether the proposed use of the existing access way, traversing the CFMA zone, violated local zoning restrictions, particularly those prohibiting expansion of nonconforming driveways in that zone.After the initial application was denied by the Tremont Planning Board due to concerns over site access, subsequent applications and appeals followed. The Planning Board, after remand from the Superior Court (transferred to the Business and Consumer Docket), held hearings and issued findings that the access way was a driveway, not a road or trail, and that the proposed project would unlawfully expand a nonconforming use. The Board of Appeals affirmed the denial. The Superior Court again reviewed the matter, finding legal error in the Board’s failure to fully consider the length of the access way and the “similar use” argument, and ordered the Board to approve the application and direct issuance of a permit.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case, applying a standard that gives deference to the Planning Board’s findings of fact and reviews legal interpretations de novo. The Court held that the Board’s determination—that the access way was a driveway and that the proposed expansion was prohibited under the ordinance—was supported by substantial evidence. The Court vacated the lower court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to affirm the Planning Board’s denial of the application. View "Brogdon v. Town of Tremont" on Justia Law

The case involved a mother whose parental rights to her youngest child were terminated by the Maine District Court. The Department of Health and Human Services initiated a child protection proceeding in June 2023, citing concerns about the mother's mental health, substance abuse, and neglect. The mother missed the preliminary hearing, and the child remained in the Department’s custody. Shortly before a scheduled jeopardy hearing, the mother’s attorney, without prior motion or notice to the mother, orally requested the appointment of a guardian ad litem (GAL) for the mother. The court, relying solely on representations of counsel and without a hearing or evidence, appointed a GAL with broad authority to make binding decisions on the mother’s behalf.Following this, several hearings took place, including a jeopardy hearing and judicial review hearings. There was ongoing confusion among the court and the mother’s attorneys regarding whether direction should be taken from the mother or the GAL, especially when their positions diverged. In August 2025, at the termination hearing, the mother’s GAL consented to termination of parental rights on the mother’s behalf, over the mother’s absence and without her knowledge of the GAL’s intent to consent. The District Court entered the termination order based on the GAL’s consent, and the mother appealed.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. It held that the process used to appoint the GAL violated the mother’s due process rights because she was not afforded notice or an opportunity to be heard before the GAL’s appointment and before her decision-making authority was delegated. The Court further concluded that this error was prejudicial and required the judgment to be vacated. The case was remanded for a proper competency hearing and new proceedings beginning with the jeopardy phase, ensuring the mother’s due process rights are protected moving forward. View "In re Child of Mindy P." on Justia Law

The defendant created a company called Icy Gulch Resources, LLC, and solicited investments from five individuals through subscription agreements and short-term loans—both considered securities under Maine law. She misrepresented Icy Gulch’s involvement in several ventures, including falsely claiming a stake in the Sudanese gum arabic market, and asserted that wealthy individuals were participating in the deals. Contrary to these representations, Icy Gulch held no such interests, and there was no plan for financial benefit for the investors. The defendant also comingled investor funds with personal assets and spent substantial amounts on personal expenses without disclosure or permission. The total invested by the five individuals was $786,000, with $936,000 invested across all her projects, none of which was returned or yielded any profit.In May 2019, the State charged the defendant in the Cumberland County Unified Criminal Docket with theft by deception and securities fraud. Before trial, the court ruled that evidence of a 2012 indictment for similar conduct could be used only if the defendant claimed ignorance about the misuse of investor funds. The defendant waived her right to a jury trial on the securities fraud charge, which was tried by the judge, while the theft charge went to a jury. The jury convicted her of theft by deception; the judge found her guilty of securities fraud. The court denied her post-trial motions and imposed concurrent sentences, with partial suspension.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. The Court held that sufficient evidence supported both convictions, as the record demonstrated deception, material misrepresentations, and misuse of funds. The Court found that arguments regarding hearsay were waived for lack of specific identification and that, regardless, the challenged evidence was properly admitted. It also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion regarding the potential use of the prior indictment. The convictions and denial of post-trial motions were affirmed. View "State of Maine v. Flynn" on Justia Law

A developer sought approval from a municipal planning board to build a new residential subdivision, proposing two access roads: one through an existing neighboring subdivision and another via a road in a neighboring town. The developer’s plan designated the road through the existing subdivision as the main entrance and the other as an emergency access. During public hearings and board review, nearby residents and their homeowners’ association raised concerns about traffic safety, particularly for pedestrians and children, on the proposed main access road. After review and site visits, the planning board approved the subdivision but imposed a condition requiring that the road through the existing subdivision be limited to emergency access, making the other road the primary entrance.The developer challenged this condition in the York County Superior Court, arguing that the planning board lacked authority to impose such a restriction, that the decision was unsupported by evidence, and that it was arbitrary and capricious. The Superior Court initially remanded the matter for additional findings, after which the planning board reaffirmed its condition, citing pedestrian and bicycle safety concerns. The Superior Court ultimately denied the developer’s appeal, upholding the planning board’s decision.On further appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the planning board’s decision directly for errors of law, abuse of discretion, or lack of substantial evidence. The Court held that the planning board had authority under the municipal ordinance to impose conditions to ensure public safety, that the condition was supported by substantial evidence including resident testimony and board observations, and that the decision was not arbitrary or capricious. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. View "Mick Land Development, Inc. v. Town of South Berwick" on Justia Law

Jesse Pelletier was charged with gross sexual assault and unlawful sexual contact after an incident at a party in March 2022. The victim alleged that while she was lying on a couch, Pelletier initiated unwanted sexual advances, despite her repeated objections and statements that she had a boyfriend and did not want to engage in sexual conduct. After the victim escaped and returned to search for her keys, Pelletier again attempted sexual contact, which she resisted. The charges required proof that the victim had not acquiesced to the sexual acts and that Pelletier was criminally negligent regarding whether she had acquiesced.The trial was held in the Hancock County Unified Criminal Docket before an Active Retired Justice. It was a jury-waived trial. Pelletier admitted that sexual acts occurred but claimed they were consensual. The trial court found, based on testimony from the victim and a mutual friend who overheard the victim objecting, that the victim had not acquiesced and that Pelletier was criminally negligent as to her acquiescence. Pelletier was convicted of gross sexual assault (Class C) and unlawful sexual contact (Class C), but found not guilty of two other, more serious charges because the court concluded the State had not proven compulsion beyond a reasonable doubt. Pelletier was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment, with part suspended, and two years of probation. He appealed the conviction.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion and other claims for obvious error. It held that the friend’s testimony about what the victim said was not hearsay, as it was not offered for the truth of the statements but to show that the victim communicated her lack of acquiescence. The Court also held there was no error in admitting the testimony, finding it relevant and not unfairly prejudicial. The Court affirmed the judgment. View "State of Maine v. Pelletier" on Justia Law