Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries
State of Maine v. Reardon
The defendant was indicted on multiple charges, including aggravated assault, domestic violence assault, and criminal threatening with a dangerous weapon. Pursuant to an agreement with the prosecution, he pleaded guilty to domestic violence assault and agreed to comply with certain conditions—such as completing a certified intervention program and undergoing a substance abuse evaluation—over a two-year deferment period. If he complied, he would be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea and plead guilty to a lesser charge; if he did not, he would be convicted as charged. During the deferment period, the defendant suffered significant physical and cognitive injuries that prevented him from fulfilling the requirements. He did not seek a modification of the deferment terms during this period.After the deferment period, the Piscataquis County Unified Criminal Docket conducted a final hearing. The court found that the defendant had not met the deferment requirements but that his failure was excusable due to his injuries. Nevertheless, the court concluded, based on contract principles, that excusable noncompliance was not sufficient to entitle the defendant to the benefits of the agreement. The court entered judgment for domestic violence assault and imposed a sentence. The defendant appealed, arguing that excusable noncompliance should have allowed him to withdraw his plea as originally contemplated.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. It did not reach the merits of the defendant’s argument. Instead, it held that under 17-A M.R.S. § 1904, appellate review is only available in deferred disposition cases when a court finds that failure to comply was inexcusable. Because the trial court found the defendant’s noncompliance was excusable, the statute barred appellate review. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "State of Maine v. Reardon" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law
Seal Cove Auto Museum v. Sanford
A charitable trust was established to preserve and display a collection of antique automobiles, with trustees authorized to manage its assets and distribute funds to a related museum. After a series of disputes following the founder’s death, the parties entered into a settlement and an amended relationship agreement in 2020 and 2021, respectively, to clarify their obligations. The amended agreement required the trust to provide at least $200,000 annually to the museum and to manage its assets in a way that reasonably protected the value of the trust’s corpus.In December 2021, the trustees committed to a $1,000,000 donation from the trust’s endowment to a different museum, paying $500,000 immediately and pledging the rest over five years. The museum challenged this action, filing a motion to enforce the settlement and amended agreement, alleging that the donation violated the trustees’ obligations by depleting the endowment. The Business and Consumer Docket held a bench trial, where it limited the scope of evidence to the specific issue of the disputed donation. After hearing testimony, the court denied the motion, concluding that the agreement gave the trustees discretion to manage trust funds so long as annual payments to the museum were met and the trust’s corpus was reasonably maintained. The court found that the value of the trust had actually increased since the agreements were made.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. It held that the agreement unambiguously referred to the entire trust, not just the endowment, and that the trial court properly limited the scope of evidence. The court further determined there was no breach, as the trust’s obligations to the museum had been met and the value of the trust was preserved. The judgment was affirmed. View "Seal Cove Auto Museum v. Sanford" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Trusts & Estates
State v. Foster
On February 7, 2025, Dustin M. Foster’s girlfriend called 9-1-1 concerned about his drug use and violent behavior. When officers from the Kennebec County Sheriff’s Office arrived, Foster appeared to be under the influence but did not require medical attention. Police arrested Foster on an outstanding warrant and, during a search incident to the arrest, found drug paraphernalia and a substantial quantity of a white substance. Foster was subsequently indicted for unlawful trafficking and possession of scheduled drugs.Before trial in the Kennebec County trial court, Foster moved for a determination that he was immune from prosecution under Maine’s Good Samaritan statute, arguing that the statute applied because his girlfriend had called 9-1-1 for suspected drug overdose assistance. The court held an evidentiary hearing, admitting the 9-1-1 recording and ambulance records, and took testimony from Foster’s girlfriend and an ambulance dispatch supervisor. The trial court found the call indicated concern about Foster’s relapse and violent behavior, not a suspected overdose. Based on the content of the call, the court concluded Foster had not met the prima facie burden required to trigger statutory immunity and denied the motion. Foster’s subsequent motions for reconsideration and further findings were denied, and he appealed.The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine reviewed the appeal. The Court clarified that the defendant must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to immunity under section 1111-B before the burden shifts to the State. Applying the “prima facie” standard, the Court found the trial court did not err in determining that Foster failed to present evidence sufficient to infer the call was for a suspected overdose. Accordingly, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine affirmed the trial court’s denial of Foster’s motion for immunity. View "State v. Foster" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law
State v. Polches
The State charged an individual with gross sexual assault of a child under twelve, based on allegations that the victim, a relative, was assaulted on two occasions during visits to the defendant’s home between May 2023 and May 2024. The victim was eight or nine years old at the time. At trial, the State presented a recording of a forensic interview with the victim and allowed her to testify remotely via Zoom, in addition to testimony from a police officer and the victim’s mother. The defendant did not present any witnesses or evidence.Prior to trial, the State successfully moved to introduce the forensic interview recording and sought permission for the victim to testify remotely under Maine law, specifically 15 M.R.S. § 1321. The defendant conceded the statutory requirements for remote testimony were satisfied but argued that the statute’s “positive identification” exception applied, and that remote testimony violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses. After an evidentiary hearing, the Washington County Unified Criminal Docket denied these challenges and permitted remote testimony. Following the jury’s guilty verdict, the defendant was sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment and lifetime supervised release, and timely appealed.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the statutory and constitutional arguments. It held that section 1321’s “positive identification” exception only applies when the State seeks to prove identity through an in-court identification by the victim. Because the State did not ask the victim to identify the defendant in court, the exception was not implicated. The Court further held that permitting remote testimony in this case did not violate the Confrontation Clause, as the procedure preserved necessary safeguards of oath, cross-examination, and witness observation. The judgment was affirmed. View "State v. Polches" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
State of Maine v. Stewart
A sixteen-year-old victim was walking from Waterville to Fairfield when she encountered Devon M. Stewart, a former schoolmate. After walking together, Stewart made inappropriate remarks, then, at a railroad trestle, unexpectedly hugged, kissed, and groped the victim. He pushed her against a railing, pulled down her pants and underwear, and subjected her to penile penetration despite her saying “no” and screaming “stop.” The victim, frightened and frozen, did not physically resist. After the assault, they continued walking until the victim separated from Stewart and called 9-1-1, later undergoing a sexual assault examination where Stewart’s DNA was found.Following the incident, Stewart was indicted in the Somerset County Unified Criminal Docket for one count of gross sexual assault (Class A). At trial, the jury heard testimony from the victim, law enforcement, and Stewart. The court admitted the 9-1-1 call, forensic evidence, and police interviews. The jury found Stewart guilty. At sentencing, the trial court imposed twenty years’ imprisonment, with all but eleven years suspended, and six years of probation, referencing aggravating and mitigating factors. Stewart appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, admission of certain evidence, and the legality of the probation period.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court found sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding of compulsion, as required for gross sexual assault, and held that Stewart had waived his objection to admission of the 9-1-1 call. The court also determined that there was no obvious error in admitting the victim’s testimony about Stewart’s prior statement regarding minors. However, the court concluded that the imposed six-year probation exceeded the statutory maximum for a Class A crime. The Court affirmed Stewart’s conviction, vacated his sentence, and remanded for resentencing in accordance with statutory limits. View "State of Maine v. Stewart" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law
Sabin v. Newcomb
A grandchild, Darby, brought suit alleging that her expectancy of inheritance from her grandfather Steven’s estate was wrongfully interfered with by his stepchildren Shawn and Cynthia, and Cynthia’s son Owen. As Steven and his wife Christine experienced cognitive decline, Shawn was granted broad authority under a power of attorney, including powers to transfer property. After Christine’s death, Shawn sold Steven’s house to Owen for far below market value, deposited the proceeds in a joint account with himself and Cynthia, and upon Steven’s death, the funds bypassed the estate and were divided between Shawn and Cynthia. Darby claimed other items, such as collectible cards and coins, were also diverted. She alleged bad faith and dishonest motives by the defendants, which deprived her of her share of the estate.Darby sued in the Franklin County Superior Court, asserting claims for tortious interference with expectancy of inheritance, constructive trust, conspiracy, and punitive damages. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The Superior Court (Mills, A.R.J.) granted the motions and dismissed the action, determining that Darby had not sufficiently alleged the nature and extent of her expectancy. Darby appealed.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the dismissal de novo and held that Darby’s complaint adequately alleged the existence, nature, and extent of her expectancy, and sufficiently pleaded facts supporting bad faith and dishonest conduct by the defendants. The Court clarified that a power of attorney cannot shield agents from liability for acts committed with dishonesty or improper motive. The Court vacated the dismissal of all counts and remanded for further proceedings, holding that Darby had stated a claim for tortious interference with an expectancy of inheritance. View "Sabin v. Newcomb" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Trusts & Estates
State of Maine v. Burns
In this case, a man in his mid-fifties was accused of unlawful sexual contact with a fourteen-year-old girl who lived in the same household with him and her mother, his then-girlfriend. The alleged incident occurred in late 2021 or early 2022, when the man intentionally touched the victim's genitals for sexual gratification. A criminal complaint was filed in January 2023, charging him with unlawful sexual contact during a period between November 18, 2021, and January 31, 2022. He pleaded not guilty.Prior to trial in the Aroostook County Unified Criminal Docket, the defendant sought to compel production of an electronic “change log” associated with the police report, arguing it was necessary for his defense. After a hearing, the trial court found that the change log would not reveal any information beyond what had already been disclosed and denied the motion. During the trial, the State was permitted to recall the victim’s mother to clarify inconsistencies in her testimony regarding when the defendant lived in her home, after a recess in which the prosecutor spoke to her privately. The defendant objected, but the court allowed the recall, limiting the testimony to clarifying the timeline. Additionally, during closing arguments, the prosecutor repeatedly used the phrase “we know” despite the court’s instruction to avoid it, leading the defendant to object multiple times. The court sustained the objections but did not declare a mistrial.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the trial court’s decisions. It held that the change log was not automatically discoverable under Maine Rule of Unified Criminal Procedure 16(a)(2) and was not material or relevant to the defense under Rule 16(c). The court further concluded that permitting the recall of the witness to clarify ambiguous testimony did not constitute an abuse of discretion. Finally, the court found that the prosecutor’s improper comments during closing did not amount to obvious error requiring a mistrial, as the trial court sustained objections and issued curative instructions. The judgment of conviction was affirmed. View "State of Maine v. Burns" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law
State of Maine v. Desrosiers
Desroisiers was stopped by police while driving a Chevrolet Trailblazer with her mother as a passenger. The vehicle lacked an inspection sticker, prompting a police sergeant to initiate a traffic stop. The vehicle was registered but not to Desroisiers, who was on pre-conviction bail requiring her to commit no criminal act. During the encounter, Desroisiers resisted requests for documentation, accused the officer of harassment, and refused to comply with commands to be handcuffed. She crossed her arms, attempted to pull away, dropped to the ground after being handcuffed, and later stuck her foot outside the cruiser door, requiring officers to push it in. Footage showed her thrashing inside the cruiser.The Aroostook County Superior Court held a jury trial and admitted relevant evidence, including body camera footage. Desroisiers moved for judgments of acquittal on the charge of refusing to submit to arrest or detention, arguing the evidence showed only passive resistance, not physical force. The court denied the motions. The jury convicted her of refusing to submit to arrest or detention by using physical force against a law enforcement officer, operating an unregistered vehicle, and violating a condition of release. Desroisiers subsequently renewed her acquittal motions, which were again denied, and she timely appealed.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. It interpreted the statutory phrase “uses physical force against a law enforcement officer” to include any muscular effort directed toward an officer’s attempt to detain, not just violent or injurious acts. The court held that Desroisiers’s crossing her arms, pulling away, and obstructing the cruiser door constituted physical force under the statute, affirming her convictions for refusing to submit to arrest and violating a condition of release. However, the court found insufficient evidence that Desroisiers was the current owner required to register the vehicle, vacating her conviction for operating an unregistered vehicle. View "State of Maine v. Desrosiers" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Berwick Solar, LLC v. Public Utilities Commission
Berwick Solar, LLC entered into an interconnection agreement with Central Maine Power Company (CMP) in March 2020 to connect its solar generation facility to CMP’s electric distribution system. The agreement estimated costs, but Berwick Solar opted not to obtain a detailed facilities study. After the project became operational in May 2021, CMP failed to issue cost reconciliation statements within the deadlines set by both the governing regulation and the agreement. CMP eventually sent a series of reconciliation statements, each seeking progressively lower amounts, but Berwick Solar disputed their timeliness and contended that CMP was required to provide further documentation for the costs.The dispute was not resolved through informal procedures, so Berwick Solar sought formal adjudication before the Maine Public Utilities Commission. After receiving testimony and briefs, the Commission dismissed Berwick Solar’s complaint, concluding that the regulation required Berwick Solar to pay the actual interconnection costs regardless of CMP’s untimely statements. The Commission also found that CMP was not obliged to provide original purchase orders or invoices, and Berwick Solar had not been prejudiced by the delay since the costs decreased over time. The Commission further declined to address Berwick Solar’s arguments about pooled overhead costs, noting those were not central to the dispute and had resulted in reduced costs for Berwick.Upon appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the Commission’s order. The Court held that CMP’s failure to issue reconciliation statements within the prescribed sixty-day period did not relieve Berwick Solar of its obligation to pay actual interconnection costs, including pooled overhead costs. CMP is not required to provide purchase orders or invoices unless requested through formal discovery. The Court also found competent evidence supporting the Commission’s finding that Berwick Solar was not prejudiced by the delay. Judgment was affirmed. View "Berwick Solar, LLC v. Public Utilities Commission" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Government & Administrative Law, Utilities Law
State of Maine v. Bradbury
In this case, a man was charged after two sisters, aged thirteen or fourteen and sixteen, reported that he engaged in various sexually inappropriate acts during the summer of 2023. The younger sister alleged that, while she was asleep at the man’s home after a family barbecue, he touched her in a sexual manner and exposed himself. The man was also accused of exposing himself and masturbating in front of both sisters by the river and showing them sexually explicit images and videos. The younger sister did not voluntarily remain at his home, was partially asleep during the incident, and did not consent to the touching. The sisters testified that they ignored his prior inappropriate behavior.The State charged the man with six offenses, including two counts of unlawful sexual touching and four counts of indecent conduct. During trial in the Piscataquis County trial court, the State disclosed sexually explicit images from the defendant’s phone late, just before the man was expected to testify. The court permitted the State to use these images for impeachment purposes if the man testified, denying his motion to exclude them as a discovery sanction. At trial’s end, the jury convicted him of unlawful sexual touching of the younger sister and two merged counts of indecent conduct but could not reach a verdict on the charge related to the older sister, which was then dismissed.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the conviction and the trial court’s handling of the late-disclosed evidence. The Court held that sufficient evidence supported the unlawful sexual touching conviction, including the lack of the younger sister’s acquiescence and the defendant’s criminal negligence regarding her lack of acquiescence. The Court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the State to use the late-disclosed evidence for impeachment only. The judgment was affirmed, except for a clerical error in the judgment and commitment, which was remanded for correction. View "State of Maine v. Bradbury" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law