Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

15 Langsford Owner LLC (15 Langsford) acquired eleven condominium units in Kennebunkport between December 2020 and June 2021. The units were previously approved as residential dwellings under the Town’s Land Use Ordinance (LUO). In April 2021, 15 Langsford began renting the units for short-term stays of less than thirty days. The Town of Kennebunkport, which did not regulate short-term rentals at that time, later contacted 15 Langsford, suggesting that the rentals violated the LUO and the Declaration of Condominium. In June 2021, the Town enacted a Short-Term Rental Ordinance (STRO) requiring licenses for short-term rentals.The Town’s code enforcement officer (CEO) denied 15 Langsford’s applications for short-term rental licenses in May 2022, reasoning that the units were being operated as a hotel or inn, which are not eligible for licenses under the STRO. 15 Langsford filed complaints in the York County Superior Court seeking review of the CEO’s decision. The Superior Court vacated the CEO’s denial, concluding that the units were “[l]egally existing residential dwelling units” eligible for licenses under the STRO.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The Court held that the CEO’s denial of the licenses was reviewable under Rule 80B of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure, as the denial involved a ministerial act rather than a discretionary one. The Court determined that 15 Langsford’s units were legally existing residential dwelling units and not hotels or inns under the LUO definitions. Therefore, 15 Langsford was entitled to the short-term rental licenses based on the undisputed facts and the terms of the STRO. View "15 Langsford Owner LLC v. Town of Kennebunkport" on Justia Law

In October 2020, Elliot Fama, employed by Sanford Contracting, was working on a project in Scarborough, Maine. After work, he and his co-worker, Robert Clarke, consumed alcohol at a hotel and a tavern. Later, in the hotel parking lot, Clarke struck Mr. Fama, causing him to fall and sustain fatal injuries. Laureen Fama, Mr. Fama’s widow, settled a workers’ compensation claim in Massachusetts for $400,000.Laureen Fama then filed a lawsuit in Cumberland County Superior Court against Bob’s LLC, which operated the tavern, and Clarke. She alleged liquor liability, wrongful death, loss of consortium, and battery. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the workers’ compensation settlement precluded the lawsuit. The Superior Court denied these motions, leading to the current appeal.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. It held that under Maine’s Workers’ Compensation Act (MWCA), Ms. Fama’s settlement barred her from suing Clarke, as the Act’s immunity provisions extend to co-employees. Consequently, Clarke was exempt from the lawsuit. The court further held that because Clarke could not be retained as a defendant, the claims against Bob’s LLC failed under the “named and retained” provisions of Maine’s Liquor Liability Act (MLLA).The court vacated the Superior Court’s order denying summary judgment and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of Bob’s LLC and Clarke. View "Fama v. Bob's LLC" on Justia Law

A group of plaintiffs, including William Clardy, Michelle Tucker, two state representatives, and a nonprofit corporation, filed a lawsuit against Maine's Senate President, Speaker of the House, and Governor. They sought to invalidate a special legislative session called by the Governor, arguing it was unconstitutional. The plaintiffs claimed the session was based on a "contrived" extraordinary occasion and that the legislative leaders ceded power to the executive branch. They sought declarations that the session and the legislation passed during it were void.The Kennebec County Superior Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court did not decide on the plaintiffs' standing but ruled that the Governor's determination of an extraordinary occasion to convene the Legislature was not subject to judicial review. Additionally, the court found that the legislative leaders were immune from suit for their actions. The plaintiffs appealed the decision.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the dismissal, but on different grounds. The court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the suit. The court found that the individual plaintiffs, as citizens and taxpayers, did not demonstrate a particularized injury distinct from the general public. The state representatives failed to show a concrete injury arising from the Governor's proclamation or the convening of the special session. Lastly, the nonprofit corporation lacked standing because its members did not have standing to sue individually. The court concluded that no plaintiff had suffered an injury sufficient to confer standing, thus affirming the lower court's dismissal of the case. View "Clardy v. Jackson" on Justia Law

The case involves Moosehead Mountain Resort, Inc. (the Resort) and the State of Maine. In 1986, the State sold a ski area, along with easements and a portion of the abutting parcel, to the Big Squaw Mountain Corporation (BSMC). The deed included restrictive covenants prohibiting timber harvesting and requiring the continued public use of the ski area. In 1995, the Resort acquired the property, including the restrictive covenants. The Resort later closed half of the ski area and harvested timber from the area, actions which the State argued violated the covenants.The Superior Court of Kennebec County granted summary judgment to the State, finding that the Resort had breached both covenants. The court ordered the Resort to pay damages for the timber harvested and to place funds into an escrow account for the repair and reopening of the ski area.The Resort appealed, arguing that the State could not enforce the covenants as it did not own a parcel that benefited from them, that the court erred in its interpretation of the public use covenant, and that the court erred in granting summary judgment because the public use covenant was unreasonable, the State failed to notify the Resort of its alleged breach, and the State was barred from enforcing the covenant by the doctrine of laches.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the State could enforce the covenants without owning a benefiting parcel, that the public use covenant required the Resort to make reasonable efforts to keep the whole ski area open for public use, and that the doctrine of laches did not apply as the Resort had not shown that the State's delay in enforcement was unreasonable or resulted in prejudice to the Resort. View "State v. Moosehead Mountain Resort, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the Town of Bar Harbor's decision to present several proposed changes to its municipal charter as separate questions to voters, rather than as a single package. The changes were recommended by a charter commission and included modifications to various areas of the town's governance. A group of voters, led by Michael Good, challenged this approach, arguing that the changes were not "minor modifications" and should have been presented as a single "revision" of the charter.The Superior Court (Hancock County, Anderson, J.) agreed with Good and nullified the changes, ruling that they were not minor modifications and should have been presented as a single revision. The court also found procedural irregularities in how the changes were developed and submitted.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court disagreed with the lower court's interpretation. The court held that the charter commission acted legally in determining that its recommendations constituted minor modifications and proposing that they be submitted to the voters in nine separate articles. The court also found that none of the claimed procedural irregularities nullified the vote. Therefore, the court vacated the lower court's judgment and remanded the case for the court to enter a judgment for the Town on Good’s complaint. View "Good v. Town of Bar Harbor" on Justia Law

In this case, a couple, Joseph R. and his wife, sought to adopt the wife's two minor children and terminate the parental rights of the children's biological father. The mother had been granted sole parental rights and responsibilities in a 2016 divorce judgment, and the biological father, who resides in Scotland, had not had contact with the children or the mother since the divorce. The couple married in 2017 and filed their petitions for adoption, change of name, and termination of parental rights in the York County Probate Court in April 2023.The York County Probate Court dismissed the couple's petitions, concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to recent legislative changes. Specifically, the court cited the enactment of 19-A M.R.S. § 1658(1-A) in 2021, which it interpreted as giving exclusive jurisdiction to the District Court in cases involving one parent's attempt to terminate another parent's parental rights to a minor child. The couple appealed this decision.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court disagreed with the lower court's interpretation of the statute. The court noted that the Probate Court has exclusive jurisdiction over petitions for adoption and termination of parental rights proceedings brought pursuant to section 9-204. The court found that the language in section 1658(1-A) does not divest the Probate Court of subject matter jurisdiction in this matter. The court further examined the legislative history of section 1658 and concluded that section 1658(1-A) applies only to termination petitions brought pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 1658 and does not divest the Probate Court of its subject matter jurisdiction over termination petitions filed in conjunction with adoption proceedings under 18-C M.R.S. § 9-103. Therefore, the court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Adoption by Joseph R." on Justia Law

The case revolves around the estate of Linda C. Giguere, who passed away in 2021. Her will, dated 2013, nominated her husband, William Giguere, as the personal representative and established a trust for his benefit if she predeceased him. The will also stated that upon William's death, the remaining balance would be paid to his children. However, the will did not provide for the disposition of Linda’s residuary estate if William predeceased her, which he did in 2015. Linda did not execute a new will after William’s death. The will also explicitly stated that Linda's estranged daughter, Hilary Barlow, was to receive nothing.In the Cumberland County Probate Court, Hilary Barlow filed an application for the informal appointment of a personal representative of her mother’s estate. The court appointed Hilary as personal representative. Later, Eric and Mark Giguere, William's sons, filed petitions for the formal probate of the will and appointment of a personal representative. The court removed Hilary as personal representative and appointed Attorney LeBlanc as successor personal representative. Attorney LeBlanc filed a petition for instructions, asserting that the 2013 will did not dispose of Linda’s estate because it made no provision for the disposition of the residuary estate in the event that William predeceased Linda.The Probate Court rejected the request to reform the 2013 will to name Eric and Mark as residuary devisees, stating that the evidence was not clear and convincing. The court concluded that since the 2013 will did not fully dispose of Linda’s estate, the residuary estate passed by intestate succession to Hilary.On appeal to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, Eric and Mark argued that the Probate Court’s finding was against the preponderance of the believable evidence. They contended that the absence of a provision disposing of the residuary estate must have been a scrivener's error. However, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the Probate Court’s judgment, stating that Eric and Mark failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Linda intended that they be the residuary devisees of her estate if William predeceased Linda. The court also concluded that the 2013 will did not provide for the disposition of Linda’s residuary estate in the event she survived William, and thus those assets passed by way of intestate succession to Hilary. View "Estate of Giguere" on Justia Law

Tammy and James Rutledge filed a lawsuit against Pamela Menard and Randall Nappi, seeking to recover personal property. The Rutledges followed the instructions on Form CV-218, which was available on the Maine Judicial Branch's website, to serve the defendants. This form was created during the COVID-19 pandemic and instructed plaintiffs to prepare for a telephonic status conference as the first court event. However, by the time the Rutledges filed their lawsuit, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court had rescinded most of the pandemic management orders, and court proceedings had returned to an in-person format.The District Court (Bridgton, Malia, J.) dismissed the Rutledges' complaint with prejudice due to their failure to appear in person for a hearing. The Rutledges had mistakenly believed that the initial court proceeding would be a telephonic status conference, as per the instructions on Form CV-218. They appealed the decision, arguing that the court erred in dismissing their case with prejudice and denying their post-judgment motion to reopen the case or amend the judgment to a dismissal without prejudice.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court found that the District Court did not err in finding that the Rutledges failed to appear. However, it held that the dismissal with prejudice was too drastic a sanction given the circumstances. The court noted that the Judicial Branch's website continued to direct parties to Form CV-218, which no longer reflected current court practices, contributing to the Rutledges' mistaken belief. The court also noted that the Rutledges' nonappearance was neither deliberate nor the result of misconduct, and they made a sustained effort to remedy their error. The court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the District Court for entry of a judgment of dismissal without prejudice. View "Rutledge v. Menard" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Peter M. Beckerman and Ricky and Monica Conant over a deeded right-of-way over the Conants' driveway. The parties own abutting waterfront properties in Rome, Maine. Beckerman's property, the Conant property, and a third property, formerly known as the Bruce Pooler lot, are connected to South Crane Lane by a horseshoe-shaped driveway that runs across all three properties. Beckerman has a deeded right-of-way over the Conants' driveway to access South Crane Lane.Previously, Beckerman had filed an action against the Poolers, previous owners of the other two lots, to establish the location of the common boundaries of the three lots. The parties settled the action at mediation, resulting in a consent order in 2002 that established the current boundaries of the three properties. As part of the settlement, Beckerman secured a right-of-way over the driveway on the Bruce Pooler lot in order to access South Crane Lane.In 2012, Beckerman filed a post-judgment motion for contempt, alleging that the Conants were in contempt of the 2002 consent judgment by impeding his use of the right-of-way over the Conant lot. The court denied Beckerman’s motion for contempt because the language of the consent order was ambiguous. Beckerman appealed and the court affirmed the denial of the contempt but vacated the portion of the court’s determination regarding whether Beckerman had an easement by deed.On remand, after a three-day bench trial, the court entered a judgment declaring that Beckerman has a deeded right-of-way over the Conants’ driveway and enjoining the Conants from interfering with that right-of-way. The Conants appealed the judgment.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment. The court found that the language of the 2016 judgment was clear and specific, and the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in finding the Conants in contempt. The court also found that the Superior Court did not err in concluding that Beckerman may use the entire paved driveway as needed to access his property. The court further held that the doctrine of claim preclusion did not apply in this instance as there was no valid final judgment entered with respect to Beckerman’s August 2016 motion for contempt. Lastly, the court held that the Superior Court was within its discretion to award Beckerman attorney fees under M.R. Civ. P. 66(d)(3)(C). View "Beckerman v. Conant" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over an easement, a right to cross or otherwise use someone else's land for a specified purpose. The plaintiffs, Kinderhaus North LLC, Prime Properties ME LLC, and Karen and Brian Fullerton (collectively, the Fullertons), own four lots in a subdivision and have an expressly deeded easement across a lot owned by the defendants, Karl and Stephanie Nicolas. The Fullertons claimed that the Nicolases had obstructed their easement by installing a granite lamp post and several trees. The Fullertons removed some of these trees, leading to a dispute over whether they had the right to do so and whether they had committed a timber trespass by cutting down the trees.The Business and Consumer Docket found that the Fullertons had an expressly deeded easement across the Nicolases' property, but that the easement was ambiguous as to its scope and purpose. The court found that the Fullertons did not have an unlimited right to use the full length and width of the easement as a driveway, and that the trees and lamp post did not prevent vehicle or pedestrian passage within the easement. The court also found that Karen Fullerton had committed a timber trespass by intentionally cutting down four trees within the easement, and awarded the Nicolases damages for this trespass. The court further found that Karen Fullerton had committed a common law trespass by entering the Nicolases' property without their consent, and awarded nominal and punitive damages for this trespass. The court granted summary judgment for the Nicolases on the Fullertons' slander of title and abuse of process claims.The Fullertons appealed, and the Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated the lower court's judgment on several issues and remanded for further findings. The court held that the Fullertons had the right to remove obstacles within their easement, and that Karen Fullerton was therefore an "owner" within the meaning of the timber trespass statute. The court also held that punitive damages may be awarded in common law trespass cases where nominal damages are awarded, but remanded for the lower court to make further findings under the guidelines established by the U.S. Supreme Court for determining punitive damages. The court affirmed the lower court's judgment in all other respects. View "Kinderhaus North LLC v. Nicols" on Justia Law