Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After almost five years of litigation, the probate court issued its final judgment in the formal testate proceeding concerning the estate of Mildred D. MacComb. James Richman appealed. The Supreme Judicial Court rejected Richman’s brief and his amended brief and dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution. Richman asked that the Court reconsider the rejection of his amended brief and the dismissal of his appeal. The Supreme Judicial Court denied the motion for reconsideration, as Richman failed to comply with the Maine Rules of Appellate Procedure and a direct order from the Court. View "In re Estate of MacComb" on Justia Law

Bank of America brought this foreclosure action against Marianne Gregor. Homeward Residential, Inc. was later substituted as plaintiff. The district court entered judgment for Gregor, determining that Homeward Residential had not established that it had standing to foreclose on the mortgage. In its judgment, the court stated that “[t]he parties may relitigate issues discussed herein in a future action.” The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that the district court (1) correctly determined that Homeward Residential lacked standing to pursue the foreclosure claim; but (2) erred when it made findings and entered judgment for Gregor rather than dismissing the action for lack of standing. Remanded for an entry of a dismissal without prejudice. View "Homeward Residential, Inc. v. Gregor" on Justia Law

The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiff’s claims for wrongful use of civil proceedings and abuse of process. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in concluding that Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case for each element of both causes of action. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed but noted that the trial court would have been well within its discretion to have granted a summary judgment in favor of Defendant based solely on Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the requirements of Me. R. Civ. P. 56(h), or to have denied summary judgment altogether based on the manner in which both parties availed themselves of the summary judgment process. View "First Tracks Invs., LLC v. Murray, Plumb & Murray" on Justia Law

The dispute in this case involved the continuing existence, scope, and extent of easements over two roads leading to the beach or ocean in Kennebunk. In the Supreme Court’s opinion issued on the first appeal, the trial court’s entry of summary judgment was vacated in part and remanded for consideration of issues the court had not reached related to the continued existence or abandonment of the easements. On remanded, instead of presenting evidence or testimony for trial, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Helen Rose and Nathaniel Merrill on their claim for declaratory judgment. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that because there were several genuine issues of material fact in dispute in this case, summary judgment was not appropriate. Remanded. View "Rose v. Parsons" on Justia Law

A New Jersey court entered a default judgment against Gawayne Dawson and for Safety Insurance Group. Safety Insurance subsequently sought enforcement of the judgment in Maine. The district court entered the New Jersey judgment and issued a notice of registration of foreign order. The court then issued a writ of execution. Safety Insurance moved to amend the writ to include post-judgment interest. The district court concluded that the post-judgment interest rate of New Jersey, rather than Maine, should apply to the foreign judgment. Before the court could finalize the writ, Safety Insurance brought this appeal. The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed the appeal as interlocutory and remanded so that the court may enter a final judgment after receiving the appropriate documentation. View "Safety Ins. Group v. Dawson" on Justia Law

Roland Gerrish created a trust consisting of certain property. The trust instrument provided that Julie and Shirley Gauthier would be the remainder beneficiaries upon Roland’s death. When Roland died, Shirley and Roland’s widow, Jacqueline, disputed the maintenance of property. Shirley filed a complaint for equitable partition against Jacqueline and the Gerrish Corporation and then requested an entry of default. The court issued default judgment and denied Jacqueline’s and the Corporation’s motion to join Julie as a necessary party. The superior court entered an order denying the motions to set aside the default and to join Julie, concluding that all necessary parties were joined, and granted the relief requested by Shirley. Jacqueline, the Corporation, and Julie appealed. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that the court erred in concluding that all necessary parties were joined and in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing before issuing the default judgment. Remanded. View "Gauthier v. Gerrish" on Justia Law

When Mason Station, LLC failed to pay assessed property taxes on multiple properties in the Town of Wiscasset, the Town filed a complaint against Mason Station for taxes owed on those properties and on certain personal property. Mason Station failed to timely file an answer, and the clerk entered a default and default judgment against Mason Station. Nearly eighteen months after the judgment was entered, Mason Station moved to set aside the default and for relief from default judgment, alleging that several days before the entry of the default judgment in favor of the Town, the Town had obtained ownership of the properties for which taxes were owed through automatic foreclosure and that the foreclosed properties had an assessed value in excess of the total amount owed on the judgment. The trial court declined to grant Mason Station relief. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the denial of the motions to set aside default and for relief from judgment, as Mason Station offered no good excuse for failing to file a timely answer to the Town’s complaint and failed to perform its duty to take legal steps to protect its own interests in the original litigation. View "Town of Wiscasset v. Mason Station, LLC" on Justia Law

All parties in this case were practicing Maine attorneys or law firms that asserted various theories of entitlement to all or part of a $1.24 million attorney fee generated in a civil judgment in another matter. In both matters, the superior court denied the motion of Daniel G. Lilley and Daniel G. Lilley Law Offices, P.A. to consolidate the matters for trial and proceeded to dispose of the cases through summary judgment on some claims and dismissal or severance of others. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments except for a single claim, holding that, with one exception, the superior court erred in denying the motion to consolidate the claims. Remanded. View "Tucker v. Lilley" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a construction company, filed a five-count complaint in superior court against Defendants, alleging breach of contract, quantum meruit, unjust enrichment, and violation of the Prompt Payment Act. In the fifth count of the complaint, Plaintiff sought enforcement of a mechanic’s lien it recorded against Defendants’ property. Plaintiff then moved for summary judgment on its claims for breach of contract, violation of the Prompt Payment Act, and enforcement of the mechanic’s lien. The superior court granted summary judgment for Plaintiff on those three counts but made no mention of Plaintiff’s quantum meruit or unjust enrichment claims. Defendants appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as interlocutory, as there was no final judgment on any of Plaintiff’s causes of action where two of Plaintiff’s claims were still pending. View "Warren Constr. Group, LLC v. Reis" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Defendant, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, conversion, and related claims. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss, but the copy she filed had a photocopied rather than an original signature. By rule, Plaintiff was deemed to have waived all objections to the motion, and Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint was granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint because Plaintiff’s tendered objection did not have legal effect, and therefore, the trial court was authorized to grant Defendant’s motion to dismiss without reaching the merits of the motion. View "Petit v. Lumb" on Justia Law