Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In Maine, former President Donald J. Trump submitted a petition for his candidacy for the Republican Party’s presidential primary. Three challengers subsequently claimed that Trump was disqualified from running because he had previously sworn to support the U.S. Constitution as President and then engaged in insurrection, which they argued precluded him from holding office under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Secretary of State held a hearing and decided that Trump was not qualified to appear on the ballot. Trump appealed this decision to the Superior Court, which remanded the matter back to the Secretary of State for a new ruling after the Supreme Court reaches a decision in a related case. The Secretary of State and the three challengers appealed to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, which dismissed the appeal as interlocutory and not justiciable, holding that it was not from a final judgment. The court reasoned that uncertainties regarding issues of federal law pervaded the proceedings and were likely to require additional proceedings. The court deemed that an immediate review would likely result in an advisory opinion and could cause additional delay that the existing interlocutory order might avoid. View "Trump v. Secretary of State" on Justia Law

In the case before the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, the dispute involved U.S. Bank, N.A. (the Bank) and Charles D. Finch. The Bank had a mortgage on Finch's property due to a loan he had taken out. When Finch defaulted on the loan, the Bank initiated foreclosure proceedings. However, the Superior Court ruled in favor of Finch, finding that the Bank's notice of default did not comply with the requirements of the Maine foreclosure statute, specifically 14 M.R.S. § 6111. Following this, Finch asked the court to rule that the Bank's mortgage was unenforceable and to order the Bank to discharge the mortgage. The court agreed with Finch, citing the Maine Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Pushard v. Bank of America.The Bank appealed this decision, arguing that the Pushard decision should be overturned, and that even if it cannot foreclose on the property, it should not be required to discharge the mortgage.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court, revisiting its decision in Pushard, determined that a lender cannot accelerate a loan balance or commence a foreclosure action without having the statutory and contractual right to do so. This effectively overruled the holding in Pushard that a lender could accelerate the note balance by filing a foreclosure action, even if they lacked the statutory right to do so.The court found that when a lender fails to prove it has issued a valid notice of default or that the borrower breached the contract, the parties are returned to the positions they held before the filing of the action. Therefore, a subsequent foreclosure action based on a different notice of default and a different allegation of default would assert a different claim and would not be barred.The court ultimately vacated the judgment requiring the Bank to discharge the mortgage and remanded the case for entry of a judgment in the Bank's favor on Finch's complaint. The judgment dismissing the Bank's unjust enrichment counterclaim was affirmed. The court concluded that while a lender must strictly comply with the statutory notice requirements in a foreclosure action, a borrower is not automatically entitled to a "free house" if the lender makes a mistake in the notice of default. View "Finch v. U.S. Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

The case involves Billie S., who appealed from a judgment by the District Court (Bangor, Roberts, J.) which terminated her parental rights to her children pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2) (2023). The mother argued that the judgment did not provide sufficient independent findings of fact to support the termination of her parental rights. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court agreed with the mother's contention.The trial court based its decision on evidence from various sources including the Department of Health and Human Services caseworker's testimony, guardian ad litem reports, and the petitions for termination. However, the judgment simply incorporated the entirety of these sources as its "specific findings" instead of providing an independent articulation of the specific facts that formed the basis of the court’s ultimate findings regarding the mother’s parental unfitness and the best interests of the children.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court held that these were not the “specific findings of fact” required by Rule 52(a) or prior decisions. The court could not infer factual findings in a termination case when the adequacy of the findings was the issue at hand. As a result, the court vacated the judgment due to its lack of adequate findings that would sufficiently inform the mother and the court of the reasoning behind the decision. The case was remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "In re Children of Billie S." on Justia Law

In this case, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court was called to determine issues regarding the distribution of assets under a will and trust, and personal jurisdiction. The case arose from a dispute between two brothers, John R. Luongo and Michael A. Luongo Jr., regarding their mother's estate and a trust she established. The Superior Court had previously divided the property of the estate between the brothers and dismissed two counts of John's complaint, arguing that it could not exercise personal jurisdiction over Michael.Upon review, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court determined that the Superior Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to distribute the assets under the will and the related trust. The authority to resolve disputes over the distribution of assets under a will rests solely with the Probate Court. Therefore, the court vacated the lower court's order distributing the assets of the estate.Regarding personal jurisdiction, the court found that the Superior Court correctly concluded that it did not have personal jurisdiction over Michael for claims related to the trust. This was due to the fact that the trust was established as a Massachusetts trust with its principal place of administration in Massachusetts and the process to transfer the trust’s administration to Maine was not completed by either trustee.The court affirmed the dismissal of Counts 1 and 3 of John’s complaint, related to the trust, but vacated the judgment in all other respects, including Michael’s counterclaim for conversion. The case was remanded for dismissal of the remaining counts of John’s complaint and Michael’s counterclaim for conversion. View "Luongo v. Luongo" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court affirming the decision of the Belfast Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) to issue five permits to Nordic Aquafarms in connection with a proposed land-based salmon aquaculture preoject, holding that the ZBA erred as a matter of law in determining that Upstream Watch did not have standing to appeal.In dismissing the appeal, the ZBA determined that Upstream, a not-for-profit corporation dedicated to the restoration of Maine mid-coast rivers and streams, had not demonstrated a particularized injury sufficient to establish standing. The superior court dismissed Upstream's complaint for judicial review, ruling that the ZBA correctly found that Upstream had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies because it did not file a cognizable appeal with the ZBA. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment below and remanded the case, holding that, as a matter of law, the administrative record sufficiently demonstrated that Upstream had standing to appeal to the ZBA. View "Upstream Watch v. City of Belfast" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court dismissing Appellant's complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction over Defendant, holding that Maine had personal jurisdiction over Defendant in this case.Plaintiff was a Delaware limited liability company with its principal place of business in Maine. Defendant was a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in California. Plaintiff brought this action asserting a claim of tortious interference with contractual and advantageous economic relations against Defendant. The district court dismissed the complaint on the ground that Maine lacked jurisdiction over Defendant. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment below, holding that all of the due process requirements were met, and therefore, the trial court had specific personal jurisdiction over Defendant. View "Premier Diagnostics v. Invitae Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed this appeal from an order entered in the business and consumer document granting a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint seeking to enforce a prior judgment awarding them damages for their claims against Defendants, holding that the appeal was interlocutory.Plaintiffs recorded writs of execution against Defendants but did not receive payment for the final judgment. Plaintiffs then filed a complaint to commence the enforcement action. Some of the defendants filed a motion to dismiss several counts, which the court granted. The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appeal was interlocutory and that no exception to the final judgment rule applied. View "Maples v. Compass Harbor Village Condominium Ass'n" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court in favor of John Bump on Wells Fargo Bank's foreclosure complaint, holding that the court did not err by concluding that a 2015 order dismissing without prejudice Wells Fargo's earlier action seeking foreclosure on the same mortgage did not vacate the final judgment in Bump's favor that had been entered in 2013 in that same case.Wells Fargo filed a foreclosure action in the district court in 2009. After a bench trial in 2013, the court entered judgment on the merits in favor of Bump. In 2015, the court granted Wells Fargo's motion to dismiss the 2009 action without prejudice. In 2016, Wells Fargo filed a new action to foreclose on the same mortgage. In 2020, the court entered judgment in favor of Bump, stating that it took notice of the 2013 final judgment and concluding that the 2015 order of dismissal without prejudice did not operate to vacate that judgment. The court then determined that Wells Fargo's entire claim was barred by res judicial given the 2013 judgment. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) properly concluded that the preclusive effect of the 2013 judgment barred the present action; and (2) did not abuse its discretion in taking judicial notice of the prior judgment. View "Wells Fargo Bank v. Bump" on Justia Law

In this challenge to the superior court's judgment on a petition for judicial review challenging a decision of the Secretary of State the Supreme Judicial Court held that execution of the judgment was automatically stayed on appeal.The superior court vacated the Secretary of State's determination that insufficient signatures had been collective to place on the November 2020 ballot a people's veto of An Act to Implement Ranked-choice Voting for Presidential Primary and General Elections in Maine. Appellants moved to stay execution of the judgment pending their appeals to the Supreme Judicial Court. The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed both motions to stay as moot, holding that execution of the judgment was automatically stayed upon appeal. View "Jones v. Secretary of State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed as moot this appeal from the decision of the superior court dismissing Appellant's petition against the Maine Department of Corrections for failure to serve the Department pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 5, 11003(1), holding that events in the superior court had overtaken this appeal, rendering it moot.After Appellant filed this action, the trial court, treating the action as a petition for review of agency action, issued Appellant an order requiring him to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed for failure to serve the Department. The court ultimately dismissed the petition for insufficient service of process. After Appellant's appeal was docketed, Appellant filed a motion asserting that the Department had acknowledged receipt of process. The court then negated its dismissal of Appellant's action. Therefore, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as moot. View "Paquette v. Department of Corrections" on Justia Law