Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of divorce, defaulting Husband, holding that the district court did not err in determining that service by publication was adequate.When Wife filed a complaint for protection from abuse against Husband, Husband fled to Florida in order to evade service of process. Two months later, Wife prepared a complaint for divorce from Husband, but neither she nor the sheriff’s office was able to find him to serve him with the divorce complaint. The district court granted a motion for service of the divorce complaint by alternate means, allowing Wife to effect service by publishing notice of the complaint in the Lewiston Sun Journal. When Father failed to appear at the divorce hearing, the district court entered a judgment of divorce defaulting Husband. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) Me. R. Civ. P. 4 did not impose a requirement that a copy of the order granting alternate service be personally delivered to Husband; and (2) the district court’s decision not to require Wife to send an email to Husband’s possible email address or notify Husband’s attorney of the order for service by publication did not result in a failure of due process. View "Schulz v. Doeppe" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment entered by the district court denying Father’s Me. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for relief from judgment after the court granted Mother’s motion to modify a parental rights and responsibilities order regarding the parties’ son. On appeal, Father argued that the court erred in denying his motion because (1) after another state assumed jurisdiction over the child custody matter, Maine necessarily lost jurisdiction over that matter; and (2) the court erred by not allowing him to present facts and legal arguments to the court before a decision on jurisdiction was made. The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed, holding (1) Maine maintained exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the child custody matter pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 19-A, 1746(1); and (2) the court acted within the confines of section 1740(2), and because Father on two occasions had already presented facts and legal arguments regarding jurisdiction, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Father a third opportunity to address the matter. View "Fitzpatrick v. McCrary" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed this appeal from a partial summary judgment entered by the superior court in favor of Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC and M&T Mortgage Corporation as interlocutory, holding that the judgment that Kittery Point Partners, LLC (KPP) appealed from was not a final judgment.KPP filed a complaint against Bayview and M&T seeking a declaratory judgment that a promissory note and the mortgage securing it were invalid. The superior court ordered entry of a partial summary judgment in favor of Bayview and M&T. The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed KPP’s appeal from this order, holding that the court was unable to determine from the superior court’s order whether the facts of this case constituted such an unusual circumstances that the merits of an interlocutory appeal should be considered before all pending claims were resolved. View "Kittery Point Partners, LLC v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order of the superior court, which vacated the district court’s order denying Mark Walker’s motion to set aside the default judgment in this small claims case. Because Walker appealed from the district court’s exercise of discretion in denying his motion to set aside the default, the superior court’s authority was purely on questions of law. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the superior court made certain factual findings that exceeded its authority and vacated the district court’s judgment based on facts it found independently, and therefore, the superior court exceeded its authority. The court remanded the case to the superior court with instructions to determine whether the district court abused its discretion in adjudicating the motion to set aside the default without a hearing. View "Taylor v. Walker" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed Defendant’s appeal from a judgment of the district court adopting the order of a family law magistrate granting Mother’s motion to modify a child support order included in the divorce judgment between Burdin and Anthony Kline. The child support order did not order Kline to pay child support. Burdin later filed a motion to modify the child support provisions of the divorce judgment, seeking an order requiring Kline to pay child support calculated pursuant to the child support guidelines. A magistrate granted Burdin’s motion. Kline appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and remanded the case because there is no right of direct appeal from a magistrate’s order. On remand, the district court treated Kline’s appeal as a Me. R. Civ. P. 118(a) objection to the magistrate’s order and adopted that order as the court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 118(a)(2). Kline appealed from the court’s adoption of the magistrate’s order. The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed the appeal because Kline failed to file a timely objection to the magistrate’s order as required by Rule 118, therefore waiving both his right to contest it in district court and to appeal. View "Kline v. Burdin" on Justia Law

Father lived the child and her mother, outside of Maine, until 2008, when the child was about six months old. After that time, he maintained regular contact with the child, who resided primarily in New York, but was never her primary caregiver. In 2016 Mother moved to Maine with the child. Father, who is incarcerated in Massachusetts, did not oppose the move. While he was incarcerated the child asked a neighbor for help and the Maine Department of Health and Human Services commenced a child protection proceeding. Father made no effort to take responsibility. The Department obtained a preliminary protection order, 22 M.R.S. 4032-4036, and placed the child in foster care after hospitalization for psychiatric care. Father was served with notice and provided with appointed counsel, who moved to dismiss the petition for lack of personal jurisdiction because Father is not a Maine resident, has never traveled to Maine,and otherwise lacked sufficient minimum contacts with Maine. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the court’s rejection of that motion. The court was not required to have jurisdiction over Father to have authority to issue a jeopardy order to protect the child. View "In re Emma B." on Justia Law

Parents Theresa Allocca and Timothy Allen Davison, filed this action in their individual capacities, and Davison also filed as personal representative of the Estate of Timothy "Asti" Davison. Asti was fatally shot while operating a vehicle that an assailant, operating another vehicle, had forced onto a median on an interstate highway. The Parents sought uninsured motorist (UM) benefits based on several automobile insurance policies issued by defendants York Insurance Company of Maine, Allstate Insurance Company, and Horace Mann Teachers Insurance Company. The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurers, concluding that neither any of the policies nor Maine’s UM statute provided coverage for the loss associated with Asti’s death. The Maine Supreme Court affirmed: "[a]lthough the conduct of the person who killed Asti was indisputably deliberate and not accidental, there is no evidence in the record that it was foreseeable to Asti himself, and so, based on that approach, his death would be viewed as 'accidental.' ... describing an intentional act, such as an intentional killing, as an 'accident' stretches the plain meaning of that word too far." Without addressing the superior court’s conclusion that the UM coverage in the policies was not applicable because the loss did not arise from the "use" of a motor vehicle, the Supreme Court concluded as a matter of law that Asti’s death was not caused by an "accident." View "Allocca. v. York Insurance Company of Maine" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court dismissing Plaintiffs’ constitutional and statutory claims against the Commissioner of the Department of Health and Human Services and two Department employees. Plaintiffs alleged the same facts in an earlier action filed in federal court arising out of the same allegedly wrongful acts. The federal court dismissed all claims against the Commission for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and dismissed the claims against one of the employees for Plaintiffs’ failure timely to serve her. Approximately one year later, Plaintiffs filed this action. The superior court dismissed all of Plaintiffs’ claims, concluding that the claims against all three defendants were barred by the claim preclusion component of the doctrine of res judicata. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the superior court did not err by dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims against the two employees on claim preclusion grounds because the employees had a sufficiently close relationship to the Commissioner to satisfy the requirement of claim preclusion of “sufficient identically between the parties in the two actions.” View "Estate of Paul F. Treworgy v. Commissioner, Department of Health & Human Services" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the trial court denying Appellant’s petition for postconviction relief on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant was found guilty of gross sexual assault, assault, and tampering with a victim. The Supreme Court affirmed on appeal. Appellant then filed a petition for postconviction review, arguing in part that he was deprived of the effective assistance of trial counsel because trial counsel opened the door to damaging evidence or failed to object to certain testimony elicited on cross-examination. The trial court denied the petition. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the matter, holding that, contrary to the trial court’s conclusion, Appellant did not waive his challenge to counsel’s effectiveness in responding to the testimony of a specific witness at trial. View "Salley v. State" on Justia Law

In 2004, Michael Bailey began to receive partial incapacity benefits stemming from a workplace injury. In 2007, a hearing officer found that Bailey had reached maximum medical improvement (MMI) and that he had sustained an injury that resulted in a permanent impairment level of thirty-two percent. In 2013, the City of Lewiston filed a petition seeking review of the level of Bailey’s incapacity and a petition seeking to determine the extent of his permanent impairment. The hearing officer concluded that there was a change of circumstances warranting a new permanent impairment finding and reduced Bailey’s permanent impairment level to zero percent. The decree thus terminated Bailey’s entitlement to further compensation. The Workers’ Compensation Board Appellate Division vacated the hearing officer’s decree, ruling that the 2007 determination of permanent impairment as of the date of MMI was final, and therefore, the doctrine of res judicata barred relitigation of that issue. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Appellate Division did not err in concluding that relitigation of Bailey’s permanent impairment level was barred by res judicata principles. View "Bailey v. City of Lewiston" on Justia Law