Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Rebecca Adeyanju, a White woman, was employed by Foot and Ankle Associates of Maine, P.A. as a medical assistant and radiology technician since 2012. In 2018, she married a Black man from Nigeria. In August 2019, Adeyanju missed three consecutive workdays to assist her husband, who was being sought by ICE agents. She informed her employer of her absences via text messages. Upon returning to work, she was terminated for "job abandonment" due to her three-day absence.The Superior Court (Cumberland County) granted summary judgment in favor of Foot and Ankle Associates, concluding that Adeyanju failed to show sufficient evidence that her termination was motivated by discriminatory animus or that the stated reason for her termination was pretextual. Adeyanju appealed the decision.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case de novo. The court found that the summary judgment record, viewed in the light most favorable to Adeyanju, revealed genuine issues of material fact. These included inconsistencies in the employer's enforcement of its attendance policy, differential treatment of employees with similar absences, and potential racial animus linked to the involvement of ICE. The court concluded that these issues warranted a trial to determine whether the termination was indeed motivated by discriminatory animus or if the employer's stated reason was pretextual.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated the summary judgment and remanded the case for trial, allowing Adeyanju to present her claims of employment discrimination under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. View "Adeyanju v. Foot and Ankle Associates of Maine, P.A." on Justia Law

Wade T. Hamilton, a pediatric cardiologist, recommended a patient for a cardiac MRI scan but warned her that due to her COVID-19 vaccination, which he claimed included "magnets and heavy metals", it would be unsafe for her to enter an MRI machine. The patient's mother reported Hamilton's statements to the nurse practitioner who had referred the patient to Hamilton, leading to a report being filed against Hamilton with the Board of Licensure in Medicine. The Board, in response, opened a complaint proceeding and demanded that Hamilton undergo a neuropsychological evaluation.Hamilton challenged the Board's order in the Superior Court, arguing that the Board had overstepped its authority and violated his rights to due process and free speech. However, the Superior Court denied his petition and ruled in favor of the Board. Shortly before this decision, Hamilton's medical license in Maine expired and he did not renew it.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court dismissed Hamilton's appeal as nonjusticiable, stating that there had been no final agency action and that the challenged order was moot because Hamilton had allowed his medical license to lapse. The court also noted that Hamilton's challenge to the order directing the evaluation was fully reviewable at the conclusion of the complaint proceedings, making his petition premature. Furthermore, since Hamilton was no longer licensed in Maine, the Board no longer had authority to pursue his evaluation. The court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the Superior Court for dismissal of the petition for judicial review as nonjusticiable. View "Hamilton v. Board of Licensure in Medicine" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over an employer's vicarious liability under the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA) for an employee's discriminatory behavior towards a customer. The plaintiffs, Tiffany Vargas and Erika Acevedo, alleged that they were subjected to racial discrimination by an employee of Riverbend Management, LLC, at a McDonald's restaurant owned and operated by Riverbend. The employee, Andrew Mosley, used a racial slur against Vargas and Acevedo.The case was initially filed with the Maine Human Rights Commission, which issued a right-to-sue letter, allowing the plaintiffs to commence an action in the Superior Court. Riverbend filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it was not vicariously liable for the race discrimination committed by its employee. The court partially granted the motion, entering judgment in favor of Riverbend on the gender discrimination claim but denied summary judgment on the race-discrimination claim.After a bench trial, the court found that while Mosley violated the MHRA when he used a racial slur against Vargas and Acevedo, Riverbend was not vicariously liable for Mosley’s actions. The court relied on both the Restatement (Second) of Agency and the Restatement (Third) of Agency in reaching its conclusion. Vargas and Acevedo appealed this decision.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court's judgment. The court applied the Third Restatement's standard for determining an employer’s vicarious liability under the MHRA for an employee’s act of discrimination against a customer. The court found that Mosley's discriminatory act reflected an independent course of conduct "not actuated by a purpose to serve" Riverbend, and therefore, Riverbend was not vicariously liable for Mosley’s conduct. View "Vargas v. Riverben Management LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of conviction entered by the trial court for attempted murder and other crimes with respect to Defendant's contended errors but vacated Defendant's sentences with respect to domestic violence assault and domestic violence terrorizing, holding that those sentences exceeded the maximum allowable under Me. Rev. Stat. 17-A, 1604(1)(D).On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a discovery sanction under M.R.U. Crim. P. 16(e) and that the jury venire was not drawn from a fair cross-section of the community. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the convictions but vacated the sentences in part, holding (1) the trial court's discovery sanction constituted a fundamentally fair balance between the parties' competing interests; (2) Defendant did not sufficiently preserve or present a sufficient record for the Supreme Court to reach Defendant's second contention; and (3) the trial court erred by entering a one-year sentence for Defendant's convictions for domestic violence assault and domestic violence, both class D misdemeanors. View "State v. Page" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the trial court denying Petitioner's petition for post-conviction review (PCR) arguing that her trial counsel provided ineffective assistance, holding that Petitioner's conviction of domestic violence assault against her daughter must be vacated.In her PCR petition, Petitioner argued that trial counsel's representation was ineffective by opening the door during opening statements to prejudicial evidence about her parenting practices and because he did not object to prosecutorial error at trial. The PCR denied relief. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment below, holding that trial counsel's decision to open the door to evidence regarding Petitioner's parenting practices and his failure to object at trial to the prosecutorial error made his conviction unreliable and unworthy of confidence. View "Pratt v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of two counts of aggravated trafficking of scheduled drugs and one count of unlawful trafficking in scheduled drugs and finding that $1,500 was subject to criminal forfeiture, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) Defendant's claim that his right to a speedy trial was violation under the Maine Constitution failed because he did not adequately assert his right, and his speedy trial claim under the United States Constitution failed under obvious error review; (2) Defendant's claim under the Maine Constitution that evidence obtained pursuant to the execution of a search warrant was inadmissible was unpreserved, and his claim under the United States Constitution that the warrants were not supported by probable cause failed; and (3) Defendant's last argument on appeal was unavailing. View "State v. Norris" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction on charges of domestic violence aggravated assault and domestic violence assault and the trial court's finding of guilty on a charge of violating a condition of release, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion in the proceedings below.On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the trial court violated his constitutional right to a representative jury by using the absolute disparity test to determine the racial makeup of the jury venire. The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed and affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) appropriately determined the 1.01% absolute disparity in Defendant's jury venire was insufficient to show underrepresentation; and (2) did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion to subpoena the grand jurors. View "State v. Footman" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of unlawful trafficking in scheduled drugs and falsifying physical evidence, entered after a jury trial, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized as the result of what Defendant argued was an unlawful arrest; (2) there was no obvious error in the admission of lay opinion testimony by law enforcement officers on certain matters; (3) the record evidence was sufficient to justify the trial court's giving a permissible-inference instruction; and (4) there was no error or abuse of discretion in the denial of Defendant's motion for new trial and for judgment of acquittal. View "State v. Abdullahi" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of two counts of gross sexual assault and two counts of unlawful sexual contact, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion for a continuance; (2) there was no constitutional error in the trial court's ruling requiring that participants in Defendant's trial be masked; (3) there was no prosecutorial error in either the State's opening or closing argument or in the State's rebuttal argument; and (4) Defendant's claims of evidentiary error were unavailing. View "State v. Hunt" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the post-conviction review (PCR) court denying Appellant's PCR petitions, holding that the PCR court misconstrued aspects of the relevant law.In his speedy trial petitions, Defendant argued that his rights to a speedy trial had been violated and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to raise his speedy trial claims. The PCR court denied the petition. Thereafter, Defendant sought a certificate of probable cause. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment below, holding (1) the PCR court utilized a faulty analysis in concluding that there was no merit to Defendant's speedy trial claim; and (2) because the PCR court did not analyze counsel's strategy in failing to assert Defendant's right to a speedy trial the case must be remanded. View "Winchester v. State" on Justia Law