Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of Class B unlawful sexual contact and two counts of Class C unlawful sexual contact. Defendant appealed, arguing that his conviction on the Class B charge should be vacated because the proof at trial varied from the dates alleged in the indictment and, therefore, his constitutional right to be protected from double jeopardy was implicated. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the variance between the indictment and the evidence presented at trial did not violate Defendant’s right to protection from double jeopardy and did not defeat the conviction for the Class B charge of unlawful sexual contact. View "State v. Lyon" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of gross sexual assault and fifteen counts of unlawful sexual contact. Defendant later filed a petition for post-conviction review, claiming that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to seek a continuance of the sentencing hearing when Defendant was allegedly incompetent and was unable to exercise his right of allocution due to his emotional state. The court denied the petition. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the evidence did not compel the court to find that Defendant was deprived of constitutionally effective assistance when his trial counsel proceeded with, rather than sought to continue, the sentencing hearing despite Defendant’s confused and emotional state. View "Middleton v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant was indicted in Cumberland County for burglary and theft by unauthorized taking or transfer. Appellant pleaded nolo contendere to Class C theft by unauthorized taking or transfer. Appellant was subsequently indicted in York County for theft by receiving stolen property. The two indictments concerned the taking of items from a residence in South Portland and the sale of the items in Biddeford. The second case was resolved by a plea agreement. In January 2014, Appellant filed a petition for post-conviction relief from the York County conviction and sentence, claiming that his trial counsel in the York County matter had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to move the York County indictment on double jeopardy grounds. The trial court denied Appellant’s request for relief, concluding that different conduct formed the basis of the Cumberland and York County cases. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the trial court’s judgment denying Appellant post-conviction relief, holding (1) the second indictment charged Appellant with the same offense for which he had already been convicted and punished; and (2) trial counsel’s failure to seek dismissal of the York County indictment established that Appellant was deprived of his right to effective assistance of counsel. View "Ayotte v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with criminal operating under the influence. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence of his roadside interactions with a game warden from the moment the game warden parked his marked patrol vehicle behind Defendant’s stopped truck, exited the vehicle, and said, “Hi. Game warden.” The trial court denied the motion to suppress, concluding that the warden did not effect a Terry stop, and therefore, Defendant was not seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment prior to the moment the warden observed signs of Defendant’s intoxication. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress, holding that Defendant was not seized at any time before the warden observed signs of Defendant’s intoxication. View "State v. Ciomei" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of unlawful sexual assault. Defendant later filed a petition for post-conviction review, alleging that his trial counsel failed to provide effective representation during the pretrial and trial proceedings. After a hearing, the superior court denied Defendant’s petition based on its conclusion that Defendant failed to establish that he was “actually prejudiced by any such deficiencies.” The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the post-conviction judgment and remanded for reconsideration, holding that the superior court’s decision applied a test for prejudice that did not fully implement the proper standard of prejudice established in Strickland v. Washington. View "Theriault v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiff purchased a former school property from the Town of Dexter for future redevelopment, and the Town initially supported Plaintiff’s redevelopment efforts. After Plaintiff contested the Town’s tax assessment of the property, the Town’s code enforcement officer (CEO) issued a stop work order and notice of violation prohibiting all work on the property. Plaintiff filed this civil rights action against Defendant, the Town of Dexter, alleging that the Town’s actions, through its CEO, were arbitrary and capricious and deprived him of equal protection of law and the use and enjoyment of property, in violation of both the federal and state constitutions. Plaintiff sought injunctive relief and damages. The superior court granted the Town’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint, concluding that Plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed on the grounds that Plaintiff (1) failed to allege that the CEO’s actions were taken pursuant to a municipal policy, (2) failed to pursue available administrative relief, and (3) failed to allege that he faced discriminatory treatment as compared with others who were similarly situated. View "Marshall v. Town of Dexter" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of elevated aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced Appellant to serve twenty-two years in prison. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the conviction on direct appeal. Appellant subsequently filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel. The superior court denied Appellant’s petition for post-conviction review, concluding that Appellant received “reasonably effective assistance” of counsel. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Appellant’s attorney provided reasonably effective assistance as required by Strickland v. Washington. View "Manley v. State" on Justia Law

BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP filed a complaint for foreclosure against Scott and Kristina Greenleaf. Bank of America, N.A. (the Bank) was substituted for BAC after the entities merged. After a trial, the court entered a judgment of foreclosure in favor of the Bank. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment based on the Bank’s lack of standing. On remand, the district court dismissed without prejudice the action due to the Bank’s standing defect. Scott appealed, arguing that the court was compelled to enter judgment in his favor because the Court vacated the Bank’s judgment after a completed trial. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the district court properly disposed of the case by entering a dismissal without prejudice. View "Bank of America, N.A. v. Greenleaf" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty in federal court to sexual exploitation of a child and possession of child pornography. Before sentencing, a state grand jury indicted Defendant on thirteen counts of gross sexual assault. Defendant pleaded not guilty to all of the gross sexual assault charges. After the federal district court sentenced Defendant, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the State’s indictments for gross sexual assault, arguing that the State’s prosecution subjected him to double jeopardy. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) even if the State’s current prosecution subjects Defendant to the risk of being punished twice for the same conduct, such duplicative punishment is constitutional when, as in this case, the punishments are imposed by separate sovereigns; and (2) there is no evidence to sustain Defendant’s contention that an exception to the “dual sovereignty” doctrine of double jeopardy jurisprudence applied in this case. View "State v. Hoover" on Justia Law

After a hearing, the district court terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 22, 4055. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not improperly terminate Father’s parental rights solely because he had been diagnosed as having borderline personality disorder and thus did not violate Father’s equal protection rights; (2) the district court provided Father with the due process required in the context of a termination of parental rights by providing him with a reasonable period of time for reunification and not improperly placing a burden of proof upon Father; and (3) there was clear and convincing evidence to support the court’s finding of at least one ground of parental unfitness and that termination was in the child’s best interest. View "In re I.S." on Justia Law