Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Desroisiers was stopped by police while driving a Chevrolet Trailblazer with her mother as a passenger. The vehicle lacked an inspection sticker, prompting a police sergeant to initiate a traffic stop. The vehicle was registered but not to Desroisiers, who was on pre-conviction bail requiring her to commit no criminal act. During the encounter, Desroisiers resisted requests for documentation, accused the officer of harassment, and refused to comply with commands to be handcuffed. She crossed her arms, attempted to pull away, dropped to the ground after being handcuffed, and later stuck her foot outside the cruiser door, requiring officers to push it in. Footage showed her thrashing inside the cruiser.The Aroostook County Superior Court held a jury trial and admitted relevant evidence, including body camera footage. Desroisiers moved for judgments of acquittal on the charge of refusing to submit to arrest or detention, arguing the evidence showed only passive resistance, not physical force. The court denied the motions. The jury convicted her of refusing to submit to arrest or detention by using physical force against a law enforcement officer, operating an unregistered vehicle, and violating a condition of release. Desroisiers subsequently renewed her acquittal motions, which were again denied, and she timely appealed.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. It interpreted the statutory phrase “uses physical force against a law enforcement officer” to include any muscular effort directed toward an officer’s attempt to detain, not just violent or injurious acts. The court held that Desroisiers’s crossing her arms, pulling away, and obstructing the cruiser door constituted physical force under the statute, affirming her convictions for refusing to submit to arrest and violating a condition of release. However, the court found insufficient evidence that Desroisiers was the current owner required to register the vehicle, vacating her conviction for operating an unregistered vehicle. View "State of Maine v. Desrosiers" on Justia Law

On October 1, 2021, Heather Marichal was involved in a car accident in Auburn, Maine, after driving on the wrong side of the road and crashing into another vehicle, then striking a snowplow. Marichal admitted to an officer that she had consumed alcohol at a brew fest and was the sole driver. She submitted to an Intoxilyzer test that showed a blood-alcohol content of .21 grams per 210 liters of breath. Marichal was charged with criminal operating under the influence (OUI), a Class D offense.The Androscoggin County Unified Criminal Docket handled the case, with multiple continuances throughout 2022, 2023, and 2024. Marichal sought to secure the appearance of a defense witness who allegedly would testify that someone else was driving. She served a subpoena and moved for a writ of capias ad respondendum when the witness ignored the subpoena. The court issued a civil warrant for the witness, but he did not appear for the December 2024 trial. Marichal filed motions in limine to admit hearsay statements from the witness and requested another arrest warrant. The trial court denied both the motion to continue and the motion in limine, finding Marichal had not demonstrated due diligence or likelihood of securing the witness, and that the hearsay exception was not met.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the appeal following Marichal’s conditional guilty plea. The Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to continue, as Marichal had not shown due diligence in securing the witness nor a likelihood that a continuance would procure the witness’s attendance. The Court also determined that Marichal’s constitutional rights to compulsory process and due process were not violated, as the witness’s absence was not attributable to State action or omission. The judgment of conviction was affirmed. View "State of Maine v. Marichal" on Justia Law

The case involves two parents, Emily A. Bickford and Matthew A. Bradeen, who share parental rights and responsibilities for their child. They initially agreed to a shared parenting arrangement in 2013, requiring joint decisions on matters such as the child’s religious upbringing and medical care. In 2021, disputes arose when Bradeen alleged that Bickford involved the child in religious activities without his knowledge, while Bickford claimed Bradeen tried to prevent the child’s religious training. Both parents sought sole authority over the child’s religious upbringing. After mediation resolved most issues except religion and healthcare, the District Court held hearings and found that Bickford's unilateral decisions regarding religion and medical care caused the child anxiety and endangered her relationship with Bradeen. The court also found that Bradeen was more capable of making decisions in the child’s best interest.The District Court (Portland) modified the prior order, allocating to Bradeen final decision-making authority regarding the child’s religious upbringing (especially relating to Calvary Chapel Greater Portland) and medical care. The court used a best-interest standard for medical decisions and, believing strict scrutiny was required for religious matters, found a compelling interest in protecting the child from psychological harm. Bickford’s motions for post-judgment relief were denied, and she appealed, arguing constitutional violations.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and clarified that strict scrutiny does not apply to allocations of parental rights between parents, even in religious matters. The Court held that the best-interest standard governs such decisions, provided there is no religious bias. It found no evidence of religious hostility or abuse of discretion by the District Court and affirmed the judgment, upholding Bradeen’s final authority in the disputed areas. View "Bickford v. Bradeen" on Justia Law

Juanita C. Clark and her husband complained to the Code Enforcement Officer (CEO) of the Town of Phippsburg about a neighbor, Dan Gurney, who was allegedly operating a nuisance wood-selling business in violation of the land use ordinance. The Board of Appeals found that Gurney’s business constituted a nuisance, but the Board of Selectmen later found that the nuisance had been abated. After the Superior Court affirmed the Board of Selectmen’s decision, Clark and her husband appealed, resulting in a prior ruling by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court that the Board of Selectmen had exceeded its authority and violated due process. The matter was remanded for proper action.Following remand, the Board of Selectmen conducted a series of meetings, some involving ex parte communications with Gurney and limiting public participation. Ultimately, the Board agreed to enter into a consent agreement with Gurney and the CEO issued a cease-and-desist order. Clark later reported that Gurney continued to violate the order, submitting evidence to the CEO, who informed the Board that legal action should be considered. The Board held further discussions, some of which Clark was not notified about, and eventually voted that there was no violation and that no action would be taken. The CEO then notified Clark of this decision. When Clark sought formal findings, the Board clarified that its previous statement was just an opinion and that the CEO’s determination was final.Clark filed a complaint in the Sagadahoc County Superior Court challenging the Board’s actions and alleging due process violations. The Superior Court dismissed the complaint, reasoning that the Board’s clarification left no final government action for review. On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court held that Clark’s allegations regarding the Board’s refusal to take legal action presented a reviewable question of final government action. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "Clark v. Town of Phippsburg" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was convicted in two separate matters in Hancock County, Maine. In the first, he was found guilty by a jury of several offenses, including domestic violence aggravated assault with a dangerous weapon, after an incident in June 2020 in which he assaulted his romantic partner in his home, engaged in multiple acts of violence, and threatened both her and her child. In the second, he entered a conditional guilty plea to tampering with a witness. The court sentenced him to concurrent terms totaling twenty-four years, with all but twenty-two years suspended, and six years of probation.After the trial, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in three main ways: (1) by denying him an evidentiary hearing regarding funds seized in an unrelated drug case, which he claimed violated his rights to counsel and due process; (2) by failing to provide a specific-unanimity jury instruction and denying his post-judgment request for a mental-condition examination; and (3) by increasing his sentence based on findings about firearms, his age, and his lack of acceptance of responsibility.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court found it lacked jurisdiction to review the issues related to the seized funds, as they were tied to a separate case. The Court held that no specific-unanimity instruction was required for the counts at issue, the trial court did not err in denying the request for a mental-condition examination, and the sentencing court properly considered the presence of firearms, the defendant’s age, and his lack of acceptance of responsibility. However, the Court concluded that certain counts should have been merged to avoid double jeopardy. The judgment was affirmed, but the sentence was vacated in part and the matter remanded for resentencing consistent with the required mergers. View "State of Maine v. Witham" on Justia Law

After a divorce in September 2024, one party engaged in a series of acts directed at the other, including making a sexually suggestive and violent Facebook post, slamming a metal mailbox while delivering a child support payment despite requests for direct deposit, and posting a “warning poster” in the other party’s neighborhood implying she was a “black widow.” The recipient of these actions, who had previously experienced the other party’s alcohol misuse, anger, suicidal statements, and gun ownership, filed for a protection from abuse order.The District Court in Rockland issued a temporary protection order and then, after a final hearing, found by a preponderance of the evidence that the actions constituted abuse under Maine law, specifically 19-A M.R.S. § 4102(1)(B) as amended in 2024. The court determined that the conduct placed the plaintiff in fear of bodily injury, and that the defendant consciously disregarded a substantial risk that his speech would cause such fear. The court issued a final protection order prohibiting contact. The defendant appealed, arguing that his conduct constituted protected speech under the First Amendment, referencing Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66 (2023), and challenging the sufficiency of the evidence regarding recklessness and “true threats.”The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case, applying clear error review to the trial court’s factual findings and de novo review to the First Amendment challenge. The court held that the trial court properly considered the context and history between the parties, and that sufficient evidence supported the finding that the defendant’s actions and communications amounted to a course of conduct that placed the plaintiff in reasonable fear of bodily injury, and that he acted recklessly. The judgment of the District Court was affirmed. View "Doe v. Weymouth" on Justia Law

The case involved a mother whose parental rights to her youngest child were terminated by the Maine District Court. The Department of Health and Human Services initiated a child protection proceeding in June 2023, citing concerns about the mother's mental health, substance abuse, and neglect. The mother missed the preliminary hearing, and the child remained in the Department’s custody. Shortly before a scheduled jeopardy hearing, the mother’s attorney, without prior motion or notice to the mother, orally requested the appointment of a guardian ad litem (GAL) for the mother. The court, relying solely on representations of counsel and without a hearing or evidence, appointed a GAL with broad authority to make binding decisions on the mother’s behalf.Following this, several hearings took place, including a jeopardy hearing and judicial review hearings. There was ongoing confusion among the court and the mother’s attorneys regarding whether direction should be taken from the mother or the GAL, especially when their positions diverged. In August 2025, at the termination hearing, the mother’s GAL consented to termination of parental rights on the mother’s behalf, over the mother’s absence and without her knowledge of the GAL’s intent to consent. The District Court entered the termination order based on the GAL’s consent, and the mother appealed.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. It held that the process used to appoint the GAL violated the mother’s due process rights because she was not afforded notice or an opportunity to be heard before the GAL’s appointment and before her decision-making authority was delegated. The Court further concluded that this error was prejudicial and required the judgment to be vacated. The case was remanded for a proper competency hearing and new proceedings beginning with the jeopardy phase, ensuring the mother’s due process rights are protected moving forward. View "In re Child of Mindy P." on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with multiple offenses, including domestic violence aggravated assault, following an incident on May 12, 2021, in which she was alleged to have strangled her roommate and caused significant injuries. After being indicted on several charges, including attempted murder, the defendant reached an agreement to plead guilty to domestic violence aggravated assault, with the other charges dismissed and sentencing to be determined by the court. At the combined plea and sentencing hearing, the State described its evidence, including the victim’s account of repeated strangulation, and submitted an expert report on the victim’s injuries. The defendant, through counsel, acknowledged responsibility for the incident but limited her admission to the initial report of a single assault and did not contest additional details provided by the victim or the expert.The Cumberland County Unified Criminal Docket accepted the guilty plea and proceeded to sentencing. The State recommended a significant term of incarceration based on multiple incidents of strangulation and serious injury, while the defendant argued for a suspended sentence, citing her personal progress, lack of criminal history, and the risks of incarceration as a transgender individual. The court followed the statutory three-step sentencing process, considered both aggravating and mitigating factors, and imposed a seven-year sentence with all but four years suspended and three years of probation. The defendant appealed, arguing that her due process rights were violated when the sentencing court relied on unsworn victim statements and an expert report without cross-examination.The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine reviewed the case, applying de novo review to constitutional claims but only for obvious error due to the lack of contemporaneous objection. The Court held that due process does not require cross-examination or sworn testimony at sentencing so long as the information considered is reliable and the defendant has an opportunity to contest it. The Court found no obvious error and affirmed the judgment. View "State of Maine v. Miller" on Justia Law

Fifth Generation, Inc., a Texas-based liquor manufacturer and subchapter S corporation known for producing Tito’s Vodka, supplied increasing quantities of vodka to Maine between 2011 and 2017 without filing Maine pass-through-entity withholding or income tax returns. The company did not own real estate or hold itself out as doing business in Maine but shipped its products to a Maine state-operated bailment warehouse, as required by state law. Fifth Generation retained title to the goods in the warehouse until they were sold to the Maine Bureau of Alcoholic Beverage and Lottery Operations, and its out-of-state employees and broker occasionally accessed the warehouse.Maine Revenue Services conducted an audit and assessed over $748,000 in withholding, interest, and penalties against Fifth Generation. The company appealed to the Maine Board of Tax Appeals, which found no income tax nexus and canceled the assessment. The State Tax Assessor then sought de novo review in the Maine Superior Court (Kennebec County), which granted summary judgment for the Assessor, reinstating the assessment. Fifth Generation subsequently appealed to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court held that Fifth Generation was not exempt from state income tax during the audit period. The Court found that, under Maine law, Fifth Generation had a sufficient nexus with Maine because it owned tangible property in the state and sold it there. The Court also concluded that neither federal law (15 U.S.C. § 381(a)), the Commerce Clause, nor any constitutional provision barred the tax, as Maine’s regulatory scheme served a legitimate state purpose and was applied equally to in-state and out-of-state businesses. The Court further held that Fifth Generation did not have “substantial authority” to justify waiving penalties. The Superior Court’s judgment was affirmed. View "State Tax Assessor v. Fifth Generation, Inc." on Justia Law

A mother, Cassie S., was subject to a child protection proceeding after concerns were raised about her medical decision-making for her child, who had a complex medical history. Despite multiple recommendations from medical providers to remove the child’s tracheostomy and gastrostomy tube, the mother insisted on maintaining these interventions and sought further procedures. After a New York hospital visit revealed no medical basis for these interventions and the mother refused to allow further evaluation, the hospital reported suspected medical abuse to Maine’s Department of Health and Human Services, which then petitioned for a child protection order.The District Court in Portland initially struggled to serve the mother and obtain necessary medical records, in part because of the mother’s resistance. The court denied her request for appointed counsel after finding she was not indigent, but she eventually retained private counsel for the hearing. The court granted a continuance of the jeopardy hearing beyond the statutory 120-day deadline due to delays attributed to the mother and the complexity of the case. Following a hearing, the court found the child was in jeopardy, placed the child in the Department’s custody, and required steps toward demedicalization and psychological evaluation for the mother. The court also issued a broad order restricting the mother from discussing the case publicly. The mother’s motion for relief from judgment based on alleged ineffective assistance of counsel was denied without a hearing.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the finding of jeopardy and the denial of the mother’s Rule 60(b) motion, holding that she was not entitled to appointed counsel, the continuance was justified for good cause, there was no error requiring recusal, and any negative inference regarding missing witnesses was harmless. The Court vacated the speech restriction order as overly broad and remanded for it to be narrowed and time-limited. View "In re Child of Cassie S." on Justia Law