Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of robbery. Defendant proceeded to trial without representation after the trial court determined that Defendant had forfeited his right to counsel after threatening to cause serious bodily harm to one of his attorneys in the presence of another attorney, by his deliberate unwillingness to work with those attorneys’ predecessors, and by failing to show that he would work cooperatively with successor counsel. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the trial court’s decision to require Defendant to proceed to trial without legal representation, holding (1) in circumstances of egregious misconduct, an accused can forfeit his right to counsel, and in this case, the trial court did not err in concluding that Defendant’s conduct rose to the level that constituted a forfeiture; and (2) in the alternative, the record established that through his egregious misconduct, Defendant waived his right to counsel by implication. View "State v. Nisbet" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of operating under the influence and violating a condition of release. Defendant was sentenced to a term of sevens days in county jail. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress and, at trial, in admitting evidence of his blood-alcohol level derived from a sample of his blood that was seized without a search warrant. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress, as there were exigent circumstances at the time of the blood draw negating the requirement for a search warrant. View "State v. Arndt" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of Class B unlawful sexual contact and two counts of Class C unlawful sexual contact. Defendant appealed, arguing that his conviction on the Class B charge should be vacated because the proof at trial varied from the dates alleged in the indictment and, therefore, his constitutional right to be protected from double jeopardy was implicated. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the variance between the indictment and the evidence presented at trial did not violate Defendant’s right to protection from double jeopardy and did not defeat the conviction for the Class B charge of unlawful sexual contact. View "State v. Lyon" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of gross sexual assault and fifteen counts of unlawful sexual contact. Defendant later filed a petition for post-conviction review, claiming that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to seek a continuance of the sentencing hearing when Defendant was allegedly incompetent and was unable to exercise his right of allocution due to his emotional state. The court denied the petition. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the evidence did not compel the court to find that Defendant was deprived of constitutionally effective assistance when his trial counsel proceeded with, rather than sought to continue, the sentencing hearing despite Defendant’s confused and emotional state. View "Middleton v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant was indicted in Cumberland County for burglary and theft by unauthorized taking or transfer. Appellant pleaded nolo contendere to Class C theft by unauthorized taking or transfer. Appellant was subsequently indicted in York County for theft by receiving stolen property. The two indictments concerned the taking of items from a residence in South Portland and the sale of the items in Biddeford. The second case was resolved by a plea agreement. In January 2014, Appellant filed a petition for post-conviction relief from the York County conviction and sentence, claiming that his trial counsel in the York County matter had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to move the York County indictment on double jeopardy grounds. The trial court denied Appellant’s request for relief, concluding that different conduct formed the basis of the Cumberland and York County cases. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the trial court’s judgment denying Appellant post-conviction relief, holding (1) the second indictment charged Appellant with the same offense for which he had already been convicted and punished; and (2) trial counsel’s failure to seek dismissal of the York County indictment established that Appellant was deprived of his right to effective assistance of counsel. View "Ayotte v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with criminal operating under the influence. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence of his roadside interactions with a game warden from the moment the game warden parked his marked patrol vehicle behind Defendant’s stopped truck, exited the vehicle, and said, “Hi. Game warden.” The trial court denied the motion to suppress, concluding that the warden did not effect a Terry stop, and therefore, Defendant was not seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment prior to the moment the warden observed signs of Defendant’s intoxication. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress, holding that Defendant was not seized at any time before the warden observed signs of Defendant’s intoxication. View "State v. Ciomei" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of unlawful sexual assault. Defendant later filed a petition for post-conviction review, alleging that his trial counsel failed to provide effective representation during the pretrial and trial proceedings. After a hearing, the superior court denied Defendant’s petition based on its conclusion that Defendant failed to establish that he was “actually prejudiced by any such deficiencies.” The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the post-conviction judgment and remanded for reconsideration, holding that the superior court’s decision applied a test for prejudice that did not fully implement the proper standard of prejudice established in Strickland v. Washington. View "Theriault v. State" on Justia Law

After a nonjury trial, the trial court convicted Defendant of operating while his license was suspended or revoked and sentenced him to thirty days in jail. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to enforce the laws of the “State of Maine” against him and that Maine’s law requiring each driver to hold a valid driver’s license is facially unconstitutional because it violates a purported fundamental right to travel. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) state jurisdiction over an individual extends to those present within the physical bounds of the state; and (2) the state may, as a valid exercise of its police power, place limitations on the operation of motor vehicles on the state’s roads. View "State v. Pelletier" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of elevated aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced Appellant to serve twenty-two years in prison. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the conviction on direct appeal. Appellant subsequently filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel. The superior court denied Appellant’s petition for post-conviction review, concluding that Appellant received “reasonably effective assistance” of counsel. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Appellant’s attorney provided reasonably effective assistance as required by Strickland v. Washington. View "Manley v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty in federal court to sexual exploitation of a child and possession of child pornography. Before sentencing, a state grand jury indicted Defendant on thirteen counts of gross sexual assault. Defendant pleaded not guilty to all of the gross sexual assault charges. After the federal district court sentenced Defendant, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the State’s indictments for gross sexual assault, arguing that the State’s prosecution subjected him to double jeopardy. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) even if the State’s current prosecution subjects Defendant to the risk of being punished twice for the same conduct, such duplicative punishment is constitutional when, as in this case, the punishments are imposed by separate sovereigns; and (2) there is no evidence to sustain Defendant’s contention that an exception to the “dual sovereignty” doctrine of double jeopardy jurisprudence applied in this case. View "State v. Hoover" on Justia Law