Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury-waived trial, David Christian was convicted of three counts of theft by unauthorized taking, a Class D theft, and one count of theft by unauthorized taking, a Class E theft. Christian appealed, contending that the evidence was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to deprive his employer of rent payments and that the court erred by classifying two counts as Class D theft rather than Class E theft. The Supreme Court vacated and modified the judgment, holding (1) the record contained sufficient evidence to support the court's findings regarding Christian's intent; but (2) the court erred in its classification of the contested counts. Remanded for resentencing. View "State v. Christian" on Justia Law

MacImage of Maine and its principal asked six Maine counties to provide to them, in a specified digital format, copies of every document contained in the counties' registries of deeds, including the indexes to the recorded documents. The counties agreed to provide electronic copies of the registries' recorded documents, but disputes over the fees that the counties could charge for the requested electronic information precipitated this litigation. The superior court determined that the counties could not charge the fees that they proposed in their responses to the requests. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, which entered its judgment before recent legislation was passed. The Court held that the recent legislation was applicable to the dispute and that the responses of all but two of the six counties agreeing to provide the requested records in bulk and setting the costs for transferring the data fell within the law's parameters for reasonable fees. Remanded for entry of judgment in favor of those four counties and for further proceedings regarding the remaining two counties. View "MacImage of Me., LLC v. Androscoggin County" on Justia Law

Beginning in 2007, the City of Lewiston assessed stormwater fees on Robert Gladu's property, which contained a small shopping mall and parking lot, pursuant to the City's stormwater ordinance. The ordinance at issue created the Stormwater Management Utility and gave it the authority to assess and collect fees for stormwater management system and facilities. Gladu did not pay the fees, and in 2010, the City filed a civil complaint alleging that Gladu owed the City for unpaid stormwater fees. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. In his motion, Gladu argued that the stormwater assessment was a tax, not a fee, and that the Utility was not authorized to impose a tax. The superior court granted the City's motion and denied Gladu's motion and ordered that Gladu pay the delinquent stormwater fees, interest, attorney fees, collection costs, and a penalty. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under the test set forth in Butler v. Supreme Judicial Court, the stormwater assessment is a fee and not a tax; and (2) the superior court did not err in awarding a civil penalty, attorney fees, and other costs. View "City of Lewiston v. Gladu" on Justia Law

Defendant Frank Johnson was convicted for operating after habitual offender revocation. Johnson appealed, arguing that the superior court erred in denying his motion to strike an earlier conviction offered by the State to enhance his current charge to a Class C crime because the prior conviction resulted from a guilty plea that was allegedly constitutionally flawed. At issue was whether Johnson had the right to collaterally attack the prior conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed after examining relevant federal and state precedent, holding (1) a criminal defendant may not collaterally attack a prior conviction during proceedings related to a different offense unless the defendant alleges a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel; and (2) because Johnson did not assert a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel as the basis for his collateral attack on his prior conviction, his motion to strike was properly denied without further hearing. View "State v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Defendant William Hanaman was convicted of intentional or knowing murder following a jury trial. Hanaman appealed, contending that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of adequate provocation to reduce the murder charge to manslaughter pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 17-A, 201(3). The trial court determined that an adequate provocation instruction was subsumed by instructions that were given on self-defense and imperfect self-defense. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence was not legally sufficient to support a jury instruction on the affirmative defense of adequate provocation, and therefore, the court did not err in refusing to give an adequate provocation instruction in this case. View "State v. Hanaman" on Justia Law

Following a bench trial in the district court, Defendant John Maynard was convicted of operating while his license was suspended, with a prior conviction (OAS). Maynard appealed, arguing that the Secretary of State's certification of the notice of Maynard's suspension failed to prove the notice element of the OAS charge. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the district court, holding that the Secretary of State's certification on its face was inadequate to prove that the court provided Maynard notice of his license suspension, as a Secretary of State's certification that does not set forth any underlying facts pertaining to the notice of suspension does not suffice as proof of notice. View "State v. Maynard" on Justia Law

The town manager of the Town of Freeport signed a contract transferring the Town's emergency dispatch services to another town. Plaintiffs, two Town residents, filed an amended complaint requesting a declaratory judgment that the contract was void because it was inconsistent with section 6.10 of the Town's charter, which provides that multi-year contracts must be "made or approved by ordinance," and seeking an injunction. The Town Council later voted in favor of an ordinance that ratified the contract. The superior court subsequently dismissed the complaint, finding that the case was moot because the Town had approved the outsourcing contract by ordinance, thereby complying with section 6.10. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and held (1) the court erred by dismissing the amended complaint because the passage of the ordinance ratifying the transfer of dispatch services contract did not render the case moot, as the contract did not conclude until the year 2016; but (2) the passage of the ordinance did satisfy the "made or approved by ordinance" requirement of section 6.10 of the charter. Remanded for entry of a judgment in favor of the Town on the merits of the amended complaint and denying the request for an injunction. View "McGettigan v. Town of Freeport" on Justia Law

Chuck Starbird submitted an application for a building permit for the construction of a home on a lot abutting a public easement portion of a road in the Town of Minot. The Town denied the application. The Board of Appeals ultimately granted Starbird's appeal, concluding that the parcel had a private right-of-way because the the term "right-of-way," as used in section 4-501.8 of the Town's Land Use Code, included a public easement. The superior court affirmed but remanded to the Board for further factual findings on whether Starbird's application met all of the factors listed in section 4-501.8(A)-(G). The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court but vacated the portion of the court's judgment remanding the matter, holding (1) the unique circumstances of the matter caused the interlocutory appeal to fall within the judicial economy exception to the final judgment rule; and (2) the Board did not err by granting Starbird's appeal of the denial of his application. View "Town of Minot v. Starbird" on Justia Law

The district court found that Michael Dee committed the civil violation of possessing a useable amount of marijuana. The Supreme Court affirmed. Dee subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that Maine's prohibition against the possession of marijuana unconstitutionally infringed on his due process rights. The Court again affirmed, holding that the Legislature's prohibition met the rational basis standard, as (1) the statute provided for the public welfare because there was evidence that marijuana is harmful; (2) the legislative means employed were appropriate to achieve the ends sought; and (3) the manner of exercising the police power, by imposing a civil fine for the possession of marijuana, was not arbitrary or capricious. View "State v. Dee" on Justia Law

Timothy Robbins entered a conditional plea of guilty to and was convicted of operating under the influence (OUI), with two prior convictions, and operating after suspension. Robbins appealed, contending that the trial court erred in denying his motion to strike two prior uncounseled misdemeanor OUI convictions, which reflected that he appeared pro se but were silent as to the procedures taken to ensure that his constitutional right to counsel was satisfied. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, holding that Robbins could not prevail on the record because, as no evidence was presented to the contrary, the Court presumed the regularity that attaches to the final judgment of a conviction. View "State v. Robbins" on Justia Law