Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

From 2018 to 2020, Central Maine Power Company (CMP) sent misleading communications to customers behind on their electric bills, threatening winter disconnection without providing accurate information about customers' rights and the required process under Maine Public Utilities Commission rules. In 2020, the Commission investigated and CMP consented to a finding of rule violations and paid a $500,000 penalty.Brett Deane, Henry Lavender, and Joleen Mitchell, CMP customers who received these misleading communications, filed a multicount complaint against CMP in January 2020. The Business and Consumer Docket dismissed claims of fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and statutory violations, and granted summary judgment for CMP on the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED).The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the misrepresentation claims, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to allege pecuniary harm, which is necessary for such claims. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the statutory cause of action, determining that 35-A M.R.S. § 1501 does not create a private right of action. Finally, the court upheld the summary judgment on the IIED claim, finding that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate severe emotional distress as required by law, and that CMP's conduct, while extreme and outrageous, did not warrant an inference of severe emotional distress. View "Deane v. Central Maine Power Company" on Justia Law

The Maine Supreme Judicial Court addressed an appeal from Citibank, N.A., challenging a District Court judgment in favor of the defendant, Ashley Moser, in a case related to the collection of credit card debt. The bank argued that the judgment violated its procedural due process rights due to insufficient notice about a hearing scheduled on April 12, 2023.The court had issued notices for both a 'first mediation' and a 'debt collection hearing' on the same day, at the same time, and in the same room. On the hearing day, Citibank's counsel attended without a representative from the bank, assuming that the case was scheduled for mediation and not a final hearing. The court proceeded with the hearing and entered a judgment in favor of Moser, as Citibank failed to satisfy its burden of proof.Citibank appealed, claiming the notices were ambiguous and violated its right to procedural due process. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed with Citibank, noting that the competing notices created an impossibility of both a mediation and a hearing taking place simultaneously. It ruled that the ambiguity in the notices and the court's subsequent judgment denied Citibank the required notice and meaningful opportunity to be heard. The court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Citibank, N.A. v. Moser" on Justia Law

Two individuals, Ronald and Karen White, bought a used car from Real Deal Auto Sales & Service Center, LLC. After experiencing issues with the car, the Whites asked Real Deal to either replace the car's catalytic converters or give them a refund, which Real Deal refused. Subsequently, the Whites repaired the car themselves and sued Real Deal in a small claims action. The District Court ordered Real Deal to pay the Whites $6,000 for the repairs, plus costs. Real Deal appealed this decision to the Superior Court, which reversed the District Court's decision. The Whites appealed this reversal to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court ruled in favor of the Whites, agreeing that the Superior Court erred in reversing the original judgement. The case was therefore remanded for reinstatement of the small claims judgement in favor of the Whites.This decision was based on a Maine law which states that a dealer warrants that a vehicle has been inspected according to rules laid down by the state. Evidence presented by the Whites suggested that parts of the car's exhaust system were inadequate, which could have led the District Court to infer that the car did not meet state inspection standards at the time of sale. As such, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court concluded that the evidence could support a determination that Real Deal breached the warranty of inspectability, thereby violating the Unfair Trade Practices Act. The Court remanded the matter to the Superior Court to enter a judgment affirming the District Court’s small claims judgement in favor of the Whites. View "White v. Real Deal Auto Sales & Service Center, LLC" on Justia Law

In this case, Michael Bordick and Monica Bordick defaulted on a loan from Franklin Savings Bank, which was secured with a hunting cabin they owned on property they leased. The Bank filed a complaint for recovery of the cabin, and the Business and Consumer Docket ruled in favor of the Bank. The Bordicks appealed, arguing that the Bank did not make disclosures required by the Federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA). The Bank argued that the credit transaction was not subject to TILA.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court held that a credit transaction secured by real property in the form of a lease is not exempt from TILA under 15 U.S.C.A. § 1603(3). However, the court also found that the lower court applied an incorrect test to determine whether the loan was for commercial purposes and therefore exempt under § 1603(1). The court vacated the judgment in favor of the Bank and remanded the case for the lower court to determine the nature of the loan, looking at the totality of the circumstances.The court also clarified that although the leased land where the cabin was located was not the Bordicks' principal dwelling, the credit transaction is not exempt from TILA under § 1603(3) because it was secured with real property. View "Franklin Savings Bank v. Bordick" on Justia Law

In this consolidated appeal regarding collection actions by a debt buyer, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgments that the district court entered in favor of Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, holding that the court's factual findings underlying the admission of certain challenged records were erroneous.When the trial court decided these credit card debt collection matters Supreme Judicial Court jurisprudence contained conflicting interpretations of Me. R. Evid. 803(6) with regard to the admission of integrated business records. The trial court admitted the records in accordance with the predominant evidentiary standards at the time. In Bank of New York Mellon v. Shone, 239 A.3d 671 (Me. 2020), however, the Supreme Court clarified the proper approach for evaluating the sufficiency of the foundation laid for the admission of integrated business records. In the instant case, the Supreme Judicial Court held that because the parties developed their records with a different evidentiary standard in mind, fairness required that the matters be remanded for further proceedings, including potentially reopening the record to allow further evidence or to take new evidence. View "Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC v. Casey Clougherty Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the the district court granting summary judgment in favor of MaineStream Finance on Jacob Berry’s complaint seeking the return of a 2016 Chevrolet Camaro, holding that summary judgment was improper on the facts of this case.In 2016, MaineStream filed an action against Dwight Moody, Berry’s uncle, to repossess two race cars - including the car called “Outlaw" - that Moody had pledged as collateral in a security agreement. The court found that Moody was the owner of Outlaw and entered a final judgment. In 2017, Berry brought this action against MaineStream, alleging that MaineStream wrongfully seized his 2016 Chevrolet Camaro. The district court granted MaineStream’s motion for summary judgment based on MaineStream’s assertion that, in the 2016 action, the court determined that Moody owned the car and that Berry was barred from seeking relief pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that summary judgment was improper because the record did not establish that Outlaw was the same vehicle was the one that was at issue in the instant case. View "Berry v. Mainstream Finance" on Justia Law

Me. Rev. Stat. 17-A, 1112 is facially constitutional, and, in the instant case, the trial court’s admission of a lab certificate in lieu of live witness testimony pursuant to that statute was not a violation of Defendant’s right of confrontation.Defendant appealed from a judgment, entered after a jury trial, convicting her of unlawful trafficking of a schedule W drug. At issue was whether the trial court’s admission of a lab certificate identifying a substance exchanged in a controlled purchase as methamphetamine. The court admitted the lab certificate in lieu of the testimony of the chemist pursuant to section 1112. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 1112 is facially constitutional; (2) Defendant’s failure to timely demand a live witness pursuant to section 1112 effected a voluntary, knowing, and intentional waiver of her Confrontation Clause rights; and (3) therefore, the trial court did not err in allowing into admission the chemist’s certificate in lieu of live testimony. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

Midland Funding LLC filed suit against Mark Walton alleging that he had entered into a credit card agreement with Barclays Bank Delaware, used the card to obtain extensions of credit, and failed to make payments on the account. Midland purchases debt from Barclays. Midland sought to collect an outstanding balance of $5,684.72. After a trial, the district court entered judgment in favor of Midland in the amount of $5,684.72, plus costs. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment, holding (1) jurisdiction over this matter was properly established in the district court; and (2) the district court did not err in admitting documentation of the assignment of Walton’s debt from Barclays to Midland pursuant to the business record exception to the hearsay rule. View "Midland Funding LLC v. Walton" on Justia Law

FIA Card Services, N.A. initiated this action against John Camire to recover damages arising out of a debt incurred using a Bank of America (Bank) credit card. Camire filed a counterclaim pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). Upon the motion of FIA Card Services, the trial court dismissed Camire’s counterclaim, concluding that FIA Card Services was exempt from liability pursuant to the FDCPA. The Bank was later substituted as the plaintiff. After a trial, the court entered a judgment in favor of the Bank in the amount of $11,573 plus costs. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment in favor of the Bank but vacated the order dismissing Camire’s FDCPA counterclaim, holding (1) the trial court properly exercised its discretion in managing trial time, and no due process violation occurred; and (2) the trial court erred in concluding that FIA Card Services was exempt from the FDCPA as a matter of law. Remanded. View "Bank of America, N.A. v. Camire" on Justia Law

Camden National Bank filed a complaint for foreclosure against Ilene Weintraub. Weintraub brought several counterclaims against the bank, including violations of the Maine Consumer Credit Code, breach of contract, and a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, alleging that she suffered injuries as a direct and proximate result of the abuse conduct of the Bank’s collections department and an accusation of criminal conduct. The Bank filed a special motion to dismiss requesting dismissal of several claims based on Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute, but failing to request dismissal of the breach of contract claim. The superior court concluded that the anti-SLAPP statute prohibits selective dismissal of claims and that Weintraub met her burden of demonstrating a prima facie case of actual injury and causation. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) erred in holding that the anti-SLAPP statute did not allow for selective dismissal of some, but not all, of Weintraub’s counterclaims, but the error was harmless; and (2) did not err in concluding that Weintraub met her burden of showing prima facie evidence of causation. View "Camden Nat’l Bank v. Weintraub" on Justia Law