Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Denis Lemieux pleaded guilty to domestic violence terrorizing and received a partially suspended sentence with probation. The probation terms required that he not contact certain family members, refrain from criminal conduct, seek evaluations and counseling, and notify probation before moving. Several months later, the State alleged that Lemieux violated his probation by making threatening social media statements about two family members he was barred from contacting, failing to comply with required evaluations and counseling, and not notifying probation of a move.The Kennebec County Unified Criminal Docket held a hearing, found by a preponderance of the evidence that Lemieux violated multiple probation conditions, and partially revoked his probation, imposing a custodial sanction. Lemieux argued at the sanction hearing that the court should consider the constitutionality of the statute under which he was convicted, asserting that if the statute was unconstitutional, his conviction and sentence were void. The court rejected this collateral attack, concluding that only a post-conviction review proceeding—not a probation revocation hearing—was the proper procedure for challenging the validity of the underlying conviction. Lemieux’s post-conviction review petition raising the constitutional issue had been stayed pending appeal.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. It held that a defendant may not use a probation revocation proceeding to collaterally attack the constitutionality of the statute underlying the conviction. The court reaffirmed that post-conviction review is the exclusive method for challenging the validity of a conviction, except for direct appeal. The decision to affirm the trial court’s revocation of Lemieux’s probation was based on the proper use of procedural avenues for contesting convictions. The judgment of probation revocation was affirmed. View "State of Maine v. Lemieux" on Justia Law

The defendant, an adult male in his fifties, was accused of engaging in unlawful sexual contact with his twelve-year-old great-niece while she was staying overnight at his home in October 2020. The victim disclosed the incident to her mother about a year later after family members encouraged her to speak up due to concerns arising from accusations the defendant had made against the victim’s cousin. The matter was reported to law enforcement and later discussed in a forensic interview. The defendant was subsequently indicted and proceeded to a jury trial.During the trial in the Cumberland County Unified Criminal Docket, significant evidentiary disputes arose. The State sought to introduce testimony regarding a subsequent incident in which the defendant allegedly offered a sex toy to the victim and another individual, arguing its relevance to intent and the relationship between the parties. The defense objected, citing prejudice and late disclosure, and initially, the trial court excluded the evidence but left open the possibility of reconsideration. As the trial progressed and new lines of questioning emerged, the court ultimately allowed this evidence, finding no unfair prejudice. The defense also attempted to introduce evidence that the defendant had threatened the victim’s cousin, theorizing it would demonstrate a motive to fabricate the allegations. The court excluded this testimony, finding it irrelevant because there was no evidence the victim knew of the threats or that her family conspired to fabricate the allegations.The jury found the defendant guilty, and the court imposed a sentence of eight years, with a portion suspended and a probation period. On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court held that the trial court acted within its discretion in admitting the evidence of the subsequent sexual behavior and did not err in excluding the evidence of threats toward the cousin due to lack of relevance. The judgment of conviction was affirmed. View "State of Maine v. Cardona" on Justia Law

A father was charged with multiple offenses after his daughter reported that he had sexually assaulted her repeatedly over many years, with the earliest incident she could recall occurring when she was in second grade. The prosecution focused on three specific incidents of sexual assault that took place when the victim was sixteen, each on a different date and in different locations. The victim provided detailed testimony about these three incidents, and additional evidence included an audio recording made by the victim during one of the assaults. After the victim disclosed the abuse to her mother, law enforcement became involved, and a grand jury indicted the defendant on nine counts: three counts each of gross sexual assault, domestic violence assault, and endangering the welfare of a child, each set corresponding to one of the three incidents.The case proceeded to a jury trial in the Sagadahoc County Unified Criminal Docket. The jury initially reported a partial deadlock but, after receiving a standard instruction for deadlocked juries, returned guilty verdicts on all nine counts. At sentencing, the court grouped the charges by incident date, imposed concurrent sentences within each group, and ordered the groups to run consecutively, resulting in an aggregate sentence of twenty-seven years, with all but seventeen years suspended and three years of probation. The defendant appealed both his convictions and his sentence, arguing that the trial court erred by not giving a specific unanimity instruction to the jury and by double counting the multiplicity of assaults during sentencing.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the judgment. The Court held that a specific unanimity instruction was not required because each count was tied to a distinct incident on a specific date, and the jury instructions sufficiently ensured unanimity. The Court also held that the sentencing court did not err by considering the number of assaults at different points in its analysis, as this was consistent with established sentencing practices and did not constitute impermissible double counting. View "State v. Chase" on Justia Law

Heather M. Hodgson was charged with several offenses following an incident at her home involving her husband and their two children. The dispute began after her husband purchased alcohol, which upset Hodgson. Both consumed alcohol, and an argument ensued. During the altercation, Hodgson pointed a loaded firearm at her husband and fired a “warning shot” at the floor near his feet. The couple’s three-year-old child was present in the home and had come out of the bedroom during the argument. Hodgson was subsequently indicted on multiple charges, including domestic violence reckless conduct with a dangerous weapon, domestic violence criminal threatening with a dangerous weapon, and endangering the welfare of a child.The case was tried without a jury in the Kennebec County Unified Criminal Docket. After the State presented its evidence, Hodgson moved for acquittal on some counts, which the court granted in part. Hodgson testified, claiming self-defense, but the court found her account not credible. The court found her guilty on three counts: domestic violence reckless conduct with a dangerous weapon, domestic violence criminal threatening with a dangerous weapon, and endangering the welfare of a child. At sentencing, the court declined to impose the mandatory minimum one-year sentence for the reckless conduct charge, instead sentencing Hodgson to three years with all but ninety days suspended and probation.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed both Hodgson’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and the State’s appeal regarding the sentence. The Court affirmed Hodgson’s convictions, finding the evidence sufficient. However, it held that the trial court erred by not imposing the mandatory minimum one-year sentence required by statute for domestic violence reckless conduct with a dangerous weapon. The Court vacated the sentence for that count and remanded for resentencing consistent with the statutory requirement. View "State v. Hodgson" on Justia Law

Law enforcement in Maine received a tip from a confidential source about suspicious rental car activity by Calvin Vandine, who was known to use drugs and associate with traffickers. Officers tracked Vandine’s movements and, based on the tip and corroborating information, stopped his car, which was also occupied by Derric McLain. During the stop, officers found drugs and arrested both men. McLain was later identified as having outstanding warrants, including for drug trafficking. The stop lasted about twenty-eight minutes, and a subsequent search revealed significant quantities of controlled substances.Prior to trial in the Penobscot County Unified Criminal Docket, McLain moved to suppress evidence from the stop and statements made during custodial interrogation, arguing lack of reasonable suspicion for the prolonged detention and that he had not waived his privilege against self-incrimination. The trial court (Anderson, J.) denied the motion to suppress, finding the stop justified and the statements admissible. After a jury trial before Justice Murray, McLain was convicted of aggravated drug trafficking and violation of condition of release, receiving a substantial sentence.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the denial of the suppression motion. The Court affirmed the lower court’s findings that the stop, search, and arrest were supported by reasonable suspicion and were not unconstitutionally prolonged. However, the Court held that McLain did not clearly waive his privilege against self-incrimination under article I, section 6 of the Maine Constitution, as his responses during interrogation were ambiguous and officers failed to clarify his intent. The Court vacated the conviction and the suppression order in part, remanding for further proceedings, and established that a clear and unequivocal waiver is required before custodial interrogation may proceed in Maine. View "State v. McLain" on Justia Law

A police officer in Pittsfield, Maine, stopped Michael L. Kilgore for speeding and discovered possible license restrictions. During the stop, Kilgore became agitated, drove away while the officer was standing next to his vehicle, and ran over her foot. After a pursuit, Kilgore was apprehended following a physical altercation with the officer, during which he kicked and punched her before being subdued. The officer suffered injuries requiring medical attention. Kilgore was charged with multiple offenses, including aggravated assault, assault on an officer, and several related charges.The Somerset County Unified Criminal Docket held a jury trial. The jury found Kilgore guilty of assault on an officer (Class C) and the lesser included offense of assault (Class D), but acquitted him of aggravated assault and other charges. The trial court merged the assault conviction into the assault on an officer conviction and sentenced Kilgore to forty-two months in prison, with all but nine months suspended, followed by probation. Kilgore appealed, arguing that the jury instructions were flawed because they failed to properly inform the jury of the State’s burden to disprove the defenses of self-defense, duress, and competing harms beyond a reasonable doubt, and did not instruct the jury to acquit if the State failed to meet that burden.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case for obvious error. The Court found that the trial court’s jury instructions contained two significant errors: they allowed the jury to find Kilgore guilty based solely on the elements of the offenses without considering the generated defenses, and they failed to instruct the jury to acquit if the State did not disprove duress and competing harms. The Court held that these errors were plain, affected Kilgore’s substantial rights, and undermined the fairness of the proceedings. The judgment was vacated and the case remanded for a new trial. View "State of Maine v. Kilgore" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of two counts of unlawful sexual contact and one count of unlawful sexual touching involving his niece by marriage, who was a minor at the time. The incidents occurred in 2020 at the defendant’s home in West Gardiner, Maine, when the victim was left alone with him during family gatherings. The victim later disclosed the abuse in a forensic interview at a Children’s Advocacy Center (CAC), which was video recorded. The State charged the defendant in March 2022, and after a grand jury indictment, the case proceeded to trial. The defendant was subject to bail conditions restricting contact with minors.Prior to trial in the Kennebec County Unified Criminal Docket, the defendant moved for a bill of particulars and later asserted his right to a speedy trial, which he temporarily waived to obtain out-of-state records. He renewed his speedy trial demand, but delays occurred due to both his requests for specific trial dates and court scheduling constraints. The trial court denied his motion to dismiss for a speedy trial violation, finding that the delays were attributable to both parties and that the prejudice suffered was insufficient to warrant dismissal. The court also admitted the CAC video under 16 M.R.S. § 358, over the defendant’s objections based on confrontation and due process rights, and after editing out most references to uncharged conduct. The jury found the defendant guilty of the counts related to West Gardiner and not guilty of those related to Augusta.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the denial of the speedy trial motion, the admission of the CAC video, and the applicability of section 358. The Court held that there was no violation of the defendant’s speedy trial rights under either the Maine or United States Constitutions, that the admission of the CAC video did not violate the Maine Confrontation Clause or Due Process Clause, and that the amended version of section 358 applied to the case. The judgment of conviction was affirmed. View "State of Maine v. Engroff" on Justia Law

The case involved a defendant who lived with his spouse, her daughter (the victim), and her younger sons in Wiscasset, Maine, from 2019 to 2022. The victim, beginning at age eight and continuing until nearly twelve, testified that the defendant repeatedly sexually assaulted her, describing both generic and three specific incidents. The assaults included acts in the defendant’s bedroom, during a family bonfire, and in a car. The victim disclosed the abuse to her mother and a friend, which led to a police investigation. The defendant was charged with gross sexual assault and violating a condition of release, with the alleged conduct occurring between January 2020 and July 2022.The Lincoln County Unified Criminal Docket held a jury trial for the gross sexual assault charge and a nonjury trial for the violation of release. The State’s evidence consisted primarily of the victim’s testimony, supported by her mother and the investigating detective. The defendant did not testify or present evidence. Both parties reviewed and did not object to the court’s draft jury instructions, which included a general unanimity instruction but not a specific unanimity instruction regarding the factual basis for conviction. The jury found the defendant guilty of gross sexual assault, and the court found him guilty of violating a condition of release. The defendant was sentenced to eighteen years in prison for gross sexual assault and six months for the release violation, to run concurrently.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed whether the absence of a specific unanimity instruction and certain statements by the prosecutor during closing arguments constituted obvious error. The court held that, although the lack of a specific unanimity instruction was plain error, it did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights given the nature of the evidence and arguments. The court also found that any prosecutorial error in closing arguments did not rise to the level of obvious error. The judgment was affirmed. View "State of Maine v. Schooley" on Justia Law

Two individuals, referred to as Child A and Child B, alleged that Ernest Fyans sexually assaulted them in Fort Kent, Maine, between 1990 and 1992, when they were children and Fyans was an adult member of their religious congregation. Child A testified that Fyans assaulted her when she was four years old, while Child B described sexual contact beginning when she was about ten and continuing until she was thirteen. Both victims delayed reporting the abuse for many years, citing threats made by Fyans. Fyans moved out of Maine in 1992, living in Connecticut and later Massachusetts.The Aroostook County Unified Criminal Docket indicted Fyans in 2021 on one count of gross sexual assault and one count of unlawful sexual contact. At trial, both victims testified, and the State presented circumstantial evidence regarding the victims’ ages, marital status, and Fyans’s age. Fyans moved for acquittal, arguing insufficient evidence on several elements, including the statute of limitations for the unlawful sexual contact charge. The trial court denied these motions, and the jury convicted Fyans on both counts. He was sentenced to twenty years for gross sexual assault and five years, to run concurrently, for unlawful sexual contact. Fyans appealed his convictions.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence and the statute of limitations issue. The Court held that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find Fyans guilty of gross sexual assault, including the required age and marital status elements. However, the Court found insufficient evidence to support that the prosecution for unlawful sexual contact was timely, as the State failed to prove Fyans’s absence from Maine long enough to toll the statute of limitations. The Court affirmed the conviction for gross sexual assault, vacated the conviction for unlawful sexual contact, and remanded for resentencing on the remaining count. View "State of Maine v. Fyans" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who, after consuming a large quantity of alcohol over several hours at a restaurant, drove his vehicle and struck an elderly pedestrian, causing serious injuries. The defendant left the scene after briefly stopping. The incident was reported to police, and evidence, including GPS data and crash reconstruction, indicated the defendant was speeding, crossed into the opposite lane, and that his alcohol consumption contributed to the crash. Due to a delay in identifying the defendant, no chemical test of his blood-alcohol concentration (BAC) was performed at the time of the accident.The State initially charged the defendant with aggravated assault and leaving the scene of an accident involving serious bodily injury or death. A grand jury later indicted him on additional charges, including aggravated operating under the influence (OUI). The State notified the defendant that it would use expert testimony based on the Widmark formula to estimate his BAC at the time of the crash, given the absence of a chemical test. The defendant moved to exclude this testimony, but the trial court allowed the State’s chemist to testify that the defendant’s BAC exceeded .08, while prohibiting the chemist from giving an exact number or invoking statutory presumptions of intoxication. The jury found the defendant guilty on all counts, and the trial court denied his motion for acquittal.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. It held that Maine’s OUI statutes do not require a chemical test as the exclusive means of proving BAC and permit the use of reliable expert opinion testimony, such as that based on the Widmark formula. The Court also found that the expert’s testimony was sufficiently tailored to the facts and thus admissible. Additionally, the Court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the aggravated assault conviction. The judgment was affirmed, with a remand to correct the sentencing record to reflect concurrent sentences. View "State of Maine v. MacKenzie" on Justia Law