Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Pat Doe and Jarrod Burnham each filed complaints for protection from abuse against each other in December 2021. Doe's complaint was transferred to Portland for a consolidated hearing, where the court found that Burnham had abused Doe and granted her a two-year protection order effective until January 14, 2024. On January 4, 2024, Doe attempted to file a motion to extend the protection order in Bangor but was informed it needed to be filed in Portland. She mailed the motion on January 13, 2024, but it never arrived due to insufficient postage. Doe learned the order had not been extended on January 17, 2024, and filed a new protection from abuse action in Bangor.The District Court in Portland denied Doe's motion to extend the protection order, concluding it could not extend an expired order. Doe's motion for reconsideration was also denied, with the court finding that her failure to file on time was not excusable neglect and that the statute did not permit extending an expired order. Doe then filed a motion for relief from judgment, arguing excusable neglect, which was also denied. The court stated that excusable neglect under M.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) did not apply to statutory deadlines.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court's decisions, holding that 19-A M.R.S. § 4111(1) unambiguously prohibits extending an expired protection order. The court also held that a motion for relief from judgment cannot be used to circumvent statutory authority, and thus the trial court did not err in denying Doe's motion for relief from judgment. View "Doe v. Burnham" on Justia Law

Michaela Boland filed for divorce in October 2019. In September 2022, the parties reached a settlement agreement regarding the economic issues of their divorce, which was accepted by the court. The agreement included a provision for Nicholas Belair to transfer $50,000 annually to Michaela for five years, secured by a promissory note from Nicholas's father, Roland Belair. However, Roland later reneged on his commitment to fund the payments, leading Michaela to file a motion to enforce the settlement agreement.The District Court (Tice, J.) denied Michaela's motion to enforce the settlement agreement, finding that the agreement was based on a material mistake of fact and was therefore unenforceable. The court concluded that Nicholas could not make the payments without his father's assistance and set the matter for trial. Michaela appealed, but the appeal was dismissed as interlocutory. The court (D. Driscoll, J.) later held a bench trial and determined that Nicholas's interest in a real estate company was nonmarital property, leading to a final divorce judgment.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and held that the settlement agreement was enforceable. The court found that all requirements for a binding settlement agreement were met, as the parties had reported the agreement to the court, read its terms into the record, and expressed clear consent. The court concluded that there was no mistake of fact at the time the agreement was reached, as Roland had agreed to fund the payments. The court vacated the order denying Michaela's motion to enforce, vacated the divorce judgment, and remanded for incorporation of the settlement agreement into a divorce judgment. View "Boland v. Belair" on Justia Law

Yolanda M. Currier and James M. Currier were married in 2000, and Yolanda filed for divorce in 2017. The divorce judgment, entered in 2019, awarded Yolanda sole parental rights and responsibilities for their three children, child support, spousal support, and half the value of James’s employee stock plan and 401(k) account. James was found to have committed economic misconduct by cashing in stocks and taking loans against his 401(k) during the divorce proceedings.The District Court (South Paris) found James in contempt multiple times for failing to comply with the divorce judgment. In 2023, Yolanda filed a fifth motion for contempt, asserting that James failed to provide an accounting of his stocks and did not file a proposed qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) for the division of his 401(k) account. The court found James not in contempt regarding the stock division, concluding that Yolanda did not prove James owned stocks. However, the court found James in contempt regarding the 401(k) account, valuing it at $7,000 and awarding Yolanda $3,500.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and found that the District Court erred in its findings. The Supreme Judicial Court concluded that Yolanda met her burden of proving James’s noncompliance with the stock accounting and division order. The court also found that the District Court erred in valuing the 401(k) account at $7,000, as this figure excluded the value of loans taken against the account, contrary to the divorce judgment’s provisions.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated the District Court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, noting James’s pattern of noncompliance and suggesting the consideration of punitive sanctions if his contumacious conduct continues. View "Currier v. Currier" on Justia Law

Pat Doe filed a complaint for protection from harassment against John Costin on behalf of her two minor children, alleging aggressive behavior by Costin, including blocking their car at school. The District Court issued a temporary order for protection, which was later made permanent for the children but not for Doe. Doe did not request attorney fees within the required time frame.Doe later moved to modify the order, fearing that Costin might access the school after a no-trespass notice expired. The court modified the order to prohibit Costin from entering the school when the children were present and awarded Doe attorney fees. Costin opposed the modification and the attorney fees, arguing the motion was frivolous and untimely.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. The court found the appeal regarding the modified order moot since it had expired. However, it reviewed the attorney fees award, determining that the lower court erred in awarding fees for services provided before the motion to modify. The court vacated the attorney fees award and remanded the case for reconsideration of fees related only to the motion to modify. View "Doe v. Costin" on Justia Law

Christian D., the father of a three-year-old child, appealed a judgment by the District Court (South Paris) that terminated his parental rights. The court found him unfit as a parent and determined that termination was in the child's best interest. The father argued that the court abused its discretion by not making specific findings of fact to support its decision and by not adequately considering a permanency guardianship as an alternative to termination.The District Court found that the father was unfit based on three grounds under 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i), (ii), and (iv). The court noted that the child had been in the custody of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) for 26 of his 35 months and that the child needed permanency, which the father could not provide in a timely manner. The child had been living in a stable and nurturing foster home with his maternal grandparents, who were willing to adopt him.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's judgment. The court held that the District Court properly exercised its discretion and that the record supported the findings that termination of the father's parental rights and adoption were in the child's best interest. The court also rejected the father's argument that Rule 52(a) precluded reliance on inferences or implicit findings, noting that the trial court's findings were sufficient to support the judgment. The court emphasized the importance of permanency for the child and found that the father's inability to provide a stable environment justified the termination of his parental rights. View "In re Child of Christian D." on Justia Law

Taylor M. appealed a judgment from the District Court terminating her parental rights to her child, arguing that her due process rights were violated and that the court failed to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The child, born prematurely with various medical conditions, required extensive care. Taylor M., a registered member of the Mi’kmaq Nation, was largely absent during the child’s initial hospitalization. The Department of Health and Human Services filed for a child protection order, which was granted, and the child was placed with resource parents.The District Court held a jeopardy hearing in January 2023, finding clear and convincing evidence of jeopardy due to Taylor M.’s inability to care for the child. The court scheduled several hearings, but delays occurred, and the child’s resource parents moved out of state with the Department and tribe’s agreement. In October 2023, the Department filed a petition to terminate Taylor M.’s parental rights. At the consolidated hearing in January 2024, the court heard testimony from various parties, including the ICWA director for the Mi’kmaq Nation.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and found that the District Court complied with ICWA requirements. The court determined that the Department made active efforts to reunify the family and that Taylor M. did not take significant steps to address the jeopardy. The court also found beyond a reasonable doubt that continued custody by Taylor M. would likely result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child. The court affirmed the termination of Taylor M.’s parental rights, concluding that the child’s placement with the resource parents was appropriate and in the child’s best interest. View "In re Child of Taylor M." on Justia Law

A District Court in Caribou, Maine, issued a judgment in February 2024 regarding the parental rights and responsibilities of a child born to Andrew M. Landeen and Ashley Burch, who were former romantic partners but never married. The court granted primary physical residence to Burch and visitation rights to Landeen. Additionally, the court changed the child's last name to "Landeen" without providing specific findings or comments on the decision. Burch appealed the name change, and Landeen cross-appealed the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities.The District Court's judgment was based on the best interest of the child, considering factors such as the parents' ability to cooperate and the child's emotional and physical safety. The court found that Landeen's persistent anger towards Burch and his inability to manage frustration appropriately were detrimental to the child's best interest. Consequently, the court allocated primary parental rights to Burch while allowing Landeen visitation rights and the right to be informed of major decisions concerning the child.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and found that the District Court's allocation of parental rights and responsibilities was supported by the record and did not constitute an abuse of discretion. However, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the portion of the judgment changing the child's last name. The court held that the father’s desire to change the child's surname, based solely on tradition and without supporting evidence, did not meet the statutory requirement of showing "good cause" or that the change was in the child's best interest. The court emphasized that both parents have equal rights in naming their child and that any name change must be justified by the child's best interest. View "Landeen v. Burch" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between the Government Oversight Committee of the 131st Maine Legislature and the Maine Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) over access to confidential records related to the deaths of four children in 2021. The DHHS refused to provide the records, citing confidentiality laws. The Committee then filed an action in the Superior Court (Kennebec County) to compel the DHHS to comply with its subpoena. The Superior Court denied the Committee’s request, and the Committee appealed.The Superior Court (Kennebec County) ruled that the Committee did not have the statutory authority to access the confidential records and denied the motion to compel. The Committee then appealed the decision to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The Court held that the Committee does not have the statutory authority to access confidential records under the OPEGA statute, which limits the Committee’s access to public information and records. The Court also found that the statutory exception in 22 M.R.S. § 4008(3)(D) does not apply to the Committee, as it is not considered a “legislative official with responsibility for child protection services.” Additionally, the Court rejected the Committee’s argument that it has inherent legislative power to compel the disclosure of confidential information via subpoena, as this power is limited by the Committee’s statutorily prescribed duties and the nature of the information it may receive. View "Government Oversight Committee v. Department of Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

The parties were married in October 1996, and John A. Jewell Sr. filed for divorce in February 2018. The divorce judgment, entered in March 2019, required Jewell to pay Carol L. Brewer $2,000 per month in spousal support indefinitely. Jewell was found to have an earning capacity of $80,000, while Brewer was deemed fully disabled with no formal education or training. Jewell later moved to modify the spousal support, citing decreased earning capacity and Brewer’s cohabitation, but his motion was denied in June 2021. Jewell appealed, but the denial was upheld.In December 2022, Jewell filed another motion to modify the spousal support, again alleging Brewer’s cohabitation. The District Court (Bangor, Szylvian, J.) held a hearing in August 2023 and found that Jewell’s income had decreased to $52,000 per year and that Brewer had the capacity to work, despite her disability claims. The court terminated Jewell’s spousal support obligation but required him to pay $500 per month towards arrearages and attorney fees.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and found that there was no evidentiary support for the District Court’s finding that Brewer had the capacity to earn income. The court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for the District Court to reevaluate whether there has been a substantial change in circumstances since the most recent judgment. If such a change is found, the court must then determine whether to modify the spousal support based on the new findings. View "Jewell v. Brewer" on Justia Law

Gregory R. Flagg filed for divorce from Shauna K. Bartlett in 2012, resulting in a settlement agreement that included shared parental rights and responsibilities, with a child support order requiring Flagg to pay $81 weekly. In 2021, Bartlett moved to modify the child support order, and Flagg cross-moved to modify the divorce judgment and child support order, citing substantial changes in circumstances. The District Court initially granted Flagg's motion, determining that Bartlett did not provide substantially equal care and awarded primary residence to Flagg without child support. Bartlett then filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment.The District Court later amended its judgment, granting Bartlett's motion to modify child support and denying Flagg's cross-motion. The court found that although Flagg provided more care, the level of care had not significantly changed since the original agreement. The court concluded that the care provided by both parents was substantially equal and modified Flagg's child support obligation to $185 weekly. Flagg appealed, arguing that the court erred in determining that the parties provided substantially equal care.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and found that the District Court had abused its discretion by failing to properly assess whether the parties provided substantially equal care for the purpose of determining child support. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the amended judgment, the amended child support order, and the order denying Flagg's motions for findings of fact and conclusions of law. The case was remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the parties are providing substantially equal care and to make consistent findings of fact and conclusions of law. View "Flagg v. Bartlett" on Justia Law