Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court terminating Mother’s parental rights to her son pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 22, 4055(1)(A)(1)(a) and (B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(ii), (iv). The court held (1) given the trial court’s findings of fact, all of which were supported by competent evidence in the record, the court did not err in its unfitness determination, nor did it err or abuse its discretion in determining that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest; and (2) the Department of Health and Human Services complied with Me. Rev. Stat. 22, 4041 by developing an adequate reunification plan and made a good faith effort to cooperate with and seek the participation of Mother throughout these proceedings. View "In re Landon S." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court terminating the parental rights of Mother and Father to their twin sons and the parental rights of Mother to her daughter pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 22, 4055(1)(A)(1)(a), (B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(ii), (iv). The Supreme Court held, contrary to the parents’ contentions on appeal, that competent evidence in the record supported the court’s findings that Parents were unwilling or unable to protect the children from jeopardy and otherwise take responsibility for the children within a time reasonably calculated to meet the children’s needs and that Father failed to make a good faith effort to rehabilitate and reunify with the children. Further, the court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the children’s grandmother’s testimony as hearsay. View "In re Hope H." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court terminating the parental rights of Parents to their child pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 22, 4055(1)(A)(1)(a) and (B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(ii), (iv). Specifically, the court held that the findings were sufficient to support the trial court’s determinations that Parents were unable to protect the child from jeopardy or take responsibility for the child within a time reasonably calculated to meet his needs, that they had failed to make a good faith effort to rehabilitate and reunify with the child, and that termination of the Parents’ parental rights was in the child’s best interest. View "In re Braxton M." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting Eric Teele’s motion to modify his child support obligation to his former wife but denying his request to be reimbursed for support he had paid during a period when he was disabled. Teele requested the reimbursement because, as a result of his disability, the parties’ two children received a retroactive lump-sum dependent benefit from the Social Security Administration (SSA) covering the same period when he had made payments. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the district court did not err in its interpretation and application of Me. Rev. Stat. 19-A, 2107 and Me. Rev. Stat. 19-A, 2009(2) in denying Teele’s request for reimbursement of child support during a period during which the children received retroactive dependent benefits from the SSA. View "Teele v. West-Harper" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed Defendant’s appeal from a judgment of the district court adopting the order of a family law magistrate granting Mother’s motion to modify a child support order included in the divorce judgment between Burdin and Anthony Kline. The child support order did not order Kline to pay child support. Burdin later filed a motion to modify the child support provisions of the divorce judgment, seeking an order requiring Kline to pay child support calculated pursuant to the child support guidelines. A magistrate granted Burdin’s motion. Kline appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and remanded the case because there is no right of direct appeal from a magistrate’s order. On remand, the district court treated Kline’s appeal as a Me. R. Civ. P. 118(a) objection to the magistrate’s order and adopted that order as the court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 118(a)(2). Kline appealed from the court’s adoption of the magistrate’s order. The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed the appeal because Kline failed to file a timely objection to the magistrate’s order as required by Rule 118, therefore waiving both his right to contest it in district court and to appeal. View "Kline v. Burdin" on Justia Law

The district court erred by issuing an order for protection from abuse entered in the district court on a complaint filed by Susan Chretien because the court explicitly did not find that Russell Chretien had abused Susan. The district court found that Russell presented a “credible threat” but concluded that it was not going to find that Susan was, in fact, abused by Russell. The Supreme Judicial Court held (1) Russell’s appeal remained justiciable even though the protective order had expired; and (2) because the court concluded that Susan failed to prove any form of abuse, the court erred in issuing a protective order. View "Chretien v. Chretien" on Justia Law

Father lived the child and her mother, outside of Maine, until 2008, when the child was about six months old. After that time, he maintained regular contact with the child, who resided primarily in New York, but was never her primary caregiver. In 2016 Mother moved to Maine with the child. Father, who is incarcerated in Massachusetts, did not oppose the move. While he was incarcerated the child asked a neighbor for help and the Maine Department of Health and Human Services commenced a child protection proceeding. Father made no effort to take responsibility. The Department obtained a preliminary protection order, 22 M.R.S. 4032-4036, and placed the child in foster care after hospitalization for psychiatric care. Father was served with notice and provided with appointed counsel, who moved to dismiss the petition for lack of personal jurisdiction because Father is not a Maine resident, has never traveled to Maine,and otherwise lacked sufficient minimum contacts with Maine. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the court’s rejection of that motion. The court was not required to have jurisdiction over Father to have authority to issue a jeopardy order to protect the child. View "In re Emma B." on Justia Law

Evelyn and Elijah, twins, were born to parents who had previously been found guilty of manslaughter. The twins went from the hospital into foster care. The district court later terminated both parents’ parental rights to the twins. The parents appealed and moved for relief from the judgment of termination and later moved for relief from the court’s initial finding of jeopardy, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court concluded that trial counsel had been ineffective at the jeopardy stage and vacated the termination order. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the court’s judgment granting the parents’ motion for relief as it affected the original jeopardy determination and remanded, holding that the district court erred in addressing the parents’ untimely raised ineffective assistance of counsel allegations, in ordering further reunification efforts, and in declining to adjudicate the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding the termination proceeding. View "In re Evelyn A." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court terminating the parental rights of Mother and Father pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 22, 4055(1)(A)(1)(a) and (B)(2)(a), (b)(i), (b)(ii). Specifically, the court held (1) the district court’s supported factual findings were sufficient for the court to have found at least one ground of parental unfitness; (2) the district court adequately explained how the deficits of the parents rendered each parent unable to meet the individual needs of each child; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that termination of the parents’ parental rights was in the children’s best interest. View "In re Myra B." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court terminating the parental rights of Mother and Father pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 22, 4055(1)(A)(1)(a) and (B)(2)(a), (b)(i), (b)(ii). Specifically, the court held (1) the district court’s supported factual findings were sufficient for the court to have found at least one ground of parental unfitness; (2) the district court adequately explained how the deficits of the parents rendered each parent unable to meet the individual needs of each child; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that termination of the parents’ parental rights was in the children’s best interest. View "In re Myra B." on Justia Law