Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Kimberly Heilig appealed from a judgment of the district court divorcing her from Ernest Neri, dividing the parties’ assets, ordering Neri to pay Heilig’s spousal support for three years, and ordering Neri to pay $2,000 toward Heilig’s attorney fees. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not clearly err in finding that real estate purchased by Neri during the marriage was nonmarital property; (2) did not abuse its discretion in calculating Heilig’s spousal support award; and (3) did not abuse its discretion by awarding Heilig a lesser amount of legal fees than she requested. View "Neri v. Heilig" on Justia Law

Mother appealed from a judgment of divorce entered in the district court, arguing that the provision requiring each parent to transport, or allow the other parent to transport, the parties’ children to extracurricular activities violated her constitutionally-protected liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of her children. The provision was entered after a dispute between the parents over the children’s level of involvement in a developmental soccer league. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) a court order that allows one parent to make the decision on a disputed child-related issue does not violate the constitutional rights of either parent; and (2) the court did not abuse its discretion in finding that continued participation in soccer was in each child’s best interest, or in ordering the default transportation provision. View "Mills v. Fleming" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court terminating Mother’s parental rights to Skyler, Rosalee, and Austin, and Father’s parental rights to Rosalee and Austin pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 22, 4055(1)(A)(1)(a) and (B)(2)(a), (b)(i), (ii). The court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parents were unable to take responsibility for the children within a time reasonably calculated to meet the children’s needs, that they were unable to protect the children from jeopardy and that those circumstances were unlikely to change within a time reasonably calculated to meet the children’s needs, and that termination of Parents’ parental rights was in the children’s best interest. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the court did not err or abuse its discretion in determining that termination of Parents’ parental rights, with a permanency plan of adoption, was in each child’s best interest. View "In re Skyler F." on Justia Law

The district court did not err in finding jeopardy as to both Mother and Father and ordering that Child be placed in the custody of the Department of Health and Human Services pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 22, 4036(1)(F). The court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that as to both parents, Child was in circumstances of jeopardy to her health and welfare. Mother did not challenge the finding of jeopardy as to her. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) a dispositional order of custody is not appealable; and (2) the court’s finding that Child was more likely than not in circumstances of jeopardy in Father’s care was supported by competent record evidence. View "In re Kaliyah B." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court terminating Father’s parental rights to Child pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 22, 4055(1)(A)(1)(a) and (B)(2) and the denial of Father’s motion for a new trial or for reconsideration. On appeal, Father argued that the court deprived him of due process by terminating his parental rights even though he was not present at the final termination hearing and by failing to grant his motion for a new trial or provide him with an alternative opportunity to be heard when he later told the court that he had not attended the hearing due to transportation problems. The Supreme Judicial Court held that Father’s failure to explain how his participation in the trial would have affected the court’s determinations that he was parentally unfit and that termination was in the child’s best interest, and therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion by denying Father’s motion for a new trial or for reconsideration. View "In re Kaylianna C." on Justia Law

The district court did not err in terminating Parents’ parental rights to their child pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 22, 4055(1)(B)(2). Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the district court’s factual findings that Parents were unwilling or unable to protect the child from jeopardy and those circumstances were unlikely to change within a time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs were supported by competent evidence in the record and were therefore not clearly erroneous. In regard to Mother, it was not a violation of due process for the court to make an explicit finding concerning her parental unfitness in an amended order without first holding a new hearing because Mother fully participated in the hearing from which the facts underlying the court’s legal judgment were derived. View "In re Gabriel W." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the probate court denying Carol A. Boardman’s petition for a name change, holding that a person’s potential misunderstanding of another person’s marital status, without more, does not qualify as fraud that would preclude the grant of a name change petition. Boardman sought to change her name to “Currier,” which was the last name of her friend. The court denied the petition, concluding that the potential effect of the name change would be to give the public the impression she and her friend were a married couple, thus demonstrating a purpose of “defrauding another person or entity.” Me. Rev. Stat. 18-A, 1-701(f). The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that Boardman met all the requirements for the change of her last name imposed by section 1-701. View "In re Carol A. Boardman" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgments of the district court terminating Mother’s parental rights to Lacie G. and Tyler S. pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 22, 4055(1)(A)(1)(a), (B)(2). Specifically, the court held (1) given the findings, which were supported by competent evidence in the record, the district court did not err in finding, by clear and convincing evidence, at least one ground of parental unfitness; and (2) the court did not err or abuse its discretion in determining that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of Tyler and Lacie. View "In re Lacie G." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgments of the district court terminating Mother’s parental rights to her children, Mackenzie P. and Antonio P. pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 22, 4055(1)(A)(1), (B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(ii). Specifically, the court held (1) given the findings, were were supported by competent evidence in the record, the district court did not err in finding at least one ground of parental unfitness and in determining that termination of Mother’s parental rights with a permanency plan of adoption was in the children’s best interests; and (2) because the court acted at Mother’s request to prevent any prejudice by excluding the testimony of a guardian ad litem at the termination hearing. View "In re Mackenzie P." on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal were two judgments of the district court. The first judgment clarified that a divorce judgment required Appellant to pay $50,000 plus post-judgment interest to Appellee and ordered that a writ of execution should issue. The second judgment, issued after a writ of execution had issued, clarified an ambiguity in the first judgment and directing that a new writ should issue in the amount of $50,000 plus interest. The Supreme Court dismissed as untimely the appeal from the first judgment clarifying the divorce judgment and affirmed the second judgment clarifying the terms on which the writ of execution would issue, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in entering a judgment clarifying that a writ of execution should issue in the same amount as the clarifying judgment. View "Chamberlain v. Harriman" on Justia Law