Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court terminating Father’s parental rights to Child pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 22, 4055(1)(A)(1)(a) and (B)(2) and the denial of Father’s motion for a new trial or for reconsideration. On appeal, Father argued that the court deprived him of due process by terminating his parental rights even though he was not present at the final termination hearing and by failing to grant his motion for a new trial or provide him with an alternative opportunity to be heard when he later told the court that he had not attended the hearing due to transportation problems. The Supreme Judicial Court held that Father’s failure to explain how his participation in the trial would have affected the court’s determinations that he was parentally unfit and that termination was in the child’s best interest, and therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion by denying Father’s motion for a new trial or for reconsideration. View "In re Kaylianna C." on Justia Law

The district court did not err in terminating Parents’ parental rights to their child pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 22, 4055(1)(B)(2). Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the district court’s factual findings that Parents were unwilling or unable to protect the child from jeopardy and those circumstances were unlikely to change within a time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs were supported by competent evidence in the record and were therefore not clearly erroneous. In regard to Mother, it was not a violation of due process for the court to make an explicit finding concerning her parental unfitness in an amended order without first holding a new hearing because Mother fully participated in the hearing from which the facts underlying the court’s legal judgment were derived. View "In re Gabriel W." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the probate court denying Carol A. Boardman’s petition for a name change, holding that a person’s potential misunderstanding of another person’s marital status, without more, does not qualify as fraud that would preclude the grant of a name change petition. Boardman sought to change her name to “Currier,” which was the last name of her friend. The court denied the petition, concluding that the potential effect of the name change would be to give the public the impression she and her friend were a married couple, thus demonstrating a purpose of “defrauding another person or entity.” Me. Rev. Stat. 18-A, 1-701(f). The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that Boardman met all the requirements for the change of her last name imposed by section 1-701. View "In re Carol A. Boardman" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgments of the district court terminating Mother’s parental rights to Lacie G. and Tyler S. pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 22, 4055(1)(A)(1)(a), (B)(2). Specifically, the court held (1) given the findings, which were supported by competent evidence in the record, the district court did not err in finding, by clear and convincing evidence, at least one ground of parental unfitness; and (2) the court did not err or abuse its discretion in determining that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of Tyler and Lacie. View "In re Lacie G." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgments of the district court terminating Mother’s parental rights to her children, Mackenzie P. and Antonio P. pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 22, 4055(1)(A)(1), (B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(ii). Specifically, the court held (1) given the findings, were were supported by competent evidence in the record, the district court did not err in finding at least one ground of parental unfitness and in determining that termination of Mother’s parental rights with a permanency plan of adoption was in the children’s best interests; and (2) because the court acted at Mother’s request to prevent any prejudice by excluding the testimony of a guardian ad litem at the termination hearing. View "In re Mackenzie P." on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal were two judgments of the district court. The first judgment clarified that a divorce judgment required Appellant to pay $50,000 plus post-judgment interest to Appellee and ordered that a writ of execution should issue. The second judgment, issued after a writ of execution had issued, clarified an ambiguity in the first judgment and directing that a new writ should issue in the amount of $50,000 plus interest. The Supreme Court dismissed as untimely the appeal from the first judgment clarifying the divorce judgment and affirmed the second judgment clarifying the terms on which the writ of execution would issue, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in entering a judgment clarifying that a writ of execution should issue in the same amount as the clarifying judgment. View "Chamberlain v. Harriman" on Justia Law

James Black appealed an order of the district court denying Dorothy Black’s motion for contempt but nonetheless ordering James to pay Dorothy a sum that the court determined he owed her pursuant to the parties’ divorce judgment. Specifically, James argued that the court lacked authority to grant Dorothy any form of relief upon denying her motion for contempt, which was not accompanied by a motion to enforce. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that, under the unique circumstances of this case, the court acted within its authority by issuing an order requiring James to pay Dorothy the arrearage owed to her and that James was not unfairly prejudiced as a result. View "Black v. Black" on Justia Law

Kimberly Quinty filed a motion to extend the spousal support provision of the divorce judgment granting a divorce to her and Steven Johnson. The district court granted Steven’s motion to dismiss Kimberly’s motion, concluding that reinstating the award of spousal support after the obligation to pay spousal support had expired was prohibited by law. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly found that its authority to reinstate the spousal support award had ceased under to the parties’ settlement agreement, which was incorporated into the divorce judgment, and therefore, Quinty’s untimely motion failed to allege facts that would entitle her to relief. View "Quinty v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The district court found John Knoblach in contempt for failing to pay spousal support to Stacylee Morris as required by the parties’ divorce decree and imposed a period of incarceration unless Knoblach paid the arrearage within a specified time. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion by proceeding with the contempt hearing without objection on the scheduled date, and even if the district court erred by holding the contempt hearing one day too soon based on the amount of notice Knoblach was entitled to receive pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 66(d)(2)(C), Knoblach failed to demonstrate that the contempt order should be vacated. View "Knoblach v. Morris" on Justia Law

Wife appealed from the judgment of divorce from Husband entered in the district court. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion (1) by limiting Wife’s financial discovery from Husband’s current partner, a third party; (2) in its findings regarding the value of marital property; (3) by declining to find specifically that Husband’s discovery violations constituted economic misconduct; (4) in its findings supporting its award of spousal support and in failing to award Wife additional support; and (5) declining to award Wife attorney fees. View "Bernsten v. Berntsen" on Justia Law