Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2015, the three children of Mother and Father came into the custody of the Department of Health and Human Services. After the Department’s efforts to reunify the family failed due to a combination of the parents’ mental health issues and their choices, the trial court terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to their children. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to support the court’s findings that the parents were unwilling or unable to protect the children from jeopardy and that these circumstances were unlikely to change within a time reasonably calculated to meet the children’s needs; and (2) there was sufficient evidence to support the court’s finding that termination was in the best interest of the children. View "In re Gracesun C." on Justia Law

In 2011, the York County Probate Court appointed Daniel Golodner’s stepmother, Gail Golodner, as the full, permanent guardian of Daniel’s minor daughter, Alisha Golodner. In 2014, Daniel filed a petition to terminate the guardianship. The probate court denied Daniel’s petition after a hearing. Daniel appealed. Thereafter, Gail died. Daniel filed a motion for relief from the probate court’s order asking the Supreme Court to “clarify and settle his status as sole custodian.” The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the portion of the judgment relating to the court’s order regarding guardian ad litem fees as a sanction, and dismissed the appeal in all other respects, as it presented issues that have become moot. The Court further ordered the immediate return of the case file to the probate court with the directive that it take action regarding Alisha’s care. View "In re Guardianship of Alisha K. Golodner" on Justia Law

The district court entered judgment terminating Father’s parental rights to his child. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the Court need not reach Father’s argument that the district court violated his due process right by applying a rebuttable presumption of parental unfitness and improperly placing the burden of proof on him because the court also found an alternative form of parental unfitness; (2) the court’s affirmative findings supporting its parental unfitness determination were supported by the evidence; and (3) the district court did not err or abuse its discretion in finding that termination was in the child’s best interest. View "In re Forest G." on Justia Law

In June 2016, the district court entered two judgments terminating Mother’s parents rights as to Logan M. and Bryson L. and Father’s parental rights as to Bryson. The court found by clear and convincing evidence that the parents were unable to protect the children from jeopardy and were unable to take responsibility for the children within a time reasonably calculated to meet the children’s needs and that termination was in the best interest of each child. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) there was competent evidence in the record to support the court’s findings, by clear and convincing evidence, of Mother’s and Father’s parental unfitness; and (2) the court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that termination of the parents’ parental rights was in the best interest of the children. View "In re Logan M." on Justia Law

In 2014, when Cameron was almost one year old, the Department of Health and Human Services obtained a preliminary protection order placing the child in the Department’s custody. The district court made a finding of jeopardy as to both parents based on their substance abuse. In 2016, the Department filed a second petition to terminate the parental rights of both Mother and Father. After a hearing, the court terminated both parents’ parental rights to Cameron. Both parents appealed. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that termination was in the best interest of the child. View "In re Cameron B." on Justia Law

In 2001, Steven Dunwoody and Janice Dunwoody were divorced. Steven was ordered to pay child support. Steven never paid child support, but the parties’ children received dependent benefits based on Steven’s disability. In 2014, the Department of Health and Human Services issued a notice of debt. Steven then filed a motion seeking a modification of his child support obligation and a declaration that he did not owe any arrearages. The magistrate granted Steven’s motion to modify child support but denied his request for a declaration that he did not owe past support. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the magistrate did not err in determining that Steven owed a child support arrearage of $21,978; and (2) the magistrate did not err in determining that there was no legal or equitable theory that would be a defense to Janice’s attempt to collect on that debt. View "Dunwoody v. Dunwoody" on Justia Law

Jessica Lisio and Tammy Thorndike, who lives as a man, began a relationship in 2005 when Lisio’s son, Caden, was one year old. In 2009, Arianna was born to Lisio, who was artificially inseminated. That same year, Lisio and Thorndike registered as domestic partners. In 2012, Thorndike moved out. In 2014, Thorndike filed a complaint for a determination of paternity and parental rights and responsibilities. Thorndike subsequently moved to amend his complaint to allege de facto parenthood. The court found by clear and convincing evidence that Thorndike was a de facto parent and then entered a parental rights and responsibilities order that provided for the children’s primary residence to be with Lisio and for the children to have contact with Thorndike on a gradually increasing schedule. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the court did not err in finding that Thorndike was the de facto parent of Caden and Arianna. View "Thorndike v. Lisio" on Justia Law

In 2012, the probate court appointed Aunt as the guardian of Child and awarded Grandmother rights of contact with Child. In 2015 and 2016, Aunt and Grandmother filed motions relating to the terms of the guardianships and Grandmother’s contact rights. The probate court denied the motions after a hearing. Further, upon Grandmother’s motion, the court found Aunt’s attorney (Attorney) in contempt and imposed sanctions against her. Both Aunt and Attorney appealed. The Supreme Judicial Court (1) affirmed the order denying Aunt’s motion, holding that there was no error in the court’s factual determinations; but (2) vacated the contempt finding and order of sanctions against Attorney, holding that Grandmother’s motion did not satisfy the procedural requirements of Me. R. Civ. P. 66(d)(2)(C), and the court did not implement the process required by that rule. View "Guardianship of Isabella Ard" on Justia Law

In a divorce judgment, the district court awarded Mother the right to provide the parties’ minor child’s primary residence. Mother moved to modify the terms of the divorce judgment and later moved to enforce the divorce judgment. The court denied Mother’s motion to enforce the divorce but did modify the terms of the divorce judgment. Mother appealed, arguing that the court erred in interpreting the divorce judgment concerning her authority to take the child on an annual trip to Brazil and violated her fundamental right to parent by modifying the divorce judgment to award the parental grandparents contact with the child. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding (1) because the divorce judgment unambiguously provided for the child’s annual travel to Brazil, the denial of the motion to enforce the judgment and the court’s modification of that provision were error; and (2) before a court may grant a third party contact with a child pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 19-A 1653(2)(B), the third party must file both a motion to intervene in the matter and his or her own motion seeking such contact, and these requirements were not met as to the paternal grandparents in this case. Remanded. View "Curtis v. Medeiros" on Justia Law

The district court terminated Father’s parental rights to his child, determining that Father was parentally unfit within the meaning of the child protection statutes and that termination was in the child’s best interest. Father appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the court’s determinations. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence supported the court’s ultimate finding of parental unfitness; and (2) given the evidence in the record, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that termination was in the child’s best interest. View "In re Carlos C." on Justia Law