Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Husband and Wife had been married for about seventeen years when Wife filed a complaint for divorce. After a trial, the district court entered a divorce judgment granting the parties a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable marital differences. Husband appealed, challenging the court’s division of the marital property. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in its consideration of the factors required by Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 19-A 953(1)-(3); (2) did not clearly err in its findings of fact; and (3) did not abuse its discretion in dividing the marital estate. View "Hutt v. Hanson" on Justia Law

After a hearing, the district court terminated the parental rights of Mother and Father to their three children. The parents appealed. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) Mother’s and Father’s arguments that the court erred in faulting them for their failures to fulfill adequately the requirements of their reunification plans failed because they did not have support in the record and were based on a misapprehension of the district court’s reasoning; and (2) the record supported the court’s findings of at least one ground of parental unfitness and that termination was in the best interest of the children. View "In re Magdalena F." on Justia Law

Stephen Cushing and Ann Cushing were divorced in 2011. In 2014, Stephen filed a motion to modify the divorce judgment’s child contact schedule and child support provision. In 2015, due to Stephen’s continued failure to comply with court orders, the court dismissed Stephen’s motion with prejudice and established a procedure to determine the final amount of the attorney fee award to Ann. Stephen appealed. The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appeal was untimely and that Stephen failed to meet his burden of establishing that he was entitled to an extension of time for filing the appeal. View "Cushing v. Cushing" on Justia Law

The Department of Health and Human Services filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights to her child. After a termination hearing, the district court terminated Mother’s parental rights, determining by clear and convincing evidence that the Department proved at least one ground of parental unfitness and that termination was in the best interest of the child. Mother appealed, challenging the court’s findings and asserting that she was denied effective assistance of counsel during the termination proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court’s judgment was supported by the evidence; and (2) Mother failed to present a prima facie case of attorney ineffectiveness. View "In re Aliyah M." on Justia Law

In 2011, Father and Mother were divorced pursuant to a divorce judgment. In 2015, the district court found Father in contempt for violating the divorce judgment. The court also denied Father’s motion to modify his child support obligation. The Supreme Court vacated in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the court did not abuse its discretion by finding Father in contempt for nonpayment of child support for the years 2011, 2013 and 2014; (2) the court erred by finding that Father had not fully paid child support for 2012 and that he was in contempt for nonpayment for that year; (3) the court did not err by finding that there was no substantial change in circumstances warranting a modification of Father’s child support obligation; and (4) the court did not err by determining that Father was obligated to sell the marital home and to divide the proceeds pursuant to the terms of the divorce agreement. View "McCarthy v. Goroshin" on Justia Law

A divorce judgment was entered providing for the shared primary residence of Mother and Father’s child. The district court subsequently modified the judgment, which created a more complicated schedule of contact. Due to the frequent transitions between parental homes and tensions between her parents, the child became depressed. By the time she was almost eight years old, the child had a serious breakdown. While Mother’s and Father’s post-divorce motions were pending, the court ordered a less complex schedule. At the conclusion of the trial on the motions, the district court ordered that a similar schedule become part of the parties’ modified divorce judgment. The resulting judgment established primary residence of the child with Mother. Father appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the record supported the court’s determination that establishing primary residence with Mother and modifying the schedule of contact was in the child’s best interest. View "Little v. Wallace" on Justia Law

Pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. 252(1)(A), a referee held hearings and issued a report, finding: The parties were married in France, in 2006. Their child was born in 2008. A protection order had issued, based on findings that Karamanoglu had abused Gourlaouen and the child. The child’s therapist and the guardian ad litem agreed that it was in the child’s best interest to have unsupervised visitation with Karamanoglu, who had entered counseling. The report recommended shared parental rights and responsibilities, including shared primary residence and care. The parties jointly own properties in Primelin, France; Freeport; and Yarmouth. The parties had entered into a standard French marriage contract, which is valid and enforceable, and had supplemented that contract. The referee recommended: Karamanoglu’s and Gourlaouen’s shares of the equity in the Yarmouth property to be $3.1 million and $1.4 million respectively; that the Yarmouth and Freeport properties be set aside to Karamanoglu; that Gourlaouen be awarded the Primelin property; that Karamanoglu pay $1 million to Gourlaouen; and that Karamanoglu pay Gourlaouen spousal support of $3,800 per month for five years. The court adopted the reports. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated with respect to co-parenting counseling, the child's medical and mental health treatment, and mandatory pre-filing mediation, and found error in the analysis of the parties’ interests in the Primelin property. View "Karamanoglu v. Gourlaouen" on Justia Law

Richard and Armande's 1999 divorce judgment ordered Richard to pay Armande $2,500 per month until Armande’s death or remarriage, “subject to review upon a significant change in the circumstances of either party, including a substantial change in [Richard’s] income, currently $108,000.” Eight years later, Richard moved to modify his support obligation on the ground that his impending retirement would result in a reduction in his income. Pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, the court amended the divorce judgment in 2008 by substituting a new provision: “[Richard] shall pay [Armande] spousal support in the amount of $2,500 per month, until the death or remarriage of [Armande], or until such time that [Armande] permanently establishes residence in a nursing home or other assisted care living facility. Spousal support shall then terminate.” Richard’s financial statement dated April 2008, reported total income of $66,360 annually, from “Pensions/Annuities,” following his retirement. In 2014, none of the terminating contingencies having occurred, Richard again moved to modify his support obligation. The court concluded that the 2008 modification left intact a provision that support was subject to review upon a significant change in the circumstances of either party and “that the [$]108,000 was the benchmark.” Citing 19-A M.R.S. 951-A(4), the court reduced Richard’s spousal support obligation to $1,250 per month. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated and remanded for further findings using Richard’s 2008 income as the benchmark. View "Marston v. Marston" on Justia Law

The Department of Health and Human Services filed child protection petitions regarding three boys, alleging that the children were in jeopardy due to mother's failure to protect them from physical abuse by her husband, and that she had deprived them of an adequate education. The court found that husband, who is not the father of any of the children, struck Sean with a wooden spoon after Sean did not say that he had vomited before reaching the bathroom. The assault caused a scratch “between [Sean’s] scrotum and anus.” The court determined that modifying Sean’s parents’ existing parental rights judgment would protect him. The amended judgment awarded shared parental rights and responsibilities, except that primary residence and “all decision-making authority concerning educational and medical decisions” were awarded to Sean’s father. The court ordered that neither parent use or permit physical discipline. While the mother’s appeal was pending, the court, by agreement among the Department, mother, and the twins’ father, determined that an order modifying the twins’ parents’ existing parental rights judgment would protect the twins from jeopardy. Both petitions were dismissed. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and clarifying that Maine Rules of Appellate Procedure do not prohibit a trial court, pending disposition of an appeal from a jeopardy order, from acting under 22 M.R.S. 4036(1-A) to dismiss a protection petition. View "In re Nicholas S." on Justia Law

In 2009 Priscilla’s birth parents consented to termination of their parental rights. Her maternal grandmother adopted Priscilla, then six-years-old. Despite the consent, the court explicitly found that the parents were unfit and that termination was in the best interest of the child.The court noted that any continued contact with the child was unlikely unless the relationship between the parents and the grandmother improved considerably. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. In 2014, the parents petitioned to annul the adoption, arguing that it was obtained by fraud or duress, 18-A M.R.S. 9-315(a)(1). The court excluded evidence of statements allegedly made during settlement discussions before the termination hearing, regarding the possibility of continued limited contact with Priscilla. The court granted the grandmother judgment, finding that the evidence did not prove that without consent, there would not have been a termination. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. While M.R. Evid. 408(a)(2) did not bar admission of the statements, which were not offered to prove the validity or amount of the claim about which the parties were negotiating, any error in excluding them was harmless, as was excluding evidence of the mother and grandmother’s past relationship. In 2009, the court informed the parents that any expectations created during settlement discussions regarding future contact might not be fulfilled. The termination was based on a finding that the statutory requirements for termination had been met. View "Adoption of Priscilla D." on Justia Law