Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After 26 years of marriage, including six years legally separated, McLeod, who resides in Shanghai, and Macul, who resides in Malaysia, divorced in 2012. In consideration of an unequal division of property, Macul was awarded $5,000 per month in support for 120 months, not to be extended. At the time, McLeod’s income was $376,728, and Macul had only investment income of $7,698. In 2014, McLeod moved to modify the award, alleging a substantial change in circumstances because his employment was going to be terminated in June 2014. The court granted McLeod’s motion, concluding that his one-time severance package was not “income from an ongoing source,” 19-A M.R.S. 2001(5)(A). McLeod acquired new employment three months after his termination, but at a 40 percent reduction in pay with no benefits. Macul had “significant job skills, but has made no effort to become gainfully employed.” Because Macul had been employed in hospital administration and had training as an English language teacher, the court found, “[s]he could earn $30,000 to $50,000 if she tried.” The court ordered complete termination of spousal support, retroactive to July 2014. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated. The lower court erred in its “substantial change” analysis by failing to consider McLeod’s severance payment and should not have reconsidered evidence of factors that existed at the time of the divorce. Its “modification” determination should have considered other factors. View "McLeod v. Macul" on Justia Law

Kelley and Gordius had a romantic relationship for 10 years before they married in May 2012. Gordius’s child was born in July 2011, while the two were together but unmarried. Although they had been living together for several years, Pennartz is the child’s biological father. Before Gordius and Kelley were married, a court determined Pennartz’s paternity, awarded shared parental rights and responsibilities, and granted Gordius primary residence of the child and Pennartz weekly contact. While Gordius and Kelley lived together before their October 2013 breakup, Kelley was very close to and supportive of Gordius’s child. When Gordius filed for divorce, Kelley moved to modify the parental rights and responsibilities order, claiming status as a de facto parent. The court consolidated the divorce and that motion, preliminarily granted Kelley de facto parent status, and awarded him the right to have contact with the child. In its final order, the court stated that it “remains convinced . . . that Mr. Kelley has undertaken a permanent, equivocal, committed, and responsible parental role in the child’s life . . . and that Mr. Kelley’s exclusion from [the child’s] life will hurt the child,” but concluded that Kelley failed to establish his status as a de facto parent because the “circumstances cannot be deemed exceptional.” The Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated, noting that key factual findings were in conflict. View "Gordius v. Kelley" on Justia Law

A daughter was born to Carey and Knight in 2010. The child was hospitalized with a serious illness when she was about a month old. Knight ended his relationship with Carey and removed himself from his daughter’s life. Carey moved into Kilborn’s home when the child was two months old; they married weeks later, including an informal “adoption” ceremony. They held the child out as Kilborn’s “adopted” daughter. Kilbourn actively participated in the child’s life, including providing day-to-day care. The couple discussed formal adoption, but he understood that Knight was unwilling or unable to consent. Kilborn and Carey had two children together. The children were raised as full siblings.Carey’s daughter refers to Kilborn as “daddy.” Kilborn's parents have acted as grandparents to all three children. In 2014, Kilborn sought a divorce and requested that he be declared the de facto father of Carey’s daughter. Carey opposed Kilborn’s request and denied him access to the child, though he had visitation with his biological children. She attempted to reintroduce Knight into the child’s life. The court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the child’s life would be substantially and negatively affected by Kilborn’s absence and that Kilborn had satisfied his burden of showing that he is the child’s de facto parent. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, noting that the Maine Parentage Act, 19-A M.R.S. 1831-1938, will soon take effect and mirrors precedent. View "Kilborn v. Carey" on Justia Law

The father of Woodard’s child died seven months after the child’s birth. There is no evidence that Woodard is an unfit parent. Dorr, the mother of the deceased father, sought court-ordered visitation with Woodard’s child, alleging a sufficient existing relationship between herself and the child, or, in the alternative, that she had made a sufficient effort to establish a relationship, 19-A M.R.S. 1803(1)(B), (C). Before the child’s birth, Dorr attended a baby shower. Dorr was in the hospital on the evening that the child was born—September 3, 2012. Dorr had additional, unspecified contact with the child until Dorr’s son died and Woodard ceased contact with Dorr. Mediation was unsuccessful. Woodard moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that the Act infringes on her fundamental right to govern the care, custody, and control of her child, and is unconstitutional both on its face and as applied. The court dismissed Dorr’s petition, finding that the affidavit did not establish a sufficient existing relationship with the child or a sufficient effort to establish such a relationship, and did not make an initial showing of “urgent reasons” that would justify infringement on the mother’s rights. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, finding that Dorr lacked standing, given the lack of “urgent reasons.” View "Dorr v. Woodard" on Justia Law

In 2014, Hailey’s mother petitioned the Cumberland County Probate Court for Hailey’s paternal grandparents to be appointed as guardians so that Hailey could attend school in Freeport. She withdrew the petition weeks later, stating that the arrangement was “for an educational purpose that [was] no longer needed.” .Weeks later, the grandparents petitioned to have themselves appointed as guardians of the child, stating that the child needed a safe and supportive environment and had threatened to run away from her mother’s house. The child began to live with her grandparents in January 2015. The child’s father consented to the guardianship, but her mother did not. The court heard testimony from the child, then 15 years old; her parents; and a clinician who had provided treatment services to the child and her mother, and entered a judgment finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that the mother had created a living situation that was at least temporarily intolerable for the child and that a guardianship with the grandparents was in the child’s best interest; mother had shown an inability to meet the child’s needs that threatened the child. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, rejecting challenges to the court’s findings and to the award of a full, rather than limited, guardianship, with no arrangement for transition back to mother’s home. View "Guardianship of Hailey M." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, on behalf of her child, filed a complaint for protection from abuse against Defendant, a neighbor, on behalf of Defendant’s child. After a hearing, the district court entered a protection order, finding that Defendant’s child presented a firearm-related credible threat to the safety of Plaintiff’s child. Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court remanded the case for entry of a second amended order that does not include the credible threat finding, holding that the district court’s finding that Defendant’s child poses a firearm-related credible threat to the safety of Plaintiff’s child was in error. View "Seger v. Nason" on Justia Law

Mother, who had been awarded sole parental rights and the right to provide Child’s primary residence, petitioned to adopt Child and to terminate the parental rights of Father. After a final hearing, the probate court denied Mother’s petitions. Although the court found that Father had abandoned Child, it concluded that Mother had not proved that it was in Child’s best interest to terminate Father’s parental rights because Mother, who was receiving state benefits, had insufficient funds to provide for Child, and Child would benefit from support payments from Father. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that the probate court erred in considering the State’s financial interest as a factor in its determination of Child’s best interest. View "In re Adoption of Liam O." on Justia Law

In 2015, Jennifer Kilton filed a complaint for divorce from Darin Kilton. The trial court held an uncontested final hearing, which Darin did not attend. The court subsequently granted the parties’ divorce, adopting the order drafted by Jennifer’s party. Darin did not file any post-judgment motions. Darin timely filed this appeal but initiated no effort to create an alternative record of the unrecorded final hearing. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that there was no basis to grant relief on appeal because the trial court was not given the opportunity to address the concerns Darin raised for the first time on appeal and because there was no record of the evidence presented to the trial court. View "Kilton v. Kilton" on Justia Law

Benjamin Yap filed a complaint for protection from abuse against Alyssa Vinton on behalf of himself and the parties’ child. A temporary protection was granted awarding Yap temporary sole parental rights and responsibilities. Yap subsequently filed a complaint for a determination of parental rights and responsibilities. The court issued a protection from abuse order that shared parental rights and responsibilities and awarded Yap primary residence of the child. After a hearing for a determination of parental rights and responsibilities, Vinton submitted a proposed order for the court’s consideration. The court adopted, in its entirety and with one change, Vinton’s proposed parental rights order and findings of fact and conclusions of law. Yap appealed, contending that the judge erred by adopting the language of Vinton’s proposed order verbatim and by not exercising independent judgment. The Supreme Court agreed and vacated the judgment, holding that the trial court’s findings were not the result of careful judicial deliberation and the exercise of independent judgment. View "Yap v. Vinton" on Justia Law

Benjamin Yap filed a complaint for protection from abuse against Alyssa Vinton on behalf of himself and the parties’ child. A temporary protection was granted awarding Yap temporary sole parental rights and responsibilities. Yap subsequently filed a complaint for a determination of parental rights and responsibilities. The court issued a protection from abuse order that shared parental rights and responsibilities and awarded Yap primary residence of the child. After a hearing for a determination of parental rights and responsibilities, Vinton submitted a proposed order for the court’s consideration. The court adopted, in its entirety and with one change, Vinton’s proposed parental rights order and findings of fact and conclusions of law. Yap appealed, contending that the judge erred by adopting the language of Vinton’s proposed order verbatim and by not exercising independent judgment. The Supreme Court agreed and vacated the judgment, holding that the trial court’s findings were not the result of careful judicial deliberation and the exercise of independent judgment. View "Yap v. Vinton" on Justia Law