Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2011, Father and Mother were divorced pursuant to a divorce judgment. In 2015, the district court found Father in contempt for violating the divorce judgment. The court also denied Father’s motion to modify his child support obligation. The Supreme Court vacated in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the court did not abuse its discretion by finding Father in contempt for nonpayment of child support for the years 2011, 2013 and 2014; (2) the court erred by finding that Father had not fully paid child support for 2012 and that he was in contempt for nonpayment for that year; (3) the court did not err by finding that there was no substantial change in circumstances warranting a modification of Father’s child support obligation; and (4) the court did not err by determining that Father was obligated to sell the marital home and to divide the proceeds pursuant to the terms of the divorce agreement. View "McCarthy v. Goroshin" on Justia Law

A divorce judgment was entered providing for the shared primary residence of Mother and Father’s child. The district court subsequently modified the judgment, which created a more complicated schedule of contact. Due to the frequent transitions between parental homes and tensions between her parents, the child became depressed. By the time she was almost eight years old, the child had a serious breakdown. While Mother’s and Father’s post-divorce motions were pending, the court ordered a less complex schedule. At the conclusion of the trial on the motions, the district court ordered that a similar schedule become part of the parties’ modified divorce judgment. The resulting judgment established primary residence of the child with Mother. Father appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the record supported the court’s determination that establishing primary residence with Mother and modifying the schedule of contact was in the child’s best interest. View "Little v. Wallace" on Justia Law

Pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. 252(1)(A), a referee held hearings and issued a report, finding: The parties were married in France, in 2006. Their child was born in 2008. A protection order had issued, based on findings that Karamanoglu had abused Gourlaouen and the child. The child’s therapist and the guardian ad litem agreed that it was in the child’s best interest to have unsupervised visitation with Karamanoglu, who had entered counseling. The report recommended shared parental rights and responsibilities, including shared primary residence and care. The parties jointly own properties in Primelin, France; Freeport; and Yarmouth. The parties had entered into a standard French marriage contract, which is valid and enforceable, and had supplemented that contract. The referee recommended: Karamanoglu’s and Gourlaouen’s shares of the equity in the Yarmouth property to be $3.1 million and $1.4 million respectively; that the Yarmouth and Freeport properties be set aside to Karamanoglu; that Gourlaouen be awarded the Primelin property; that Karamanoglu pay $1 million to Gourlaouen; and that Karamanoglu pay Gourlaouen spousal support of $3,800 per month for five years. The court adopted the reports. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated with respect to co-parenting counseling, the child's medical and mental health treatment, and mandatory pre-filing mediation, and found error in the analysis of the parties’ interests in the Primelin property. View "Karamanoglu v. Gourlaouen" on Justia Law

Richard and Armande's 1999 divorce judgment ordered Richard to pay Armande $2,500 per month until Armande’s death or remarriage, “subject to review upon a significant change in the circumstances of either party, including a substantial change in [Richard’s] income, currently $108,000.” Eight years later, Richard moved to modify his support obligation on the ground that his impending retirement would result in a reduction in his income. Pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, the court amended the divorce judgment in 2008 by substituting a new provision: “[Richard] shall pay [Armande] spousal support in the amount of $2,500 per month, until the death or remarriage of [Armande], or until such time that [Armande] permanently establishes residence in a nursing home or other assisted care living facility. Spousal support shall then terminate.” Richard’s financial statement dated April 2008, reported total income of $66,360 annually, from “Pensions/Annuities,” following his retirement. In 2014, none of the terminating contingencies having occurred, Richard again moved to modify his support obligation. The court concluded that the 2008 modification left intact a provision that support was subject to review upon a significant change in the circumstances of either party and “that the [$]108,000 was the benchmark.” Citing 19-A M.R.S. 951-A(4), the court reduced Richard’s spousal support obligation to $1,250 per month. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated and remanded for further findings using Richard’s 2008 income as the benchmark. View "Marston v. Marston" on Justia Law

The Department of Health and Human Services filed child protection petitions regarding three boys, alleging that the children were in jeopardy due to mother's failure to protect them from physical abuse by her husband, and that she had deprived them of an adequate education. The court found that husband, who is not the father of any of the children, struck Sean with a wooden spoon after Sean did not say that he had vomited before reaching the bathroom. The assault caused a scratch “between [Sean’s] scrotum and anus.” The court determined that modifying Sean’s parents’ existing parental rights judgment would protect him. The amended judgment awarded shared parental rights and responsibilities, except that primary residence and “all decision-making authority concerning educational and medical decisions” were awarded to Sean’s father. The court ordered that neither parent use or permit physical discipline. While the mother’s appeal was pending, the court, by agreement among the Department, mother, and the twins’ father, determined that an order modifying the twins’ parents’ existing parental rights judgment would protect the twins from jeopardy. Both petitions were dismissed. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and clarifying that Maine Rules of Appellate Procedure do not prohibit a trial court, pending disposition of an appeal from a jeopardy order, from acting under 22 M.R.S. 4036(1-A) to dismiss a protection petition. View "In re Nicholas S." on Justia Law

In 2009 Priscilla’s birth parents consented to termination of their parental rights. Her maternal grandmother adopted Priscilla, then six-years-old. Despite the consent, the court explicitly found that the parents were unfit and that termination was in the best interest of the child.The court noted that any continued contact with the child was unlikely unless the relationship between the parents and the grandmother improved considerably. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. In 2014, the parents petitioned to annul the adoption, arguing that it was obtained by fraud or duress, 18-A M.R.S. 9-315(a)(1). The court excluded evidence of statements allegedly made during settlement discussions before the termination hearing, regarding the possibility of continued limited contact with Priscilla. The court granted the grandmother judgment, finding that the evidence did not prove that without consent, there would not have been a termination. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. While M.R. Evid. 408(a)(2) did not bar admission of the statements, which were not offered to prove the validity or amount of the claim about which the parties were negotiating, any error in excluding them was harmless, as was excluding evidence of the mother and grandmother’s past relationship. In 2009, the court informed the parents that any expectations created during settlement discussions regarding future contact might not be fulfilled. The termination was based on a finding that the statutory requirements for termination had been met. View "Adoption of Priscilla D." on Justia Law

After 26 years of marriage, including six years legally separated, McLeod, who resides in Shanghai, and Macul, who resides in Malaysia, divorced in 2012. In consideration of an unequal division of property, Macul was awarded $5,000 per month in support for 120 months, not to be extended. At the time, McLeod’s income was $376,728, and Macul had only investment income of $7,698. In 2014, McLeod moved to modify the award, alleging a substantial change in circumstances because his employment was going to be terminated in June 2014. The court granted McLeod’s motion, concluding that his one-time severance package was not “income from an ongoing source,” 19-A M.R.S. 2001(5)(A). McLeod acquired new employment three months after his termination, but at a 40 percent reduction in pay with no benefits. Macul had “significant job skills, but has made no effort to become gainfully employed.” Because Macul had been employed in hospital administration and had training as an English language teacher, the court found, “[s]he could earn $30,000 to $50,000 if she tried.” The court ordered complete termination of spousal support, retroactive to July 2014. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated. The lower court erred in its “substantial change” analysis by failing to consider McLeod’s severance payment and should not have reconsidered evidence of factors that existed at the time of the divorce. Its “modification” determination should have considered other factors. View "McLeod v. Macul" on Justia Law

Kelley and Gordius had a romantic relationship for 10 years before they married in May 2012. Gordius’s child was born in July 2011, while the two were together but unmarried. Although they had been living together for several years, Pennartz is the child’s biological father. Before Gordius and Kelley were married, a court determined Pennartz’s paternity, awarded shared parental rights and responsibilities, and granted Gordius primary residence of the child and Pennartz weekly contact. While Gordius and Kelley lived together before their October 2013 breakup, Kelley was very close to and supportive of Gordius’s child. When Gordius filed for divorce, Kelley moved to modify the parental rights and responsibilities order, claiming status as a de facto parent. The court consolidated the divorce and that motion, preliminarily granted Kelley de facto parent status, and awarded him the right to have contact with the child. In its final order, the court stated that it “remains convinced . . . that Mr. Kelley has undertaken a permanent, equivocal, committed, and responsible parental role in the child’s life . . . and that Mr. Kelley’s exclusion from [the child’s] life will hurt the child,” but concluded that Kelley failed to establish his status as a de facto parent because the “circumstances cannot be deemed exceptional.” The Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated, noting that key factual findings were in conflict. View "Gordius v. Kelley" on Justia Law

A daughter was born to Carey and Knight in 2010. The child was hospitalized with a serious illness when she was about a month old. Knight ended his relationship with Carey and removed himself from his daughter’s life. Carey moved into Kilborn’s home when the child was two months old; they married weeks later, including an informal “adoption” ceremony. They held the child out as Kilborn’s “adopted” daughter. Kilbourn actively participated in the child’s life, including providing day-to-day care. The couple discussed formal adoption, but he understood that Knight was unwilling or unable to consent. Kilborn and Carey had two children together. The children were raised as full siblings.Carey’s daughter refers to Kilborn as “daddy.” Kilborn's parents have acted as grandparents to all three children. In 2014, Kilborn sought a divorce and requested that he be declared the de facto father of Carey’s daughter. Carey opposed Kilborn’s request and denied him access to the child, though he had visitation with his biological children. She attempted to reintroduce Knight into the child’s life. The court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the child’s life would be substantially and negatively affected by Kilborn’s absence and that Kilborn had satisfied his burden of showing that he is the child’s de facto parent. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, noting that the Maine Parentage Act, 19-A M.R.S. 1831-1938, will soon take effect and mirrors precedent. View "Kilborn v. Carey" on Justia Law

The father of Woodard’s child died seven months after the child’s birth. There is no evidence that Woodard is an unfit parent. Dorr, the mother of the deceased father, sought court-ordered visitation with Woodard’s child, alleging a sufficient existing relationship between herself and the child, or, in the alternative, that she had made a sufficient effort to establish a relationship, 19-A M.R.S. 1803(1)(B), (C). Before the child’s birth, Dorr attended a baby shower. Dorr was in the hospital on the evening that the child was born—September 3, 2012. Dorr had additional, unspecified contact with the child until Dorr’s son died and Woodard ceased contact with Dorr. Mediation was unsuccessful. Woodard moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that the Act infringes on her fundamental right to govern the care, custody, and control of her child, and is unconstitutional both on its face and as applied. The court dismissed Dorr’s petition, finding that the affidavit did not establish a sufficient existing relationship with the child or a sufficient effort to establish such a relationship, and did not make an initial showing of “urgent reasons” that would justify infringement on the mother’s rights. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, finding that Dorr lacked standing, given the lack of “urgent reasons.” View "Dorr v. Woodard" on Justia Law