Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Father and Mother were divorced by a judgment entered in 2006. Mother was awarded sole parental rights and responsibilities and primary residence of the parties' three children. Father subsequently filed several motions to modify parental rights and responsibilities, and both parties filed motions for contempt. As of 2010, the parties were subject to a court order giving them “parallel, but not fully shared” parental rights and responsibilities. In 2013, Father requested primary residence of the three children and child support. Mother filed two motions for contempt, alleging that Father had violated the contact provisions of the 2010 order. One week before the scheduled hearing on the motions, Father filed a motion for recusal and transfer. The court ultimately denied the motion. As to the remaining motions, the court denied Father’s motion to modify and granted Mother’s motions for contempt. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Father’s motion to recuse, in excluding the testimony of the parties’ two younger children, and in its ultimate allocation of parental rights and responsibilities or its award of attorney fees. View "Robertson v. Gerakaris" on Justia Law

John Boddy and Amy Dickens were divorced by a judgment that awarded Dickens primary residence of the parties’ child and required Boddy to pay weekly child support. Boddy later filed a second motion to modify requesting that the district court declare that the parties were currently providing substantially equal care for the child and provide for shared residence between the parties. The district court granted Boddy’s motion to modify in part by modifying Boddy’s child support obligation to reflect his changed employment status but denying his requests to recognize substantially equal care and provide for shared residency. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by (1) finding that Boddy was not providing substantially equal care to his child and in failing to adjust his child support obligation accordingly; and (2) finding no substantial change in circumstances sufficient to modify the child’s residency. View "Dickens v. Boddy" on Justia Law

After a contested hearing, the district court entered a jeopardy order finding that Father had exposed K.M., his child, to verbally violent confrontations and that Father’s unstable mental health placed K.M. at risk of harm. The Department of Health and Human Services subsequently filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights. Almost two years later, the court entered an order granting the Department’s petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the record contained support for the court’s finding that Father was unable to protect K.M. from jeopardy and that these circumstances were unlikely to change within a time that would need the child’s needs, and the record contained support for the court’s finding that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. View "In re K.M." on Justia Law

Marc Chamberlain was the father of two children who had been the care of their maternal grandmother for several years before and following the death of their mother. The children’s maternal grandmother and their maternal aunt petitioned the probate court for appointment as the children’s co-guardians. Chamberlain opposed the petition. The court entered a judgment appointing the grandmother, but not the aunt, as the children’s guardian. In making its decision, the court applied the plain language of Me. Rev. Stat. 18-A, 5-204(d) and found by a preponderance of the evidence that the grandmother was the children’s de facto guardian and that Chamberlain had not consistently participated in the children’s lives. Chamberlain appealed, arguing that section 5-204(d) is facially unconstitutional because it, and the statutes defining its terms, are unconstitutionally vague and violate due process. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that the appointment of a guardian over a parent’s objection upon proof by the lower standard of a preponderance of the evidence violates the Due Process Clause of the federal Constitution. Remanded for the court to apply the constitutionally required standard of proof by clear and convincing evidence when applying section 5-204(d). View "In re Guardianship of Chamberlain" on Justia Law

In 2013, Molly Jandreau filed a complaint for divorce from Daniel LaChance. The district court ordered LaChance to pay Jandreau $230 weekly in child support and divided the marital assets and liabilities. Jandreau appealed, arguing that the court abused its discretion by denying her requests for spousal support and attorney fees. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed with Jandreau and vacated the portion of the judgment denying spousal support and attorney fees, holding that Jandreau was entitled to some amount of spousal support and that it was an abuse of discretion for the court to deny Jandreau’s request for attorney fees. View "Jandreau v. LaChance" on Justia Law

John and Judith Monahan were married in 1976. In 2011, John filed a complaint for divorce. After a final divorce hearing held in 2014, the district court made several factual findings. The court then entered an initial divorce judgment awarding Judith monthly spousal support. The judgment provided that the spousal support award was non-modifiable. John moved to amend the judgment seeking modifiable spousal support so that the award would conform with the district court’s preliminary memorandum of decision, which did not state that spousal support may not be modified. In an amended divorce judgment, the court declined to make the spousal support modifiable. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment as amended, holding (1) the district court did not err or abuse its discretion in regard to the marital property division; but (2) the divorce judgment must be amended to remove the language prohibiting modification of spousal support, as, pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 19-A, 951-A(4) as amended, the court could not direct that spousal support “may not be modified.” View "Monahan v. Monahan" on Justia Law

In 2012, the district court entered an order protecting Jana Gehrke, Chad Gehrke’s ex-wife, and the parties’ sons. Thereafter, the order was twice modified, further constraining Chad’s contact with the children. In 2013, Jana filed her third motion to modify the protection order. After a hearing, the court found that Chad had committed abuse and entered an amended order prohibiting Chad from having any contact with Jana or the children. In 2014, Jana moved to extend the order of protection from abuse for two more years. The court entered a judgment extending the order of protection from abuse due to Chad’s pattern of violence, threats, suicide threats, and failure to comply with the increasingly restrictive court orders. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in relying on evidence of abuse that predated the initial protection from abuse order and determining that the extended order was necessary to protect Jana and the children; and (2) the extended protection order did not violate Defendant’s constitutionally protected parental rights. View "Gehrke v. Gehrke" on Justia Law

In 2014, Mother filed a complaint seeking a protection order against Father for herself and their two children. After a hearing, the district court found that Father had abused Mother and issued a protection order for the benefit of Mother and the children and granted Mother temporary custody. Father appealed, arguing that the court erred by denying his motion to continue the hearing. Father orally made the motion at the hearing after the attorney he purportedly retained did not appear. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Father’s motion for a continuance. View "Daud v. Abdullahi" on Justia Law

Mother’s first two children were removed from her care due to neglect. Mother’s third child lived with his paternal grandmother. Mother’s parental rights to her fourth child were terminated when the child was twelve months old. After Mother gave birth to her fifth child, R.M., the district court ordered that her parental rights to R.M. be terminated. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) determined by clear and convincing evidence that Mother was unwilling or unable to protect R.M. from jeopardy and that these circumstances were unlikely to change within a time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs, and (2) did not abuse its discretion in determining that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in R.M.’s best interest. View "In re R.M." on Justia Law

Six days after premature twins were born, the Department of Health and Human Services petitioned for a child protection order, alleging that the twins were in circumstances of immediate risk of serious harm based on Mother’s infliction of fatal injuries to the parents’ one-year-old adopted son and Father’s infliction of serious bruising to the son two days before his death. The district court concluded that the twins would be in circumstances of jeopardy to their health and welfare if returned to the custody of their parents and found aggravated factors as to both Mother and Father. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did err when it found aggravating factors as to Father or when it admitted an autopsy report of the parents’ son. View "In re E.A." on Justia Law