Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a hearing, the district court terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 22, 4055. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not improperly terminate Father’s parental rights solely because he had been diagnosed as having borderline personality disorder and thus did not violate Father’s equal protection rights; (2) the district court provided Father with the due process required in the context of a termination of parental rights by providing him with a reasonable period of time for reunification and not improperly placing a burden of proof upon Father; and (3) there was clear and convincing evidence to support the court’s finding of at least one ground of parental unfitness and that termination was in the child’s best interest. View "In re I.S." on Justia Law

Christine Violette filed a complaint for divorce from Randy Violette. The district court entered a divorce judgment granting the parties a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable marital differences. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the portion of the judgment that mandated specific disciplinary measures and affirmed in all other respects, holding that the district court (1) did not clearly err in calculating Randy’s income and by relying on that finding in its child support and spousal support awards; (2) did not abuse its discretion in its spousal support award; (3) did not clearly err in finding that two assets - a piece of real estate and a business - were wholly nonmarital; but (4) abused its discretion when it ordered the parties to discipline their children in a specific and inflexible fashion upon the occurrence of particular events with no discretion left to the parents. View "Violette v. Violette" on Justia Law

Christine Violette filed a complaint for divorce from Randy Violette. The district court entered a divorce judgment granting the parties a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable marital differences. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the portion of the judgment that mandated specific disciplinary measures and affirmed in all other respects, holding that the district court (1) did not clearly err in calculating Randy’s income and by relying on that finding in its child support and spousal support awards; (2) did not abuse its discretion in its spousal support award; (3) did not clearly err in finding that two assets - a piece of real estate and a business - were wholly nonmarital; but (4) abused its discretion when it ordered the parties to discipline their children in a specific and inflexible fashion upon the occurrence of particular events with no discretion left to the parents. View "Violette v. Violette" on Justia Law

The Department of Health and Human Services filed a petition for child protection regarding L.T. alleging that Father created jeopardy through neglect, emotional abuse, and physical abuse. The Father and the Department agreed to the entry of a jeopardy order as to Father. Father was later incarcerated, during which time the Department petitioned to terminate Father’s rights to the child based largely on the factual allegations included in the jeopardy order. After a termination hearing, the district court terminated Father’s rights to the child. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court had sufficient evidence before it to find, by clear and convincing evidence, the statutory grounds for parental termination; and (2) Father’s remaining allegations of error were without merit. View "In re L.T." on Justia Law

The Department of Health and Human Services filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother to her child, I.R. After a hearing, the district court terminated Mother’s parental rights to I.R., finding that Mother was unable or unwilling to protect the child from jeopardy, was unable or unwilling to take responsibility for the child within a reasonable time, and failed to make a good faith effort to rehabilitate and reunify with the child, and that termination was in the child’s best interest. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to support the court’s findings, by clear and convincing evidence, of parental unfitness; and (2) there was sufficient evidence to support the court’s finding that termination was in the best interest of the child. View "In re I.R." on Justia Law

In 2012, Jennifer Young filed a complaint for divorce from Michael Young. After a hearing, the district court entered a divorce judgment that granted Jennifer sole parental rights and responsibilities for the children, awarded Jennifer child support arrearages, divided the martial property, set aside Michael’s retirement account to Jennifer in lieu of spousal support, and ordered Michael to pay Jennifer’s attorney fees. The Supreme Judicial Court (1) vacated the judgment as to (i) the retirement account because the court failed adequately to explain this aspect of the property division, (ii) the distribution of all tangible marital personal property because of several discrete errors affecting the court’s analysis, and (iii) attorney fees; (2) affirmed the child support arrearage as corrected; and (3) affirmed in all other respects. View "Young v. Young" on Justia Law

Father and Mother were divorced by a judgment entered in 2006. Mother was awarded sole parental rights and responsibilities and primary residence of the parties' three children. Father subsequently filed several motions to modify parental rights and responsibilities, and both parties filed motions for contempt. As of 2010, the parties were subject to a court order giving them “parallel, but not fully shared” parental rights and responsibilities. In 2013, Father requested primary residence of the three children and child support. Mother filed two motions for contempt, alleging that Father had violated the contact provisions of the 2010 order. One week before the scheduled hearing on the motions, Father filed a motion for recusal and transfer. The court ultimately denied the motion. As to the remaining motions, the court denied Father’s motion to modify and granted Mother’s motions for contempt. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Father’s motion to recuse, in excluding the testimony of the parties’ two younger children, and in its ultimate allocation of parental rights and responsibilities or its award of attorney fees. View "Robertson v. Gerakaris" on Justia Law

John Boddy and Amy Dickens were divorced by a judgment that awarded Dickens primary residence of the parties’ child and required Boddy to pay weekly child support. Boddy later filed a second motion to modify requesting that the district court declare that the parties were currently providing substantially equal care for the child and provide for shared residence between the parties. The district court granted Boddy’s motion to modify in part by modifying Boddy’s child support obligation to reflect his changed employment status but denying his requests to recognize substantially equal care and provide for shared residency. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by (1) finding that Boddy was not providing substantially equal care to his child and in failing to adjust his child support obligation accordingly; and (2) finding no substantial change in circumstances sufficient to modify the child’s residency. View "Dickens v. Boddy" on Justia Law

After a contested hearing, the district court entered a jeopardy order finding that Father had exposed K.M., his child, to verbally violent confrontations and that Father’s unstable mental health placed K.M. at risk of harm. The Department of Health and Human Services subsequently filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights. Almost two years later, the court entered an order granting the Department’s petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the record contained support for the court’s finding that Father was unable to protect K.M. from jeopardy and that these circumstances were unlikely to change within a time that would need the child’s needs, and the record contained support for the court’s finding that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. View "In re K.M." on Justia Law

Marc Chamberlain was the father of two children who had been the care of their maternal grandmother for several years before and following the death of their mother. The children’s maternal grandmother and their maternal aunt petitioned the probate court for appointment as the children’s co-guardians. Chamberlain opposed the petition. The court entered a judgment appointing the grandmother, but not the aunt, as the children’s guardian. In making its decision, the court applied the plain language of Me. Rev. Stat. 18-A, 5-204(d) and found by a preponderance of the evidence that the grandmother was the children’s de facto guardian and that Chamberlain had not consistently participated in the children’s lives. Chamberlain appealed, arguing that section 5-204(d) is facially unconstitutional because it, and the statutes defining its terms, are unconstitutionally vague and violate due process. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that the appointment of a guardian over a parent’s objection upon proof by the lower standard of a preponderance of the evidence violates the Due Process Clause of the federal Constitution. Remanded for the court to apply the constitutionally required standard of proof by clear and convincing evidence when applying section 5-204(d). View "In re Guardianship of Chamberlain" on Justia Law