Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2013, the district court entered a judgment granting a divorce to Jeff Emerson and Patricia Bonner. Bonner subsequently filed motions for post-judgment relief pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 120 seeking enforcement of the divorce judgment. Emerson filed his own post-judgment motion pursuant to Rule 120 seeking enforcement. The district court employed the “applicable body of law relating to a [Me. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion]” and, sua sponte, amended the judgment. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment because the court amended the judgment without the authority to do so. Remanded for reconsideration. View "Bonner v. Emerson" on Justia Law

Mother, who was from Italy, married Father, and the parties had one child. Father later filed for divorce. The district court entered a divorce judgment finding that, while the parties were both in Maine, it was in the child’s best interest to remain in the primary custodial care of Mother. The court also ordered that, if Mother relocated to Italy, primary residence would shift to Father so the child could remain in Maine. The court also divided the marital real estate, financial assets and debts. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding that the district court (1) did not limit Mother’s constitutional right to travel or deprive Mother of her liberty without due process when balancing the parents’ and the child’s rights and interests in reaching its judgment; (2) did not abuse its discretion in refusing to reopen the evidentiary record to allow Mother to present evidence of the parties’ changed residential circumstances and work prospects; and (3) erred in failing to allocate Father’s deferred compensation account to one party or the other after determining it had no marital value. View "Light v. D'Amato" on Justia Law

After a hearing, the district court issued a protection from abuse order against Father, finding that he had sexually abused his five-year-old daughter, ordering that he have no contact with her, and temporarily awarding sole parental rights and responsibilities to Mother. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of statements that the victim made to a social worker during therapy identifying Father as her abuser; (2) the court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of statements the victim made during a forensic interview; and (3) the evidence was sufficient to support the court’s finding of abuse. View "Walton v. Ireland" on Justia Law

After a termination hearing, the district court terminated Father’s parental rights to his child on the grounds that Father was unwilling or unable to take responsibility for the child in a time frame calculated to meet the child’s needs and that the termination of parental rights was in the best interest of the child. Father’s counsel subsequently filed an appellate brief containing only a procedural history and statement of facts, accompanied by a motion for enlargement of time to allow Father personally to file a supplemental brief. The Supreme Court granted the motion, but Father did not file a supplemental brief by the deadline provided. The Court affirmed, holding (1) the process utilized by Father’s counsel in this appeal was proper; and (2) the district court did not err in finding that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. View "In re M.C." on Justia Law

Father and Mother divorced in 2010. In the divorce judgment, the district court awarded sole parental rights and responsibilities along with primary residential care of the parties’ son to Mother and granted Father visitation rights. Father filed several post-judgment motions related to his contact with his son. In 2013, the district court denied Father increased contact with his son, finding, among other things, that Father had not successfully completed the Violence No More program. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that some of the district court’s findings were not supported by competent evidence, and the errors were not harmless. Remanded. View "Remick v. Martin" on Justia Law

After Mother relocated to North Carolina, Mother and Father, who were divorced, litigated the issue of whether their child’s primary physical residence would be in Maine or North Carolina. The district court ordered that the child was to live primarily in Maine with Father and that Mother pay child support to Father. The parties then began disputing travel costs. In 2011, the court amended the judgment to provide that the child’s travel expenses “shall be reflected as a 50% credit against [Mother’s] child support obligation.” In 2013, Mother filed a motion “to enforce and clarify” the judgment, requesting that the court amend the 2011 order so as to give her credit against her child support obligation based on the amount of her own travel expenses. The court denied the motion, finding it to be “frivolous,” and awarded Father attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the motion was frivolous and imposing sanctions. View "Tuell v. Nicholson" on Justia Law

Sarah Craig, individually and on behalf of her two children, filed a complaint for protection from abuse alleging that Krystal Gayle Caron, the ex-wife of Craig’s boyfriend, came into her home and hit her. The trial court found that Caron had stalked Craig and entered an order of protection from abuse. Caron appealed, arguing that the district court erred in entering the judgment because Craig and her children were not family or household members or dating partners of Caron and because her conduct did not constitute stalking. The Supreme Court agreed with Caron and vacated the judgment, holding that because the parties were not family or household members or dating partners, and because Caron’s conduct did not fall within the definition of stalking pursuant to the protection from abuse statute, the statute did not authorize the entry of a protection from abuse judgment for Craig and her children. View "Craig v. Caron" on Justia Law

After the district court allocated primary residence of two minor children to Father, the children began residing with Father’s mother (“Grandmother”). Mother later sought primary residence and sole parental rights and responsibilities with regard to the children. In response, Grandmother filed a petition for de facto parental rights. The district court denied Grandmother’s petition, concluding that Grandmother failed to present sufficient evidence of her status as a de facto parent to establish that she had standing in a parental rights and responsibilities proceeding. Because the Supreme Court clarified, in Pitts v. Moore, the concepts necessary for a determination of de facto parenthood after the district court denied Grandmother’s petition, the Court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for reconsideration in light of the Court’s opinion in Pitts.View "Eaton v. Paradis" on Justia Law

Amanda Moore and Matthew Pitts were in an “on again, off again” relationship when Moore learned she was pregnant. The child was born in 2009. In 2011, Pitts filed a complaint seeking parental rights and responsibilities concerning the child. Moore asserted that Pitts was not the child’s biological father, and Pitts stipulated to that fact. The matter thus proceeded as one of asserted de facto parenthood. The district court determined that Pitts was the child’s de facto parent and that continued contact with Pitts was in the child’s best interest. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that pursuant to the Court’s newly-announced two-part standard pursuant to which de facto parenthood petitions must be evaluated, the matter must be remanded.View "Pitts v. Moore" on Justia Law

In 2012, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed a petition for termination of Mother and Father’s parental rights to M.S., alleging that Mother had failed to take responsibility for her mental health issues, her substance abuse, and her abusive relationship with Father, and that Father had failed to protect M.S. from the risk of harm posed by Mother. After a hearing, the district court terminated both parents’ parental rights to M.S. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court erred in excluding the testimony of a DHHS caseworker regarding Father’s care for his daughter from a prior relationship, but the error was harmless; and (2) sufficient evidence supported the termination of the parents’ parental rights. View "In re M.S." on Justia Law