Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2008, the district court entered a divorce judgment that awarded primary residence of Mother and Father’s child to Mother with specific rights of contact to Father. After the initial divorce judgment was entered, the parties filed multiple post-judgment motions on issues of custody and visitation. A hearing was held on Mother’s latest motion to modify, in which the district court determined that the parties’ child was competent to testify. The testimony was taken in chambers and off the record. Based on the testimony, along with Mother’s testimony, the district court concluded that it was not in the child’s best interest to continue to have unsupervised contact with Father. The Supreme Court vacated the order, holding (1) a trial court may not, in a civil proceeding, and in the absence of an agreement of the parties, take testimony from a child witness in chambers and off the record; and (2) the court’s ultimate decision to modify Father’s rights of contact based on the testimony was error, and the error was not harmless.View "Hutchinson v. Cobb" on Justia Law

After Patrick Burrow filed a complaint for divorce from Rachel Burrow, the parties resolved all issues relating to parental rights and responsibilities. A trial was held on the disposition of the real property. The trial court entered a final order accepting the parties’ stipulated value of $310,000 of the martial home, finding that the parties’ equity in the property was $215,000, setting aside $75,00 of the equity as having been gifts to Rachel from her family, and dividing the remaining $140,000 equally. After an additional adjustment, the court distributed $77,500 of the equity to Patrick and $137,500 to Rachel. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the trial court and remanded, holding (1) the court’s judgment did not impermissibly have the effect of setting apart some portion of the marital equity in the real property as if it were nonmarital; and (2) the trial court erred its factual findings regarding the value of the gifts given to Rachel by her family, and therefore, the division of the equity between the parties must be decided anew. View "Burrow v. Burrow" on Justia Law

After nearly thirty years of marriage, Christine Starrett filed a complaint for divorce from Irven Starrett. In preparation for trial, the parties hired an expert to calculate the value of Irv’s Drywall, the parties’ privately owned business. The district court entered a divorce judgment that rejected the expert’s opinion and rejected Christine’s estimate and ultimately awarded Irven all of the parties’ interest in the business. The Supreme Court affirmed the divorce judgment, holding (1) the district court committed factual error in its valuation of Irv’s Drywall; but (2) the factual error did not affect Christine’s substantial rights in the ultimate division of the marital property or otherwise prejudice her. View "Starrett v. Starrett" on Justia Law

Patrick Jackson and Sally McLeod were divorced in 2004. The contentiousness that began at the outset of the divorce action extended over a decade with continuing conflict and litigation, much of which centered around the parties’ three children. Prior to the judgment at issue in this appeal, McLeod provided the primary residence for all three children, and Jackson had visitation rights. McLeod filed a motion to modify the parental rights order. The court later held a hearing on McLeod’s motion to modify. Relying on incidents that occurred the summer prior to the hearing, the court implicitly concluded that a substantial change in circumstances had occurred and that it was in the youngest child’s best interest to eliminate overnight visitation with Jackson. The court then imposed a $1000 civil fine for Jackson’s “subterfuge” during one of the incidents. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment assessing the civil penalty and affirmed in all other respects, holding (1) the court lacked authority to impose the civil penalty; (2) the court did not err in modifying Jackson’s rights of contact; and (3) Jackson’s remaining arguments were without merit. View "Jackson v. MacLeod" on Justia Law

Richard Sullivan began sexually exploiting and abusing Jane Doe starting when Doe was approximately thirteen years old. When Doe was twenty years old, she gave birth to the parties’ daughter. Doe later filed a complaint for an order for protection from abuse, which the district court granted. Sullivan subsequently filed a complaint for a determination of paternity, parental rights and responsibilities, and child support obligations as to the child. The district court awarded sole parental rights and responsibilities to Doe with no rights of contact to Sullivan “at this time,” ordered that Sullivan may not have access to records and information about the child, and found that Sullivan owed Doe $38,019 in past child support. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding that Sullivan posed a significant risk to minors, did not abuse its discretion in denying Sullivan rights of contact and access to the child’s records, and did not err in determining the amount of child support arrearages Sullivan owed Doe. View "Sullivan v. Doe" on Justia Law

Mother gave birth to a child in 2009. Mother arranged with a couple to adopt the child, and the couple was appointed the child’s temporary guardians (Guardians) while adoption proceedings commenced. However, subsequent genetic testing revealed that R.M. was the child’s father. The Guardians had filed a petition to terminate R.M.’s parental rights, which the probate court denied, concluding that the Guardians had not met their burden of proving that R.M. was unfit to parent the child. The probate court then ordered that the child be moved to Indiana, where R.M. lived. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the probate court did not err by concluding that the Guardians had not met their burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that R.M. was unfit to parent the child.View "In re Adoption of T.D." on Justia Law

The Department of Health and Human Services initiated proceedings against Father with regard to his child, G.W. After a termination hearing, the district court determined that the Department had demonstrated all four statutory grounds for termination and that termination was in the best interest of the child. Father appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding (1) the district court did not violate Father’s due process rights by proceeding with the termination hearing without Father’s participation by telephone; and (2) the record contained sufficient evidence to support the district court’s finding that, by clear and convincing evidence, termination was in G.W.'s best interest.View "In re G.W." on Justia Law

After a hearing, the trial court granted Timothy Dalton and Sarah Dalton a divorce and awarded parental rights and responsibilities and primary residence of the children to Timothy. In the months following the divorce judgment, Sarah sought to collaterally attack the judgment by filing numerous post-judgment motions in an effort to modify the visitation and supervision arrangement in the judgment. After a hearing, the court denied or declared moot all of Sarah’s motions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary rulings during the hearing on Sarah’s post-judgment motions; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Sarah’s motion for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law; and (3) the trial judge did not err in failing to sua sponte recuse himself from this matter. View "Dalton v. Dalton" on Justia Law

The Oxford County Probate Court awarded guardianship of a child to the child’s paternal grandparents with the consent of the child’s father, finding that the grandparents met their burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the mother was an unfit parent and that it was in the child’s best interest to grant the guardianship. The mother appealed, arguing that the court erred in refusing to allow her to record the final hearing and that the court’s judgment was not supported by sufficient findings or evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court did not err in denying the mother’s request to record the final hearing at her own expense; and (2) the court’s findings were sufficient to support its judgment. View "In re Guardianship of Gabriel I.K. Johnson" on Justia Law

Zacharia was born to Mother and Father in 2009. Because Mother was transient at the time of Zacharia’s birth, Zacharia began living with Mother’s grandparents, who became temporary guardians of Zacharia. In 2011, Mother filed a petition to terminate the guardianship. After a hearing, the probate court (1) denied Mother’s petition, concluding that Mother was unfit because she was unable to meet Zacharia’s needs; and (2) rejected the guardian ad litem’s and Zacharia’s mental health therapist’s recommendations that transitional efforts be put into place, either upon termination of the guardianship or under a continued guardianship. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that the probate court (1) abused its discretion in declining to implement transitional arrangements; and (2) committed clear error in finding Mother unfit because that finding was premised upon the court’s erroneous denial of transitional arrangements. Remanded.View "In re Guardianship of Stevens" on Justia Law