Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Mother and Father were married and had a son. After Father was convicted of sexual abuse of girls who had been his piano students, Mother filed for a divorce. The trial court granted the parties a divorce, concluded that Father’s criminal conduct constituted financial misconduct, and divided the parties’ property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) provided findings necessary to support its judgment; (2) did not err as a matter of law in considering Father’s criminal conduct as a relevant factor in arriving at a just division of the parties’ marital estate; and (3) equitably divided the marital property. View "Lesko v. Stanislaw " on Justia Law

After Father and Mother divorced, Mother maintained primary physical custody of the parties’ two daughters, and Father and Mother shared joint legal custody of the girls. Mother later filed a motion to modify the custody order. The trial court granted the motion and eliminated overnight visitation with Father, finding that the girls were inadequately fed after visits with Father, that Father failed to take one daughter’s asthma seriously, and that Father had been “convicted” of offensive touching. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court’s finding that Father had been convicted of a crime was clear error, but the error was harmless; and (2) the trial court’s findings were sufficient to support the result in this case. View "Gordon v. Cheskin" on Justia Law

In 2006, the district court awarded shared parental rights and responsibilities of the parties' children, with Mother having primary residence. In 2012, Father filed successive motions to enforce and to modify. After a hearing, the district court ruled there had been a substantial change in circumstances and that it was in the children's best interest that their primary residence be changed to Father. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence presented at the hearing was sufficient to establish a substantial change in circumstances justifying a change in the children's primary residence and that the district court did not err in applying the statutory best interest factors in reaching its decision. View "Brasier v. Preble" on Justia Law

In 2010, the district court issued a divorce judgment awarding Mother and Father shared parental rights and responsibilities of their child and granting Mother primary residence of the child. In 2011, Father filed a motion to modify the divorce judgment, claiming that the child, who had been living in a truck with his mother, had not had a stable living environment following the divorce and that returning him to a living arrangement in the truck could have significant negative effects on the child's well-being. The court granted Father's motion to modify and awarded him primary residence of the child. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court evaluated the evidence with the best interest of the child in mind, and therefore did not err or abuse its discretion. View "Bulkley v. Bulkley" on Justia Law

Parents' two young children were removed from their care and placed in the custody of the Department of Health and Human Services due to Parents' abuse and neglect. The day before a scheduled contested hearing on the Department's termination petition, Parents appeared in court and represented through counsel that they intended to consent to the termination. After an individual colloquy with each parent, the district court found that Parents had voluntarily and knowingly executed their consent and ordered the termination of their parental rights. Parents appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in terminating Parents' parental rights to their two children, as the court rationally could have found clear and convincing evidence to support its findings that Parents' consents were executed voluntarily and knowingly. View "In re H.C. " on Justia Law

A.H. was born in 2010 with extreme medical needs. A.H. required hospitalization three times when she was in the care of her parents. Eventually, the Department of Health and Human Services placed the child in a foster home. After being placed in a foster home, A.H. began receiving adequate nutrition and became healthier. Because A.H.'s parents demonstrated that they had limited intellectual capacity and failed to progress in rehabilitation, the Department petitioned for the termination of each parent's parental rights. After a hearing, the district court terminated both parents' parental rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding (1) the parents were not able to protect A.H. from jeopardy; (2) the parents were unable to take responsibility for A.H. within a time reasonably calculated to meet her needs; and (3) the termination of parental rights and adoption by the foster parents was in A.H.'s best interest. View "In re A.H." on Justia Law

After a hearing, Mother's rights to her two-year-old daughter were terminated. The district court found by clear and convincing evidence that Mother abandoned the child, that Mother was unwilling or unable to protect the child from jeopardy, and that the child was thriving in the foster home. Mother appealed, arguing that she was denied due process because her attorney was ineffective and that insufficient evidence supported the judgment of termination. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court did not err in concluding that termination was in the child's best interest; and (2) Mother was not denied due process because her attorney provided effective assistance of counsel. View "In re S.P." on Justia Law

Fourteen-year-old Kenneth's paternal aunt (Aunt) and her son filed joined petitions for the appointment of a conservator and guardian based on Kenneth's mother's (Mother) inability to create a tolerable living situation for Kenneth. The probate court appointed Mother and Aunt as Kenneth's coguardians subject to Mother's compliance with certain conditions. The court's order provided that if Mother failed to comply with any of the conditions then Aunt could remove Kenneth from Mother's residence, and the court would then terminate Mother's guardianship. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded, holding that the probate court's order could not be reconciled with the principles established in Guardianship of Jewel M. View "In re Guardianship of Kenneth" on Justia Law

Michael filed a complaint for divorce from Laurel. The district court dissolved Michael's marriage to Laurel and ordered Michael to (1) maintain health insurance for Laurel as an element of spousal support, and (2) be responsible for Laurel's future nonmarital federal tax debt. The Supreme Court vacated portions of the divorce judgment, holding that the district court (1) erred in awarding spousal support without making findings about the costs of the mandated health care insurance payments or the health care insurance alternatives and in ordering Michael to provide health insurance coverage for Laurel indefinitely; and (2) erred in failing to clarify the tax years to which it intended its order regarding tax payments to apply. Remanded. View "Finucan v. Williams" on Justia Law

Less than eighteen months after the district court entered a judgment granting Husband and Wife a divorce, Husband moved to terminate spousal support payments. Wife did not file a response or opposition to the motion but did appear with counsel at a hearing on the motion. The district court granted Husband's motion for the entry of a default judgment against Wife on the ground that Wife failed to file an objection to Husband's motion as required by Me. R. Civ. P. 7(c). The default judgment terminated spousal support. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that the court erred as a matter of law in applying Rule 7 and not Me. R. Civ. P. 105 and in failing to allow Wife to be heard on the substance of Husband's motion. Remanded. View "Bertin v. Bertin" on Justia Law