Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After William Dean was involuntarily hospitalized, the Department of Health and Human Services was appointed as Dean’s temporary public conservator. Thereafter, the Department sold some of Dean’s property. Dean’s sister, Claire Perry, filed a complaint against the Department and certain state individuals, asserting claims arising out of the Department’s management of Dean’s property during the public conservatorship. Later, Pamela Vose was appointed as Dean’s conservator. Vose filed a cross-claim and then a separate action against the Department, alleging breach of fiduciary duty. The court consolidated the two cases. The Department and the individual state defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting sovereign immunity. The court entered a summary judgment in favor of the defendants on most claims but denied the Department’s motions for summary judgment on Vose’s claim for breach of fiduciary duty in both cases, concluding that the Maine Probate Court waived sovereign immunity and that the Department was subject to suit in tort when acting as a public conservator. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order denying the Department’s motions for summary judgment, holding that the Department is immune from the breach of fiduciary duty claims asserted in these cases because the Probate Code does not expressly waive sovereign immunity and the Department did not waive immunity. View "Perry v. Dean" on Justia Law

After a hearing, the State Board of Nursing found that John S. Zablotny had violated his professional duties and revoked his nursing license for two years. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings, concluding that the district court erred in conducting an appellate-type review. On remand, the district court concluded that Zablotny had engaged in activities that constituted professional misconduct but also concluded that the Board failed to prove other allegations of professional misconduct. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the district court’s findings supported the conclusion that the court was not compelled, as a matter of law, to find that Zablotny violated Board rules or professional standards of care. View "Zablotny v. State Board of Nursing" on Justia Law

The Town of Cumberland applied for site plan review of a proposed development involving Broad Cove Reserve property that it owned. The Town of Cumberland Board of Adjustment and Appeals determined that the Town’s proposed development was permitted within the Low Density Residential district as a municipal use. The Estate of Merrill P. Robbins, which owned land abutting the Broad Cove Reserve property, appealed, arguing that the Town’s development was prohibited under the terms of the relevant ordinance. The superior court affirmed, concluding that the plain language of the ordinance supported the Board of Adjustment and Appeals’ determination. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the meaning of “municipal use” as used in the ordinance was unambiguous and that the Town’s proposed facility was allowed under the terms of the ordinance. View "Estate of Merrill P. Robbins v. Town of Cumberland" on Justia Law

The Town of Cumberland applied for site plan review of a proposed development involving Broad Cove Reserve property that it owned. The Town of Cumberland Board of Adjustment and Appeals determined that the Town’s proposed development was permitted within the Low Density Residential district as a municipal use. The Estate of Merrill P. Robbins, which owned land abutting the Broad Cove Reserve property, appealed, arguing that the Town’s development was prohibited under the terms of the relevant ordinance. The superior court affirmed, concluding that the plain language of the ordinance supported the Board of Adjustment and Appeals’ determination. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the meaning of “municipal use” as used in the ordinance was unambiguous and that the Town’s proposed facility was allowed under the terms of the ordinance. View "Estate of Merrill P. Robbins v. Town of Cumberland" on Justia Law

After a public hearing, the Town of Stockton Spring’s Board of Selectman determined that a structure owned by Hollie Beal was a dangerous building or nuisance pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 17, 2851. The superior court affirmed the decision of the Board. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) Beal’s contention that the Board violated her due process rights when it allegedly denied her the opportunity to be heard, to cross-examine witnesses, and to have an impartial fact-finder was unavailing; and (2) there was substantial evidence in the record to support the Board’s findings. View "Beal v. Town of Stockton Springs" on Justia Law

21 Seabran, LLC applied for two permits necessary to renovate a garage on a lakefront parcel. The Town of Naples Code Enforcement Officer denied the permits, concluding that the parcel would have insufficient shore frontage to comply with state and local law. The Town of Naples Board of Appeals denied 21 Seabran’s appeal, concluding that the proposed renovation would add to the parcel a second “residential dwelling unit” for purposes of the Town of Naples Shoreland Zoning Ordinance, which would render the parcel noncompliant. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding (1) the Board’s determination that the proposed structure was a residential dwelling unit was erroneous; and (2) the Board’s conclusion that the parcel failed to comply with the minimum lot size law and rules was erroneous. View "21 Seabran, LLC v. Town of Naples" on Justia Law

Friends of the Motherhouse, a nonprofit corporation and two individuals (collectively, Friends) filed a complaint seeking a declaration that the Portland City Council’s rezoning of a parcel owned by Sea Coast at Baxter Woods Associates, LLC and Motherhouse Associates LP (collectively, Sea Coast) was invalid. Sea Coast successfully moved to intervene and then moved for summary judgment. The superior court granted summary judgment for Sea Coast. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the Council acted within its broad legislative authority, and therefore, the superior court did not err in finding that Sea Coast was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Friends of the Motherhouse v. City of Portland" on Justia Law

The Fryeburg Academy, a private secondary school, applied to the Town of Fryeburg Planning Board for permits authorizing changes in the use of two parcels of leased land. Following a hearing, the Planning Board approved the Academy’s applications for both parcels. Specifically, the Town allowed the Academy to use one parcel of land (the Land Lot) as an outdoor classroom and to use a building on the second parcel of land (the House Lot) to house administrative offices. The Fryeburg Trust, which owns property abutting both lots, appealed. The superior court affirmed the Planning Board’s decision to grant the Land Lot permit but vacated the Planning Board’s decision to grant the House Lot. The Trust, the Academy, and the Town all appealed, challenging the interpretation of the definition of secondary school in Fryeburg’s Land Use Ordinance. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the Planning Board, holding (1) the Academy’s proposed use of the Land Lot fit within the definition of secondary school; and (2) the proposed use of the House Lot was permissible under the Ordinance. View "Fryeburg Trust v. Town of Fryeburg" on Justia Law

Bangor Hydro-Electric (BHE) and Maine Public Service Company (MPS) were regulated utilities engaged in the transmission and distribution of electric it. The companies merged to become Emera Maine during the pendency of this proceeding. BHE and MPS filed a petition for reorganization, under which Emera Maine’s parent company would increase its ownership interest in Algonquin Power & Utilities Corporation (APUC), a publicly-traded company that is in the electricity generation business. The petition was subject to approval by the Maine Public Utilities Commission because of the relationship that would result between Emera Maine, as a transmission and distribution entity, and APUC, a generator. The Commission approved the petition. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the Commission’s order approving the petition, holding that the Commission misconstrued the governing statute in the Electric Industry Restructuring Act. On remand, the Commission once again approved the petition. On the second appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the Commission’s order, holding that the Commission acted outside of its authority when it imposed conditions that would regulate APUC beyond what the Restructuring Act allows. Remanded with instructions to deny the petition. View "Houlton Water Co. v. Public Utilities Commission" on Justia Law

BCN Telecom, Inc. was assessed a state service provider tax on certain flat charges that BCN imposed on some business customers’ lines from 2008 to 2011. The charges were designed both to reimburse BCN for presubscribed interexchange carrier charges that it paid to access local telephone infrastructure and to generate profits. The Sales and Use Tax Division of Maine Revenue Services affirmed the assessment. The Maine Board of Tax Appeals affirmed. On judicial review, the superior court granted summary judgment in favor of BCN, concluding that BCN’s charges were not part of the “sale price” of telecommunications service and that, even if they were, they were exempt from taxation under Me. Rev. Stat. 36, 2557(34) because they were charges for interstate telecommunications services. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment entered by the superior court, holding (1) the amounts received by BCN were subject to the service provider tax as part of the sale price for telecommunications services; and (2) BCN failed to provide prima facie proof that the tax exemption for interstate telecommunications services applied as a matter of law to these charges. View "BCN Telecom, Inc. v. State Tax Assessor" on Justia Law