Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Bowers Wind Project proposed to place sixteen wind turbines within the boundary of an expedited permitting area, making them visible from multiple scenic resources of state or national significance. Champlain Wind, LLC filed an application with the Department of Environmental Protection seeking permits to construct the Project. The Department denied Champlain’s application, concluding that the Project did not satisfy the statutory scenic standard. The Board of Environmental Protection affirmed the Department’s denial of Champlain’s permit application, concluding that the Project would “unreasonably adversely affect scenic character and existing uses related to scenic character.” The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the Board did not act unlawfully or arbitrarily in its determination that the visual impact of the Project would have an unreasonable adverse effect on the existing scenic character or existing uses related to scenic character of nine affected great ponds. View "Champlain Wind, LLC v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

Plaintiff challenged three City of Saco decisions issued in connection with the construction of a car dealership by WWS Properties, LLC. Specifically at issue were (1) the City Planning Board’s and the Zoning Board of Appeals’ (ZBA) conclusions that each lacked jurisdiction to review the City Planner’s grant of an amendment to WWS’s approved site plan, and (2) the ZBA’s determination that it did not have jurisdiction to consider Plaintiff’s appeal of the certificate of occupancy issued to WWS. The superior court affirmed the decisions of the Planning Board and ZBA. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding (1) Plaintiff’s appeal of the City Planner’s approval of the site plan amendment was properly before the Planning Board, and therefore, the Planning Board erred in determining that it lacked jurisdiction; and (2) the ZBA had jurisdiction to consider Plaintiff’s appeal of the issuance of a certificate of occupancy, and the ZBA erred in refusing to exercise that jurisdiction. Remanded. View "Desfosses v. City of Saco" on Justia Law

Plaintiff purchased a former school property from the Town of Dexter for future redevelopment, and the Town initially supported Plaintiff’s redevelopment efforts. After Plaintiff contested the Town’s tax assessment of the property, the Town’s code enforcement officer (CEO) issued a stop work order and notice of violation prohibiting all work on the property. Plaintiff filed this civil rights action against Defendant, the Town of Dexter, alleging that the Town’s actions, through its CEO, were arbitrary and capricious and deprived him of equal protection of law and the use and enjoyment of property, in violation of both the federal and state constitutions. Plaintiff sought injunctive relief and damages. The superior court granted the Town’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint, concluding that Plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed on the grounds that Plaintiff (1) failed to allege that the CEO’s actions were taken pursuant to a municipal policy, (2) failed to pursue available administrative relief, and (3) failed to allege that he faced discriminatory treatment as compared with others who were similarly situated. View "Marshall v. Town of Dexter" on Justia Law

Brian Bailey filed a Me. R. Civ. P. 80C appeal from a decision of the Maine Department of Marine Resources (DMR) setting Bailey’s 2014 elver fishing quota at four pounds. The basis for the quota was confirmed on March 31, 2014 by issuance of a 2014 elver transaction card. No appeal was filed within thirty days after Bailey’s receipt of the 2014 elver transaction card. After the close of the 2014 elver season on May 31, 2014, Bailey filed this appeal on July 10, 2014. The superior court dismissed the appeal. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the issues in this case present an exception to the jurisprudence that would ordinarily require the Court to dismiss this appeal for mootness; and (2) DMR’s issuance of Bailey’s 2014 elver transaction card constituted a final agency action, and therefore, Bailey’s appeal was not timely filed. View "Bailey v. Dep’t of Marine Res." on Justia Law

In 1973, the City of South Portland issued a variance to Kay Loring that brought her parcel of land, which was previously nonconforming, into dimensional conformity. For purposes of land use regulation, Loring’s 4,703 square foot lot became the equivalent of a conforming 5,000 square foot lot. In 2013, the City’s Building Inspector issued a building permit based on the 1973 variance that authorized Loring to construct a single-family house on her lot. Mary Campbell and others (collectively, Campbell), who owned nearby lots, appealed the issuance of the permit. The South Portland Board of Appeals affirmed the Building Inspector’s action, and the superior court affirmed the Board’s decision. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the 1973 variance was still in force when the building permit was issued, and the Building Inspector was authorized to act on Loring’s permit application; and (2) Campbell did not preserve her argument for municipal or judicial review that the building permit was not lawful because the proposed development would exceed the density restrictions for that zoning district. View "Campbell v. City of S. Portland" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was an order of the Maine Public Utilities Commission approving an alternative rate plan (ARP) for Bangor Gas Company, LLC. The Maine Office of the Public Advocate (OPA) and Bucksport Mill, LLC appealed from the Commission’s order. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission did not abuse its discretion or exceed its statutory authority in calculating the APR initial rate base by utilizing an unimpaired, “original cost” valuation of Bangor Gas’s assets rather than the impaired “acquisition cost” incurred by Bangor Gas’s parent company; and (2) the OPA’s argument that the Commission abused its discretion by including in its revenue requirement calculation a portion of the Bangor Gas’s regulatory proceeding expenses amortized over five years need not be addressed because the Commission’s decision to include the regulatory proceeding expenses in its revenue requirement analysis had no impact on its decision to approve the ARP. View "Office of Pub. Advocate v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n" on Justia Law

Kevin Collins, a prison inmate, filed three grievances against the Department of Corrections relating to food services and the prison’s telephone system. The Department denied the grievances. Collins subsequently filed a petition for judicial review of a final agency action. The trial court ultimately dismissed Collins’s petition as untimely. Collins filed a notice of appeal accompanied by an application to proceed without payment of fees, thus requiring Collins to file a certified copy of his account statement for the six months preceding his appeal. Collins did not file his account statement in a timely manner. The trial court waived the appellate filing fee. The Department appealed from the order waiving the filing fee and filed a motion to dismiss Collins’s appeal for failure to file a new account statement for the six months preceding this appeal, arguing that Collins had failed to perfect his appeal. The Supreme Judicial Court (1) dismissed Collins’s appeal on the grounds that Collins failed to comply with the timing requirements of the Maine Rules of Appellate Procedure and had failed to perfect his appeal; and (2) dismissed as moot the Department’s appeal from the order waiving Collins’s appellate filing fee. View "Collins v. Dep’t of Corr." on Justia Law

The Workers’ Compensation Board imposed a $30,000 penalty on Nale Holyoke and his construction company (collectively, Holyoke) for violating the insurance coverage requirements of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA). The Workers’ Compensation Board Appellate Division vacated the Board’s imposition of penalties on Holyoke. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, albeit for a different reason than that expressed by the Appellate Division, holding that Holyoke complied with Me. Rev. Stat. 39-A, 401 and 403 by maintaining workers’ compensation policies that would have provided compensation to any worker entitled to benefits, and therefore, Holyoke complied with the coverage requirements of the WCA. View "Workers Comp. Bd. Abuse Investigation Unit v. Nate Holyoke Builders, Inc." on Justia Law

After a formal investigation, the Commission on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices determined that the National Organization for Marriage (NOM) - a national nonprofit advocacy corporation “dedicated to preserving the institution of marriage as between one man and one woman” - was a “ballot question committee” and was therefore subject to and in violation of the registration and reporting requirements of Me. Rev. Stat. 21-A, 1056-B. The business and consumer docket denied NOM’s petition for review. NOM filed a petition for review of the Commission’s decision, accompanied by a motion for a stay pending the resolution of its appeal. The trial court denied NOM’s request for a stay. NOM then filed a petition with the Supreme Judicial Court seeking “clarification” that the Commission’s decision was automatically stayed or, alternatively, seeking a stay pursuant to the Court’s inherent power to grant a stay. The Supreme Judicial Court denied NOM’s motion for a stay, holding (1) the Commission’s determination is not automatically stayed pending appeal pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 62(e); and (2) the Court declines to stay the Commission’s decision pursuant to its inherent equitable authority. View "Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. Comm’n of Governmental Ethics & Elections Practices" on Justia Law

Donald Paradis applied for and obtained a building permit to construct a two-car garage on property in the Town of Peru. After Paradis constructed the garage, the Town sent Paradis a notice of violation, stating that the garage violated multiple ordinance provisions. The Board of Appeals concluded that the appeal was properly denied. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that the Board of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider Paradis’s appeal, which deprived the courts of jurisdiction to consider it, as the notice of violation was not an appealable decision. Remanded. View "Paradis v. Town of Peru" on Justia Law