Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2010, Gregory Sullwold died of a heart attack while exercising on a treadmill in his home. Sullwood was employed by the Salvation Army at the time of his death, and the Salvation Army permitted Sullwold to work remotely from home. In 2011, Sullwold’s widow filed a petition for award of compensation, alleging that Sullwold’s work resulted in his heart attack. The Workers’ Compensation Board granted the petition. A hearing officer reaffirmed the original order, finding that work stress was a major factor in Sullwold’s death. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing officer (1) did not err in finding that the evidence triggered the presumption found in 39-A Me. Rev. Stat. 327, which provides that an employee covered by the Maine Workers’ Compensation Act must be paid compensation if he or she receives a personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment; and (2) did not erroneously shift the burden of persuasion to the Salvation Army in this case. View "Sullwold v. Salvation Army" on Justia Law

Michael Doyle submitted to the Town of Falmouth a request pursuant to the Freedom of Access Act (FOAA) seeking to inspect certain cellular telephone bills of the School Department’s former Superintendent. The former Superintendent provided the requested records but redacted the information she considered nonpublic and confidential, exempt from disclosure pursuant to the FOAA, or beyond the scope of Doyle’s request. Doyle appealed, alleging that he was entitled to received unredacted copies of the cellular telephone records. After an in camera review of the unredacted records, the superior court entered judgment in favor of the Town and School Department. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the personal telephone numbers of public employees, any information concerning calls other than those related to the Town’s business, and any records containing information about parents’ and students’ telephone numbers were properly redacted from the Town’s response to the FOAA request. View "Doyle v. Town of Falmouth" on Justia Law

In 2010, the Workers’ Compensation Board found that Fay Johnson was injured while working for Home Depot USA, Inc. Home Depot agreed to pay Johnson benefits. In 2012, Johnson went missing. Later that year, Home Depot filed two petitions, one seeking permission to stop paying benefits and the other asking the Board to declare Johnson’s benefits forfeited. A hearing officer ordered that Johnson’s benefits be suspended until Johnson reappeared and dismissed the petition for forfeiture as moot. The Workers’ Compensation Board Appellate Division affirmed. Johnson’s attorney appealed on Johnson's behalf. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the hearing officer reasonably found that the statutory requirement that petitions for review of incapacity and for forfeiture of benefits be served on “other parties” was satisfied by service on Johnson’s attorney, who continued to represent her before the Board; and (2) the hearing officer had the authority to direct Home Depot to pay Johnsons’ benefits into a segregated account pending a hearing on the petitions and to suspend her benefits following the hearing. View "Johnson v. The Home Depot USA, Inc." on Justia Law

David Fleming, a prisoner at the Maine State Prison, filed a complaint seeking review of a decision of the Department of Corrections not to return items to him that he claimed were stolen from him. Because Fleming did not file any proof of service demonstrating compliance with 5 Me. Rev. Stat. 11003, the superior court dismissed Fleming’s complaint with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the matter after Fleming failed to file proof of service during the time available to him after his initial filing of a complaint. View "Fleming v. Dep’t of Corr." on Justia Law

Gina Turcott filed a complaint for injunctive relief against the Humane Society Waterville Area (HSWA) seeking the release of HSWA records relating to a certain cat. The complaint further alleged that Turcott had submitted a request for documents to HSWA pursuant to Maine’s Freedom of Access Act (FOAA) and that HSWA had wrongfully withheld the requested records. The superior court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, although HSWA performs a function that benefits the public and assists municipalities, HSWA is not a public agency subject to the requirements of FOAA. View "Turcotte v. Humane Soc’y Waterville Area" on Justia Law

In 2011, the Town of Arundel reissued a conditional use permit to Dubois Livestock, Inc. In 2012, the Town’s code enforcement officer issued to Dubois a notice of violation for failure to comply with the conditional use permit. The Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) upheld the code enforcement officer’s notice of violation because Dubois admitted to violating the conditions of the 2011 permit. Dubois appealed, arguing that the Town did not have the authority to regulate Dubois’s operation because the Town of Arundel Land Use Ordinance was preempted by state law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that state law does not preempt the Ordinance, and therefore, the Town’s action taken pursuant to the Ordinance in issuing Dubois a notice of violation for failure to comply with the conditional use permit was not ultra vires or beyond the Town’s jurisdiction. View "Dubois Livestock, Inc. v. Town of Arundel" on Justia Law

The Town of Madawaska filed an amended land use citation and complaint against Richard and Ann Cayer for violations of a shoreland zoning ordinance. The Cayers filed a special motion to dismiss pursuant to Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute, arguing that the land use citation was a retaliatory effort by the Town to punish them for exercising their right to petition local government. The trial court denied the special motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, except possibly in extraordinary circumstances not presented in this case, the anti-SLAPP statute cannot be invoked to thwart a local government enforcement action commenced to address the defendants’ alleged violations of law. View "Town of Madawaska v. Cayer" on Justia Law

32 Thomas Street, LLC applied to the Portland City Council for conditional rezoning of its property in Portland’s West End. The City Council ultimately approved the conditional zoning agreement (CZA) for the reuse and rehabilitation of the property. The superior court determined that the rezoning did not comply with the City’s comprehensive plan and state statutes limiting conditional rezoning. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court and remanded with direction to affirm the decision of the City Council, holding that the record before the City Council supported its legislative determination that the CZA was consistent with the comprehensive plan and therefore did not violate relevant state statutes. View "Remmel v. City of Portland" on Justia Law

The Commissioner of the Department of Environmental Protection granted Janis Walsh and Paul Walsh a permit to construct a pier on their property. Thereafter, Marjorie Getz and David Tourangeau appealed the Commissioner’s order to the Board of Environmental Protection and filed a petition to revoke the Walshes’ permit. The Board summarily dismissed as untimely Getz and Tourangeau’s appeal, and the Commissioner dismissed Getz and Tourangeau’s petition to revoke the permit. Tourangeau and Getz petitioned for judicial review of the administrative decisions. The superior court dismissed the petitions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board did not err in concluding that Getz and Tourangeau were not “abutters” entitled to notice of the Walshes’ permit application, and the superior court did not abuse its discretion in declining to apply a good cause exception to extend the time for appeal from the Commissioner’s decision granting the Walshes’ permit application; and (2) the superior court did not err in dismissing Tourangeau and Getz’s appeal from the Commissioner’s dismissal of their petition for revocation, as the Legislature has given the Commissioner sole discretion to decide whether to revoke permits. View "Getz v. Walsh" on Justia Law

The Francis Small Heritage Trust, Inc. owned eleven parcels of land in the Town of Limington. The Trust requested tax abatement on its properties for the tax years 2009-2010, arguing that the properties should be granted tax-exempt status. The Town denied the Trust’s petitions. The State Board of Property Tax Review denied the Trust’s appeals, concluding that the Trust was not entitled to a tax exemption pursuant to 36 Me. Rev. Stat. 652(1)(A),(C) because its activities were “not restricted solely to benevolent and charitable purposes.” The superior court vacated the Board’s ruling, concluding that the Trust was entitled to a tax exemption as a benevolent and charitable institution. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the Trust was entitled to a charitable exemption as a charitable and benevolent organization. View "Francis Small Heritage Trust, Inc. v. Town of Limington" on Justia Law