Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Securities Administrator of the Office of Securities revoked the securities licenses of North Atlantic Securities, LLC, a licensed broker-dealer, Michael J. Dell’Olio & Associates, a licensed investment adviser, and Michael Dell’Olio. Dell’Olio was an investment advisor representative of Michael J. Dell’Olio, an agent of North Atlantic, and an owner exercising control in both firms. The revocations resulted from transactions through which Dell’Olio, his son, and the two entities under Dell’Olio’s control received over $200,000 in loans from Dell’Olio’s mother-in-law, most of which were not repaid. The business and consumer docket affirmed the revocation of Appellants’ securities licenses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the charges arising from transactions that occurred in 2006 were not time-barred; (2) the administrative record supported the Administrator’s factual findings; (3) the Administrator’s decision was not affected by structural or actual bias; and (4) despite the severity of the penalty imposed, the Administrator did not abuse her discretion in revoking the licenses. View "N. Atlantic Secs., LLC v. Office of Secs." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a public assistance recipient who was accepted to rent an apartment owned by RRE Coach Lantern Holdings, LLC. Plaintiff’s caseworker indicated that Coach Lantern would have to include a Housing and Urban Development (HUD) tenancy addendum in Plaintiff’s lease for Plaintiff to be able to use her voucher for subsidized rent. Coach Lantern refused to include the addendum in Plaintiff’s lease. Because Plaintiff could not use the voucher unless Coach Lantern included the addendum in her lease, Plaintiff did not rent the apartment. Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint with the Maine Human Rights Commission alleging that Coach Lantern’s policy of refusing to include the HUD tenancy addendum in her lease constituted a refusal to participate in the voucher program, which amounted to discrimination against Plaintiff on the basis of her status as a public assistance recipient in violation of the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA). The superior court entered summary judgment in favor of Coach Lantern. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Coach Lantern because the undisputed facts showed that Coach Lantern did not discriminate against Plaintiff in violation of the MHRA. View "Dussault v. RRE Coach Lantern Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

Darling’s, a Ford dealer and franchisee, filed a complaint before the Maine Motor Vehicle Franchise Board (Board), alleging that Ford Motor Company, an automobile manufacturer and franchisor, violated the Business Practices between Motor Vehicle Manufacturers, Distributors and Dealers Act (Dealers Act). The Board concluded that Ford violated the Dealers Act by terminating an incentive program without providing Darling’s with written notice by certified mail. The superior court affirmed the Board’s factual findings and the Board’s damages award. The Supreme Court affirmed in all respects but one, holding that the Dealers Act does not authorize the Board to award monetary damages. Remanded for a determination of damages by a jury. View "Ford Motor Co. v. Darling's" on Justia Law

The Department of Environmental Protection granted DCP Midstream Partners, LP, a permit to construct a liquefied petroleum gas terminal near Searsport. Thanks But No Tank and several individuals (collectively TBNT) sought review of the Department's decision. The superior court affirmed. Four months after TBNT filed its notice of appeal, DCP withdrew its municipal application and petitioned the Department to surrender the permits. The Department granted DCP's petition. The Supreme Court subsequently dismissed this appeal as moot and (1) declined to vacate the judgment of the superior court, and (2) denied TBNT's motion for costs, as it was not a prevailing party pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 1501. View "Thanks But No Tank v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs owned property near but not on Sebago Lake. Defendants owned shorefront property on the lake. Through their deeds, Plaintiffs acquired an easement consisting of a right-of-way over lot 40A, a strip of land situated between Defendants' lots. In 2007, the lot was conveyed to Defendants. Before the conveyance, Plaintiffs obtained a permit for the construction of a dock extending from the lot to the lake. In 2010, the Town's code enforcement officer rescinded the permit and ordered the dock to be removed. The Town's zoning board upheld the enforcement officer's decision. Plaintiffs filed suit, challenging the zoning board's decision and Defendants' fee simple title to the lot and seeking a declaratory judgment that they were entitled to maintain a dock on the lot. Ultimately, the superior court found Defendants held fee simple title to the lot and that the easement held by Plaintiffs did not grant them a right to maintain the dock. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that the deed in Defendants' chains of title unambiguously excepted the lot from a prior conveyance and that deeds in Plaintiffs' chains of title were ambiguous as to whether the dock was allowed. Remanded. View "Sleeper v. Loring" on Justia Law

The district court ordered Defendant to pay a civil penalty and attorney fees and to remove three unregistered, uninspected vehicles from his property after finding that he maintained an automobile graveyard on his property in violation of Me. Rev. Stat. 30-A, 3753. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not misconstrue the applicable law in determining that the vehicles on Defendant's property did not meet the definition of "antique auto"; (2) did not clearly err in finding that one of the vehicles on Defendant's property was not a tractor used solely for logging purposes; (3) did not err by accepting Defendant's interrogatory answers into evidence and finding that his truck was an "altered vehicle"; and (4) did not abuse its discretion in declining to award additional attorney fees to the Town of China. View "Town of China v. Althenn" on Justia Law

Berwick Iron & Metal Recycling, Inc. operated a metal and automobile recycling business under an existing conditional use permit. In 2010, Berwick Iron applied for a conditional use permit to install and operate a metal shredder. On remand, the Berwick Planning Board voted to approve the conditional use permit. The superior court vacated the Board's judgment, concluding that the Board erred in applying the ordinance governing air emissions. Both parties appealed. On cross-appeal, the abutters argued, among other things, that the superior court erred in concluding that the Board did not violate the abutters' due process rights by communicating ex parte with representatives from Berwick Iron. The Supreme Court vacated the superior court's judgment and remanded for entry of a judgment affirming the Board's decision, holding that, despite the Board's ex parte communications with Berwick Iron, the Board did not violate the abutters' due process rights or err in applying its ordinance. View "Duffy v. Town of Berwick" on Justia Law

The Superintendent of Insurance ordered Guarantee Trust Life Insurance Company (GTL) to pay a civil penalty of $150,000 after finding that GTL violated Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 24-A, 1420-M(1), 1902, and 2412(1-A)(B), and that GTL was accountable, pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 24-A, 1445(1)(D) for violations committed by Cinergy Health, Inc., a company that acted as GTL's producer. The business and consumer docket affirmed the decision of the Superintendent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) GTL was accountable pursuant to section 1445(1)(D) for Cinergy's misconduct occurring before the date on which GTL formally appointed Cinergy as its producer; (2) the Superintendent did not err in concluding that GTL provided coverage to Maine residents and was liable under section 2412(1-A)(B); (3) the Superintendent's did not issue an untimely decision pursuant to the plain language of Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 24-A, 235(2); (4) the Superintendent did not abuse her discretion by holding GTL liable under section 1420-M(1); and (5) the Superintendent did not abuse her discretion by penalizing GTL for violating section 1902. View "Guarantee Trust Life Ins. Co. v. Superintendent of Ins." on Justia Law

A.H. was born in 2010 with extreme medical needs. A.H. required hospitalization three times when she was in the care of her parents. Eventually, the Department of Health and Human Services placed the child in a foster home. After being placed in a foster home, A.H. began receiving adequate nutrition and became healthier. Because A.H.'s parents demonstrated that they had limited intellectual capacity and failed to progress in rehabilitation, the Department petitioned for the termination of each parent's parental rights. After a hearing, the district court terminated both parents' parental rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding (1) the parents were not able to protect A.H. from jeopardy; (2) the parents were unable to take responsibility for A.H. within a time reasonably calculated to meet her needs; and (3) the termination of parental rights and adoption by the foster parents was in A.H.'s best interest. View "In re A.H." on Justia Law

Since 2001, Callaghan has worked part-time at the South Portland Library. Edwards works for the Parks and Recreation Department about four hours per week. Both are subject to a personnel policy, which, following 2010-2011 amendments, provides that city employees may not seek or accept nomination or election to any South Portland elective office; use the influence of their employment for or against any candidate for city elective office; circulate petitions or campaign literature for any city elective office; solicit or receive subscriptions, contributions or political service from any person for or against any candidate for any city elective office; or use city property to assist or advocate for or against any candidate. Callaghan has served on the School Board since 2007. When Callaghan sought reelection in 2011, the City Clerk stated that the personnel policy amendments prevented placement of her name on the ballot. Edwards had served on the Board for 18 years. In 2010, Edwards expressed interest in filling a vacancy on the Board. After the City Clerk questioned whether Edwards could be appointed given his city employment, Edwards did not pursue the appointment. Edwards and Callaghan filed a complaint, 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting that the policy was an unconstitutional restraint on political speech. The trial court entered partial summary judgment for the employees and an injunction barring enforcement of a prohibition on any city employee seeking election to or serving on the School Board or, on their own time, from circulating petitions or campaign literature and soliciting or receiving contributions or political service for or against candidates in School Board elections. The Maine Supreme Court affirmed as to the employees, but vacated the judgment to the extent that it invalidates the policy as to employees who were not parties. View "Callaghan v. City of South Portland" on Justia Law