Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Reva Merrill appealed a Superior Court judgment that affirmed the Board of Trustees for the Maine Public Employees Retirement System's decision to deny her request for a waiver of past-due life insurance premiums. Merrill contended on appeal that the Board erred in interpreting 5 M.R.S. 17103(6)(2008) to prohibit it from waiving past-due payments for the non-mandatory Group Life Insurance Program, and that the Board's administrative procedures violated her right to due process. Because the Supreme Court agreed with Merrill that the Board had the authority to waive back premiums, the Court vacated the Board's decision and remanded the case for the Board to decide finally whether to waive Merrill's required payments. View "Merrill v. Maine Public Employees Retirement System" on Justia Law

In 2011, the Maine Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) issued an order approving water quality certification (WQC) under the Clean Water Act for the continued operation of the Eel Weir Hydropower Project. The project includes Eel Weir Bypass, a stretch of water that connects Sebago Lake to the Presumpscot River. Douglas Watts, a recreational user of Sebago Lake and the Presumpscot River, appealed the WQC to the Maine Board of Environmental Protection (BEP). The BEP affirmed the DEP’s order. The Business and Consumer Docket affirmed. The Supreme Court also affirmed, holding that the BEP did not err in approving the WQC and in finding that the WQC complies with Maine’s water quality standards governing the Eel Weir Bypass and Sebago Lake. View "Watts v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

Glen Harrington pleaded guilty in 2012 to eluding an officer and admitted to violating the conditions of his probation. Harrington was sentenced to forty-eight months’ imprisonment. The Department of Corrections subsequently determined that Harrington was eligible to receive seven days per month of good-time credits and that Harrington would be eligible to receive an additional two days per month for participation in transition-plan programs. Harrington appealed this determination, arguing that he was entitled, for the entire duration of his sentence, to the two days per month for participation in transition-plan programs. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition on the basis that calculations of good time credits are not reviewable in post-conviction proceedings. Harrington appealed, arguing that his petition did not challenge a “calculation” of the credits but instead challenged the Department’s policy of making the credit available to only to inmates at a certain point in their sentences. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the post-conviction court did not err in construing the Department’s decision as a calculation of good-time credits and dismissing Harrington’s petition. View "Harrington v. State" on Justia Law

Pike Industries operated a quarry in the City of Westbrook. Smiling Hill Farm owned property and operated businesses near Pike’s quarry. After the City concluded that Pike did not have a grandfathered right to quarry and attempted to rezone the property and end Pike’s quarrying operations, Pike filed a complaint seeking to enjoin the City from enforcing its zoning ordinances. The City and Pike subsequently entered into a consent decree that allowed Pike to continue its quarrying operations subject and established a set of governing performance standards. Smiling Hill appealed. In Pike I, the Supreme Court remanded the case with instructions for the parties to formalize the performance standards. The parties then entered into a second consent decree. Smiling Hill appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the decree conformed to the requirements laid out in Pike I; and (2) the decree did not result in a forfeiture of the City’s enforcement power or an illegal contract zone. View "Pike Indus., Inc. v. City of Westbrook" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s employment as a corrections officer at the county jail was terminated as a result of an incident with an inmate. Although Plaintiff was reinstated to his position at the jail, the Board of Trustees of the Maine Criminal Justice Academy suspended Plaintiff’s corrections-officer certificate for one year, finding that Plaintiff recklessly caused bodily injury or offensive physical contact to an inmate and that this conduct constituted a gross deviation from the standard of conduct. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Board did not abuse its discretion in issuing a one-year suspension in this case. View "Stein v. Me. Criminal Justice Academy" on Justia Law

The Securities Administrator of the Office of Securities revoked the securities licenses of North Atlantic Securities, LLC, a licensed broker-dealer, Michael J. Dell’Olio & Associates, a licensed investment adviser, and Michael Dell’Olio. Dell’Olio was an investment advisor representative of Michael J. Dell’Olio, an agent of North Atlantic, and an owner exercising control in both firms. The revocations resulted from transactions through which Dell’Olio, his son, and the two entities under Dell’Olio’s control received over $200,000 in loans from Dell’Olio’s mother-in-law, most of which were not repaid. The business and consumer docket affirmed the revocation of Appellants’ securities licenses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the charges arising from transactions that occurred in 2006 were not time-barred; (2) the administrative record supported the Administrator’s factual findings; (3) the Administrator’s decision was not affected by structural or actual bias; and (4) despite the severity of the penalty imposed, the Administrator did not abuse her discretion in revoking the licenses. View "N. Atlantic Secs., LLC v. Office of Secs." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a public assistance recipient who was accepted to rent an apartment owned by RRE Coach Lantern Holdings, LLC. Plaintiff’s caseworker indicated that Coach Lantern would have to include a Housing and Urban Development (HUD) tenancy addendum in Plaintiff’s lease for Plaintiff to be able to use her voucher for subsidized rent. Coach Lantern refused to include the addendum in Plaintiff’s lease. Because Plaintiff could not use the voucher unless Coach Lantern included the addendum in her lease, Plaintiff did not rent the apartment. Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint with the Maine Human Rights Commission alleging that Coach Lantern’s policy of refusing to include the HUD tenancy addendum in her lease constituted a refusal to participate in the voucher program, which amounted to discrimination against Plaintiff on the basis of her status as a public assistance recipient in violation of the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA). The superior court entered summary judgment in favor of Coach Lantern. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Coach Lantern because the undisputed facts showed that Coach Lantern did not discriminate against Plaintiff in violation of the MHRA. View "Dussault v. RRE Coach Lantern Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

Darling’s, a Ford dealer and franchisee, filed a complaint before the Maine Motor Vehicle Franchise Board (Board), alleging that Ford Motor Company, an automobile manufacturer and franchisor, violated the Business Practices between Motor Vehicle Manufacturers, Distributors and Dealers Act (Dealers Act). The Board concluded that Ford violated the Dealers Act by terminating an incentive program without providing Darling’s with written notice by certified mail. The superior court affirmed the Board’s factual findings and the Board’s damages award. The Supreme Court affirmed in all respects but one, holding that the Dealers Act does not authorize the Board to award monetary damages. Remanded for a determination of damages by a jury. View "Ford Motor Co. v. Darling's" on Justia Law

The Department of Environmental Protection granted DCP Midstream Partners, LP, a permit to construct a liquefied petroleum gas terminal near Searsport. Thanks But No Tank and several individuals (collectively TBNT) sought review of the Department's decision. The superior court affirmed. Four months after TBNT filed its notice of appeal, DCP withdrew its municipal application and petitioned the Department to surrender the permits. The Department granted DCP's petition. The Supreme Court subsequently dismissed this appeal as moot and (1) declined to vacate the judgment of the superior court, and (2) denied TBNT's motion for costs, as it was not a prevailing party pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 1501. View "Thanks But No Tank v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs owned property near but not on Sebago Lake. Defendants owned shorefront property on the lake. Through their deeds, Plaintiffs acquired an easement consisting of a right-of-way over lot 40A, a strip of land situated between Defendants' lots. In 2007, the lot was conveyed to Defendants. Before the conveyance, Plaintiffs obtained a permit for the construction of a dock extending from the lot to the lake. In 2010, the Town's code enforcement officer rescinded the permit and ordered the dock to be removed. The Town's zoning board upheld the enforcement officer's decision. Plaintiffs filed suit, challenging the zoning board's decision and Defendants' fee simple title to the lot and seeking a declaratory judgment that they were entitled to maintain a dock on the lot. Ultimately, the superior court found Defendants held fee simple title to the lot and that the easement held by Plaintiffs did not grant them a right to maintain the dock. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that the deed in Defendants' chains of title unambiguously excepted the lot from a prior conveyance and that deeds in Plaintiffs' chains of title were ambiguous as to whether the dock was allowed. Remanded. View "Sleeper v. Loring" on Justia Law