Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was a general construction company. In 2010, the Maine Department of Labor Bureau of Unemployment Compensation conducted a random audit of Plaintiff's business to verify that twenty-four individuals that worked for Plaintiff were independent contractors. The Bureau determined the individuals were employees of Plaintiff and thus assessed Plaintiff unpaid unemployment tax liability for each of these individuals. The Unemployment Insurance Commission affirmed the Bureau's determination as to twenty-two of the individuals - salespeople, a bookkeeper, and skilled workers employed as subcontractors. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the Commission's decision as to the bookkeeper and the salespeople; but (2) vacated the Commission's judgment with regard to eighteen of the subcontractors, holding that Plaintiff met its burden of demonstrating that the subcontractors met all three criteria listed in 26 Me. Rev. Stat. 1043(11)(E)(1) to (3). Remanded. View "Sinclair Builders, Inc. v. Unemployment Ins. Comm'n" on Justia Law

The City Council authorized the City Manager to sell a parcel of oceanfront property known as "the Boat School." Plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that the sale agreement was invalid due to the City's failure to advertise in accordance with its charter, and moved for a temporary restraining order to prevent the sale of the property. Defendants counterclaimed against Plaintiffs for slander of title and tortious interference with a contract. Plaintiffs filed a special motion to dismiss the counterclaims of Defendants pursuant to Maine's anti-SLAPP statute because Defendants' counterclaims were based on Plaintiffs' petitioning activity. The district court (1) declined to address the merits of Plaintiffs' special motion to dismiss because it was filed after the sixty-day period provided by the statute; (2) granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' complaint; (3) granted in part and denied in part summary judgment for Plaintiffs on Defendants' counterclaims. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of Plaintiffs' special motion to dismiss, holding that the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to consider the merits of Plaintiffs' untimely special motion. View "Bradbury v. City of Eastport" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was the administratrix of a Massachusetts estate appointed by a Massachusetts court. Part of the estate was a parcel of real property located in Maine that was later sold. The estate and the IRS agreed to value the back parcel at $950,000. Plaintiff later filed an amended Maine estate tax return, but insufficient funds remained in the estate to pay the Maine assessment. Plaintiff received a notice of assessment for Maine estate tax informing her that, as the estate's personal representative, she was personally liable for the money owed by the estate. Upon Plaintiff's request for reconsideration, the Assessor upheld an adjusted assessment of $98,180. The superior court vacated the Assessor's decision, concluding that the Assessor lacked jurisdiction to impose personal liability for unpaid estate taxes on a personal representative appointed by an out-of-state court to administer a foreign estate. The Supreme Court vacated the superior court's judgment and remanded for entry of judgment against Plaintiff, holding that Maine tax law provides the Assessor with the authority to hold a personal representative appointed by an out-of-state court personally liable for unpaid Maine estate taxes resulting from the sale of real property located in Maine. View "Metcalf v. State Tax Assessor" on Justia Law

Paul Dyer held licenses as an insurance producer and consultant. Because of Dyer's alleged misconduct, the Bureau of Insurance filed a petition for enforcement against Dyer alleging that Dyer violated the Maine Insurance Code and seeking the revocation of his licenses and requesting civil penalties and restitution. After a hearing, the Superintendent of Insurance concluded that Dyer violated the identified provisions of the Insurance Code, revoked Dyer's licenses, and ordered him to pay civil penalties and restitution. Dyer appealed the judgment entered in the business and consumer docket affirming the Superintendent's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Superintendent did not err in interpreting the Insurance Code or in making factual findings and did not abuse his discretion by imposing penalties permitted in the statute. View "Dyer v. Superintendent of Ins." on Justia Law

Eagle Rental was a licensed used car dealer. Daniel Bickford and his wife were the company's vice president and treasurer. In 2003, Eagle Rental began purchasing Cadillac Escalades and trading them in to dealers for newer models. The Bickfords were unable to sell their Escalade inventory for several years and drove the Escalades on personal business. The tax assessor assessed use taxes on four of those Escalades. The business and consumer docket affirmed the assessment. Eagle Rental appealed, arguing it did not owe use tax because the Bickfords operated the Escalades with dealer plates for their personal use in accordance with Maine's dealer plate statute. Read together, the dealer plate and taxation statutes provide that dealers and their immediate families may use dealer plates on vehicles in a dealer's inventory for their personal use without being subject to use tax until the vehicles to which the plates are attached are withdrawn from inventory. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Eagle Rental did not meet its burden of proving that the Escalades were not withdrawn from inventory, and accordingly, the trial court correctly concluded they were subject to use tax. View "Eagle Rental, Inc. v. State Tax Assessor" on Justia Law

Employee suffered an injury to his left hand while working for Employer. Later, Employee's left index finger had to be amputated. Employee subsequently filed a petition for specific loss benefits. The parties agreed Employee was entitled to specific loss benefits because of the amputation for a period of thirty-eight weeks. At issue was whether Employer was entitled to an offset for the incapacity benefits it paid before the amputation. The Workers' Compensation Board granted the petition for specific loss benefits and determined that Employer was allowed to offset the incapacity benefits paid before the amputation. The Supreme Court vacated the Board's decision, holding that Employer was not entitled to offset the incapacity benefits paid during the months after Employee's initial injury but before the amputation of his finger. View "Scott v. Fraser Papers, Inc. " on Justia Law

In 2007, Petitioner pleaded guilty to ten counts of burglary. Because of a pending federal sentence, Petitioner was classified as a medium security inmate by the Department of Corrections (DOC). In 2011, Petitioner filed a grievance with the DOC contending that he should have been receiving two days of good time per month pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 17-A, 1253(10)(B), which gives the chief administrative officer of a prison the discretion to deduct up to two days per month from an inmate's sentence for satisfactory performance in "community work, education or rehabilitation programs." The DOC denied relief. The superior court denied Petitioner's petitions seeking post-conviction relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the DOC properly construed section 1253(10)(B); and (2) the DOC's policy implementing section 1253(10)(B) was validly adopted in accordance with the Maine Administrative Procedure Act. View "Roderick v. State" on Justia Law

Decedent, an employee of the Salvation Army, died at his home, part of which served as his office. Decedent's spouse filed a petition for death benefits with the Workers' Compensation Board (Board), which issued an award in favor of the Estate. The Salvation Army filed notices of appeal with the Supreme Court and with the Workers' Compensation Board Appellate Division. At issue before the Court was whether the appeal was properly before the Appellate Division or the Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the Salvation Army's petition, holding (1) for all workers' compensation cases without final decision before September 1, 2012, the initial review must go to the Appellate Division; and (2) because the Board declined review on or after September 1, 2012, the appeal from the hearing officer's final decision was not properly before the Supreme Court. View "Estate of Sullwold v. Salvation Army" on Justia Law

The Scarborough Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) granted a setback variance to property owners in the Higgins Beach neighborhood of Scarborough. The property abutted land owned by Summerwind Cottage, LLC. Peter and Libby Cassat owned the land directly across the street. The superior court affirmed the decision of the ZBA. Summerwind Cottage and the Cassats appealed, arguing that the superior court erred in relying on the Official Shoreland Zoning Map to conclude that the property was in the buildable Shoreland Overlay District and in concluding that the property met the requirements for a variance. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Summerwind's arguments failed to establish that the ZBA erred in relying on the Official Shoreland Zoning Map in determining that the property was in the buildable Shoreland Overlay District; and (2) there was substantial evidence in the record to support the ZBA's decision to grant the ordinance. View "Summerwind Cottage, LLC v. Town of Scarborough" on Justia Law

The Town of Madawaska foreclosed on Jeffrey and Jeanne Stoops' property after the Stoops failed to pay municipal taxes. The Town then conveyed the property to Richard and Betty Nelson by municipal quitclaim deed. The Stoopses subsequently filed a complaint against Richard Nelson seeking to quiet title to the property and asking the court to declare the respective rights of the parties to the property. The superior court granted the Nelsons' motion for summary judgment. The Stoopses appealed, arguing (1) the Town failed to give the Stoopses proper notice of the pending foreclosure in violation of their due process rights, and (2) the Town failed to adhere strictly to the requirements of the statutorily outlined steps a municipality must take to foreclose on a municipal tax lien. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the Town complied with the requirements of the statutory scheme and gave the Stoopses sufficient notice, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the Nelsons. View "Stoops v. Nelson" on Justia Law