Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Department of Environmental Protection approved an application of Saddleback Ridge Wind, LLC for a permit to construct the Saddleback Ridge Wind Project, a wind energy development. The Board of Environmental Protection affirmed. Friends of Maine's Mountains, Friends of Saddleback Mountain, and several individuals appealed, arguing, among other things, that the Board abused its discretion when determining which nighttime sound level limit to apply to the applications. The Supreme Court vacated the Board's order related to nighttime sound requirements and remanded, holding that the Board failed to meet its statutory obligation to protect the health and welfare of the Project's neighbors and thus abused its discretion in approving Saddleback's permit applications. View "Friends of Maine's Mountains. v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

Michael Nadeau, an employee with the Bureau of Insurance, married a manager of a Bureau-regulated entity. The Bureau subsequently discharged Nadeau on the basis that his continued employment at the Bureau while married to a manager of a Bureau-regulated entity violated Me. Rev. Stat. 24, 209(1). Nadeau initiated the grievance process manadated by the collective bargaining agreement (CBA). After an arbitration hearing, the arbitrator concluded that the Bureau violated the CBA by discharging Nadeau without just cause and ordered his reinstatement. The Bureau petitioned the superior court seeking to vacate the arbitration award, contending that the award of reinstatement required the Bureau to violate section 209(1), which prohibits the Bureau from employing persons "connected with the management" of Bureau-regulated entities. The superior court reported the case to the Supreme Court. The Court declined to answer the reported question regarding the interpretation of section 209 after finding that the arbitration award did not violate public policy, the arbitrator did not exceed his powers, and the award was not subject to further judicial scrutiny on that basis. Remanded for entry of a judgment confirming the arbitration award. View "Dep't of Prof'l & Fin. Regulation v. State Employees Ass'n" on Justia Law

In 2010, Hebron Academy requested a tax abatement from the Town for the 2009 tax year. Because the Academy did not file the abatement request before the statutory deadline, the Town denied the request. The Board of Assessment Review denied the request on the same ground. The Academy subsequently filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that its properties were exempt from taxation and that the Town must reimburse it for real estate taxes it paid on its exempt properties for the prior three years. The superior court declared that the Academy was entitled to the exemption for most of its property but that res judicata precluded the court from relieving it of its obligation to pay the 2009 taxes at issue. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Hebron Academy, as a literary and scientific institution, was entitled to a tax exemption for its real estate "owned and occupied or used solely for [its] own purpose"; and (2) the trial court correctly concluded that res judicata precluded the declaratory judgment from applying to the 2009 tax year because an administrative adjudication had been rendered on the merits of the case. View "Hebron Academy, Inc. v. Town of Hebron" on Justia Law

In 2008, the Public Utilities Commission approved a merger between FairPoint Communications-NNE (FairPoint) and Verizon Maine (Verizon). The merger order committed FairPoint to expanding DSL availability in Maine to certain percentages within certain periods of time. The merger order incorporated an amended stipulation presented by FairPoint and other parties. Approximately twenty months later, FairPoint filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The Commission agreed to reduce FairPoint's ultimate broadband buildout obligations from ninety percent addressability to eighty-seven percent. Fairpoint subsequently notified the Commission that it had expanded broadband buildout to the level of eighty-three percent. The Commission disagreed, concluding that FairPoint had used the wrong measure of addressability and therefore overstated its results. At issue on appeal was how "addressability" would be measured when calculating FairPoint's broadband buildout commitments in Maine. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the merger order was an order of the Commission and not a consent decree, and therefore, the Commission did not err by failing to interpret the merger order in a manner consistent with the intent and understanding of the parties to the stipulation; and (2) the Commission did not err in its definition of "addressability." View "N. New England Tel. Operations LLC v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Superintendent of Insurance found that a Bankers Life and Casualty Company agent engaged in deceptive insurance sales practices in multiple transactions with an elderly woman. Bankers Life and its agents functioned as insurance producers at the relevant time. The Superintendent ordered Bankers Life to pay restitution and a civil penalty of $100,000. The business and consumer docket affirmed the Superintendent's decision. Bankers Life appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Superintendent did not err in her statutory interpretation or factual findings and did not abuse her discretion by imposing restitution and a penalty on Bankers Life based on the evidence presented in the administrative record. View "Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Superintendent of Ins." on Justia Law

When Restaurant was denied a requested liquor license by the Town of Bingham, Restaurant appealed to the Department of Public Safety. After a hearing, a Department hearing officer also denied the license. On appeal, Restaurant asserted various independent claims alleging constitutional and statutory violations by the Department and Town. The appellate court found in favor of Defendants on Restaurant's independent claims but, on the merits, remanded the matter to the Department after concluding that an appeal of a municipality's denial of a liquor license could only be decided by the Commissioner of Public Safety and not a hearing officer. On remand, the Commissioner of the Department denied the license application. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the deficiencies in the Department's notice to Restaurant of the hearing on Restaurant's requested liquor license constituted harmless error in the circumstances presented by this case; (2) The Department had sufficient grounds on which to deny Restaurant's liquor license; and (3) the court did not err in entering a judgment against Restaurant on its 42 U.S.C.S. 1983 claims. View "Antler's Inn & Rest., LLC v. Dep't of Pub. Safety" on Justia Law

The Board of Licensure in Medicine revoked Petitioner's medical license. The superior court dismissed Petitioner's complaint seeking judicial review, concluding (1) it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review the Board's decision because the district court had exclusive jurisdiction to review nonconsensual license-revocation orders pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 10, 8003(5); and (2) Petitioner's 42 U.S.C.S. 1983 claim should be dismissed because the Board members had authority to revoke her license and were immune from suit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the superior court properly dismissed Petitioner's petition for review of the Board order revoking her license because the district court had exclusive jurisdiction in such matters; and (2) because the Board acted within its authority in revoking Petitioner's license and, on appeal, Petitioner did not otherwise assert a denial of her constitutional rights, Petitioner's section 1983 claim was properly dismissed. View "Michalowski v. Bd. of Licensure in Med." on Justia Law

Brockway-Smith Company and MMTA Workers' Compensation Trust appealed from a decision of a Workers' Compensation Board hearing officer awarding incapacity benefits to Richard Graves for a 2003 work-related injury to his left shoulder. Brockway-Smith contended that Graves's claim for the 2003 injury was barred for failure to file it within the six-year limitations period in 39-A Me. Rev. Stat. The Supreme Court was asked to decide whether that six-year period was tolled until the employer filed a first report of injury with the Workers' Compensation Board, even though at the time of the injury the employer was not required to file a first report pursuant to 39-A Me. Rev. Stat, 303. The Supreme Court affirmed the hearing officer's decision, holding that the limitations period did not begin to run until the first report was filed. View "Graves v. Brockway-Smith Co." on Justia Law

Sears, Roebuck & Company appealed a judgment which concluded as a matter of law that the Supreme Court's holding in "Linnehan Leasing v. State Tax Assessor," (898 A.2d 408) applied retroactively. Sears argued that Maine recognizes the practice of retroactively applying certain legal holdings of a decision in a case to the parties in that case but only prospectively in all other instances. Sears urged the Supreme Court to adopt the three-part test enumerated in "Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson" (404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971)) when deciding whether to apply the holding of a decision retroactively to other cases. Sears further argued that "Linnehan Leasing" should not apply retroactively because the three Chevron factors weigh in favor of applying the holding with selective prospectivity. Finally, Sears argued that the Court should have reaffirmed its holding in "Myrick v. James" (444 A.2d 987, 1001-02 (Me. 1982)). Without addressing the issue of retroactivity, the Court applied the plain meaning of the statute at issue and affirmed. View "Sears, Roebuck & Company v. State Tax Assessor" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the question presented to the Supreme Court based on the facts of this case was: "[w]hen a physician is alleged to have acted as an apparent agent of a hospital, does the Maine Health Security Act require that the alleged negligent acts or omissions of that physician be evaluated by the mandatory prelitigation screening and mediation panel before a claim may be brought in court against the hospital based on that physician’s conduct? The Court answered that question in the affirmative: "[b]ecause Maine law requires that a prelitigation screening panel evaluate a physician's alleged professional negligence before consideration at trial, and because that did not occur in the instant case," the Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Levesque v. Central Maine Medical Center" on Justia Law