Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

William Buckley appealed a decision of a Workers' Compensation Board hearing officer on remand from the Supreme Court. Buckley contended that, when determining whether his permanent impairment level was above the threshold for receiving partial incapacity benefits for the duration of his incapacity, the hearing officer misinterpreted the Court's mandate by failing to combine or "stack" the percentages of permanent impairment attributable to all of his work injuries. Furthermore, Buckley asserted that the hearing officer's finding that he suffered 0% permanent impairment from a 2001 injury is inconsistent with a finding in the prior decree that he suffered 7% permanent impairment for that injury. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no error and affirmed the hearing officer's decision. View "Buckley v. S.D. Warren Co." on Justia Law

Dale Henderson Logging, Inc. (DHL), and Oak Leaf Realty, Inc. (OLR). DHL owned property in Washington County, and OLR owned several thousand acres in Hancock County. The DHL and OLR properties have a four-rod-wide rail corridor running over them that was once owned by the Maine Central Railroad Company which was later conveyed to the State of Maine, which the Department of Transportation (DOT) claimed to own in fee simple absolute by virtue of deeds given to Maine Central's predecessor in title from 1897 to 1898. DHL and OLR contended that Maine Central held only a railroad easement that it abandoned prior to its purported conveyance to the State, and therefore DOT owned nothing. Alternatively, OLR contended that if DOT held an interest in the corridor, two deeds in DOT's chain of title contained covenants allowing OLR to compel DOT to build and maintain a fence along a portion of the corridor in Hancock County. DHL and OLR appealed the grant of summary judgments entered in favor of DOT by the Superior Court on their complaints seeking a declaration on who owned what. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the superior court correctly found that DOT held an easement that had not been abandoned in the Washington County portion of the corridor, and owned the fee simple in the Hancock County portion of the corridor. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the covenants requiring Maine Central to build and maintain a fence along the corridor were not enforceable against DOT in equity. View "Dale Henderson Logging, Inc. v. Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the notice provision of the Paper Streets Act requires that the person asserting the claim to own a paper street notify all record lot owners in the subdivision that includes the street, or only those lot owners that the person asserting ownership of the paper street seeks to exclude from the paper street property. Barbara Carson appealed a superior court judgment in favor of her neighbors who brought suit to determine if they had rights to use a portion of a paper street that bisected Carson's property in order to access another paper street that provides access to the Atlantic Ocean. Because the Court concluded that notice to all subdivision lot owners is required, the Court affirmed that portion of the trial court's judgment addressing the notice issue. View "Brooks v. Carson" on Justia Law

Maine Public Employees Retirement System (the System) appealed a superior court judgment reversing a decision of the System’s Board of Trustees that denied Petitioner Ellen Goodrich basic life insurance coverage under the group life insurance plan administered by the System. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court's judgment in part and remanded the case for entry of a judgment: (1) vacating the decision of the Board; and (2) remanding to the Board with instructions to provide Goodrich with prospective basic life insurance coverage after she paid back premiums accrued to date. View "Goodrich v. Maine Public Employees Retirement System" on Justia Law

Ed Friedman and others (collectively, Friedman) appealed the Maine Public Utilities Commission's dismissal of their complaint against Central Maine Power Company (CMP) regarding CMP's use of smart-meter technology. Friedman also appealed the Commission's dismissal of those portions of the complaint that were directed at the Commission and raised constitutional concerns regarding orders previously issued by the Commission. Friedman asserted, among other issues, that the Commission erred because its dismissal of his complaint ignored the Commission's statutory mandate to ensure the delivery of safe and reasonable utility services. The Commission and CMP contended that the complaint was properly dismissed in all respects. Because the Supreme Court agreed with Friedman that the Commission should not have dismissed the portion of the complaint against CMP addressing health and safety issues, the Court vacated that portion of the judgment and otherwise affirmed. View "Friedman v. Public Utilities Comm'n" on Justia Law

Petitioners David F. and Jeannette A. D'Alessandro appealed a superior Court judgment that affirmed a Town of Harpswell Board of Appeals decision. The Board had denied the D'Alessandros' appeal of a permit issued by the code enforcement officer to several subdivision landowners to install a seasonal stairway for shore access over an easement that burdens land the D'Alessandros own in the same subdivision. The D'Alessandros opposed the permit, arguing that the Harpswell Shoreland Zoning Ordinance allowed for only one stairway to the shore in this subdivision and there was an existing stairway providing shore access in another location within the subdivision. Upon review, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded for further proceedings: The Board's finding that "the location of the proposed stairs is reasonable under the ordinance" did not apply the standard as it is set forth in the ordinance and provided no finding regarding the actual question presented by the ordinance: did a reasonable access alternative exist? Thus, although the Supreme Court reviewed the Board's factual findings under a deferential standard of review, here the Board erred because it failed to make a finding as to whether there was no reasonable access alternative. View "D'Alessandro v. Town of Harpswell" on Justia Law

Petitioner Steven R. Danzig appealed a superior court order that affirmed the Maine Board of Social Worker Licensure’s denial of his application to become a licensed clinical social worker (LCSW). The Board denied Danzig’s application after concluding that he was “self-employed” during his requisite clinical internship, which is prohibited pursuant to Board rules. Petitioner argued that the Board's decision was based on an error of law and was not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Finding substantial evidence in the record, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decision. View "Danzig v. Board of Social Worker Licensure" on Justia Law

Appellant Timothy Daniels appealed a superior court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants Narraguagus Bay Health Care Facility and North Country Associates, Inc. Appellant contended that the court erred in concluding that Narraguagus and North Country were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on his disability discrimination and retaliation claims made pursuant to Maine's Human Rights Act. Appellant suffered a work-related injury to his right shoulder in 2007 and thereafter was given work restrictions by his physician that prevented him from performing all of the work duties he had previously handled. In 2008, Appellant underwent surgery and then began a leave of absence. A few months later, Appellant notified his employer that he was applying for more leave at her insistence. In that letter, Appellant also reported that he had been cleared for light duty work, accused his supervisor of refusing to accommodate his disability, and asked for light duty work. No work was afforded to Appellant as a result of that letter. Appellant suffered another work-related injury to his right shoulder in 2009, and, although he did not lose any time from work as a result of that injury, he was restricted to modified duty for the next three months. During that period Appellant was disciplined for performance issues. Early in November 2009, when Daniels no longer had any work restrictions, a new Narraguagus administrator gave Appellant a performance improvement plan for failing to complete some tasks at all and failing to complete other tasks on time. In November, 2009, in response to the complaint that he filed in 2008, the Commission issued Appellant a right-to-sue letter pursuant to the Human Rights Act. When state regulators visited Narraguagus to conduct a licensing inspection, they uncovered issues that resulted in fines to the facility. Narraguagus blamed Appellant for the negative inspection and terminated his employment on January 29, 2010. After his termination, Appellant filed a two-count complaint against Narraguagus and North Country. On appeal, Appellant advanced two theories of liability against North Country: (1) that it can be liable because it is part of an integrated enterprise with Narraguagus, and (2) that it acted in Narraguagus’s interest in discriminating against him. Finding multiple issues of disputed facts regarding North Country's involvement in the actions that Appellant claimed constituted discrimination and retaliation, the Supreme Court vacated the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Daniels v. Narraguagus Bay Health Care Facility" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from the City of Saco's approval of a contract zoning agreement for property purchased by Estates at Bay View, LLC. Several nearby property owners (collectively, the Neighbors) filed a five-count complaint in the superior court challenging the legality of the contract zoning agreement and the Saco Planning Board's subsequent approval of a subdivision and site plan for the property. The superior court granted the City's motion to dismiss three of the counts, granted summary judgment in favor of the City and Bay View on one of the counts, and affirmed the decision of the Board on the final count. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no merit in the Neighbors' arguments regarding all of their claims except the grant of summary judgment in favor of the City; and (2) the superior court did not err in granting summary judgment to the City and Bay View, as the contract zone agreement met the requirements of Me. Rev. Stat. 30-A, 4352(8)(C). View "Golder v. City of Saco" on Justia Law

Covanta Maine, LLC (Covanta), a subsidiary of Covanta Energy, appealed from orders of the Public Utilities Commission denying Covanta's requests for certification of two of its facilities as Class I new renewable resources. Covanta argued that the Commission erred by basing its conclusion that the facilities were not refurbished on the ratio of Covanta's expenditures in the facilities to the value of those facilities, and it therefore asserted that the Commission improperly denied certification of its two facilities. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Commission, holding that the Commission erred by establishing a requirement that the expenditures meet some minimum level that equals an unspecified percentage of the total value of the facility. Remanded. View "Covanta Maine, LLC v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n" on Justia Law