Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Michael Joyce, who was frequently exposed to airborne asbestos while working, died of lung cancer. His last documented exposure to asbestos dust was while working for Commercial Welding. A Workers' Compensation Board hearing officer later awarded the estate of Joyce benefits on a petition for an award of compensation and ordered benefits paid to Mary Joyce, Michael's widow, on a petition for death benefits. Commercial Welding appealed the hearing officer's decision as well as the hearing officer's determinations that (1) it had not cured a previously established violation of the Board's "fourteen-day-rule" because it had not paid interest on the required payment imposed for the violation, and (2) it was not permitted to offset the amount of the death benefits ordered to be paid to Mary by the amount of the payment for the fourteen-day rule violation. The Supreme Court vacated in part and affirmed in part the hearing officer's decision. The Court (1) disagreed with the hearing officer's decision that interest was due on the required payment to the Estate, but (2) agreed that the required payment amount could not be used to offset the death benefits ordered to be paid to Mary. View "Estate of Joyce v. Commercial Welding Co." on Justia Law

The Land Use Regulation Commission (LURC) approved the issuance of a permit to TransCanada Maine Wind Development, Inc. to construct a wind energy facility. Friends of the Boundary Mountains (FBM) appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that LURC (1) did not abuse its discretion in denying FMB's request to reopen a public hearing on TransCanada's original application or to conduct a new hearing on the amended application; (2) did not violate its own procedural rules; (3) properly handled consideration of several issues raised by FMB during the administrative proceedings; and (4) did not err in finding that TransCanada's wind energy project would provide significant "tangible benefits" under 12 Me. Rev. Stat. 685-B(4-B)(D). View "Friends of the Boundary Mtns. v. Land Use Reg. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Employee suffered a work-related stroke, after which the Workers' Compensation Board awarded Employee 800 weeks of total incapacity benefits for the permanent and total loss of industrial use of one leg and one arm. After paying total incapacity benefits for the 800-week period, Employer filed petitions for review and for determination of offset rights. A Board hearing officer granted Employer's petitions and determined that because Employee had received 800 weeks of permanent incapacity benefits pursuant to the conclusively presumptive time period established in Me. Rev. Stat. 39-A, 212(2)(G), Employer could prospectively take statutory offsets against Employee's benefits pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 39-A, 221. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that although Employee remained totally incapacitated from work, after 800 weeks, Employer was entitled to reduce the total benefit by amounts authorized by Me. Rev. Stat. 39-A, 221. View "Mitton v. Verizon" on Justia Law

Victor Bravo Aviation, LLC purchased an aircraft in Connecticut in 2004 that was flown to Victor Bravo in Connecticut. Victor Bravo did not register the aircraft in Maine but used it regularly in Maine during the first twelve months of ownership. In 2007, the State Tax Assessor assessed Victor Bravo a use tax on its aircraft plus interest, penalties and costs. Victor Bravo appealed. The Business and Consumer Docket entered summary judgment for the Assessor affirming the assessment of the tax and interest, and judgment for Victor Bravo waiving and abating the non-payment penalty. The Supreme Court affirmed except vacated and remanded the issue of interest waiver or abatement. On remand, the court declined to waive or abate the interest as of the date of the reconsideration decision. Victor Bravo appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court properly considered Victor Bravo's arguments for failure to pay the use tax and deemed them unsatisfactory to warrant a waiver or abatement of interest under the statutory scheme. View "Victor Bravo Aviation, LLC v. State Tax Assessor" on Justia Law

Chuck Starbird submitted an application for a building permit for the construction of a home on a lot abutting a public easement portion of a road in the Town of Minot. The Town denied the application. The Board of Appeals ultimately granted Starbird's appeal, concluding that the parcel had a private right-of-way because the the term "right-of-way," as used in section 4-501.8 of the Town's Land Use Code, included a public easement. The superior court affirmed but remanded to the Board for further factual findings on whether Starbird's application met all of the factors listed in section 4-501.8(A)-(G). The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court but vacated the portion of the court's judgment remanding the matter, holding (1) the unique circumstances of the matter caused the interlocutory appeal to fall within the judicial economy exception to the final judgment rule; and (2) the Board did not err by granting Starbird's appeal of the denial of his application. View "Town of Minot v. Starbird" on Justia Law

The Town of Westport Island issued a building permit to George Richardson to build a single-family residence on his property. Abutting landowner Deirdre Dunlop filed a notice of appeal, and the Westport Island board of appeals (Board) affirmed the issuance of the permit. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the issuance of the building permit, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the Board's finding that Richardon's property met minimum lot-size requirement for construction of a residential dwelling; and (2) the Board correctly determined that Richardson's road lot could be included in his property's acreage calculation. View "Dunlop v. Town of Westport Island " on Justia Law

Anthem Health Plans of Maine appealed from a judgment entered in the Business and Consumer Docket affirming a decision by the Superintendent of Insurance (1) determining that Anthem's proposed rate increase for its individual health insurance products was excessive and unfairly discriminatory, and (2) indicating that an average rate increase with a lower profit margin for those products would be approved. Anthem appealed, contending that the Superintendent's decision violated Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 24-A, 2736 (the statute) and the state and federal Constitutions because the approved rate increase eliminated Anthem's opportunity to earn a reasonable profit on its line of individual health insurance products. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Superintendent properly balanced the competing interests within the statutory framework of the statute in arriving at its approved rate increase; and (2) because the approved rate provided a built-in risk and profit margin, Anthem's argument that the Superintendent improperly cross-subsidized between Anthem's regulated and unregulated product lines, and the corollary argument that the approved rate resulted in an unconstitutional confiscatory taking, necessarily failed as a matter of law. View "Anthem Health Plans of Me., Inc. v. Superintendent of Ins." on Justia Law

Mrs. T. was the mother of C.T., a fifteen-year-old boy with severe disabilities. At issue in this case was C.T.'s eligibility for the Department of Health and Human Services' home and community-based waiver program. C.T. was approved for the waiver program but was not receiving services under the waiver when the Department instituted a new regulation that closed the program to children but grandfathered children who were already receiving services. Mrs. T. subsequently filed a grievance with the Department seeking to have C.T. declared waiver-eligible. The Commissioner of the Department accepted the recommendation of an administrative hearing officer that denied the grievance. The superior court affirmed. Mrs. T. appealed, contending that the Department was equitably estopped from denying services because she reasonably relied to her detriment on misinformation she received that C.T. was eligible. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Mrs. T. did not meet her burden to prove that her reliance on the misinformation given to her by the Department caused any detriment to C.T., the hearing officer did not err in finding that the Department was not equitably estopped from declaring C.T. ineligible for a waiver. View "Mrs. T. v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

Humboldt Field Research Institute and Eagle Hill foundation applied for a property tax exemption pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 36, 652(1)(A) and (B), which the Town assessors denied. The county commissioners upheld the Town's denial, and the superior court affirmed. Humboldt and Eagle Hill appealed, arguing (1) the Town was required to continue Humboldt's and Eagle Hill's tax exemptions from the prior year, which were based on their status as charitable institutions, absent evidence of an organizational change; and (2) the organizations were exempt as literary and scientific institutions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Maine law consistently places the burden on the taxpayer to prove entitlement to a tax exemption, even when an exemption has been granted in prior years, if the assessor challenges the exemption; and (2) the commissioners did not err in determining that Humboldt and Eagle Hill did not meet their burden to prove entitlement to an exemption. View "Humboldt Field Research Inst. v. Town of Steuben" on Justia Law

Larry Hilderbrand, a law enforcement officer employed by the police department, was working with the Maine Drug Enforcement Agency (MDEA) when the county sheriff received a video of Hilderbrand behaving crassly. The sheriff then publicly announced that his department would discontinue working with the MDEA because Hilderbrand was assigned to it and stated that his decision was based on the video. Hilderbrand subsequently filed a three-count complaint against the county commissioners and the sheriff alleging slander per se, invasion of privacy, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the commissioners and sheriff, concluding that the sheriff had discretionary function immunity and the commissioners could not be liable for the sheriff's conduct because he was not their employee. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that application of the factors set forth in Darling v. Augusta Mental Health Inst. to the undisputed facts indicated the sheriff's allegedly tortious activities were within the Maine Tort Claim Act's discretionary function immunity provision, and the superior court did not err in dismissing the suit against him on that basis. View "Hilderbrand v. Washington County Comm'rs" on Justia Law