Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Town of Westport Island issued a building permit to George Richardson to build a single-family residence on his property. Abutting landowner Deirdre Dunlop filed a notice of appeal, and the Westport Island board of appeals (Board) affirmed the issuance of the permit. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the issuance of the building permit, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the Board's finding that Richardon's property met minimum lot-size requirement for construction of a residential dwelling; and (2) the Board correctly determined that Richardson's road lot could be included in his property's acreage calculation. View "Dunlop v. Town of Westport Island " on Justia Law

Anthem Health Plans of Maine appealed from a judgment entered in the Business and Consumer Docket affirming a decision by the Superintendent of Insurance (1) determining that Anthem's proposed rate increase for its individual health insurance products was excessive and unfairly discriminatory, and (2) indicating that an average rate increase with a lower profit margin for those products would be approved. Anthem appealed, contending that the Superintendent's decision violated Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 24-A, 2736 (the statute) and the state and federal Constitutions because the approved rate increase eliminated Anthem's opportunity to earn a reasonable profit on its line of individual health insurance products. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Superintendent properly balanced the competing interests within the statutory framework of the statute in arriving at its approved rate increase; and (2) because the approved rate provided a built-in risk and profit margin, Anthem's argument that the Superintendent improperly cross-subsidized between Anthem's regulated and unregulated product lines, and the corollary argument that the approved rate resulted in an unconstitutional confiscatory taking, necessarily failed as a matter of law. View "Anthem Health Plans of Me., Inc. v. Superintendent of Ins." on Justia Law

Mrs. T. was the mother of C.T., a fifteen-year-old boy with severe disabilities. At issue in this case was C.T.'s eligibility for the Department of Health and Human Services' home and community-based waiver program. C.T. was approved for the waiver program but was not receiving services under the waiver when the Department instituted a new regulation that closed the program to children but grandfathered children who were already receiving services. Mrs. T. subsequently filed a grievance with the Department seeking to have C.T. declared waiver-eligible. The Commissioner of the Department accepted the recommendation of an administrative hearing officer that denied the grievance. The superior court affirmed. Mrs. T. appealed, contending that the Department was equitably estopped from denying services because she reasonably relied to her detriment on misinformation she received that C.T. was eligible. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Mrs. T. did not meet her burden to prove that her reliance on the misinformation given to her by the Department caused any detriment to C.T., the hearing officer did not err in finding that the Department was not equitably estopped from declaring C.T. ineligible for a waiver. View "Mrs. T. v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

Humboldt Field Research Institute and Eagle Hill foundation applied for a property tax exemption pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 36, 652(1)(A) and (B), which the Town assessors denied. The county commissioners upheld the Town's denial, and the superior court affirmed. Humboldt and Eagle Hill appealed, arguing (1) the Town was required to continue Humboldt's and Eagle Hill's tax exemptions from the prior year, which were based on their status as charitable institutions, absent evidence of an organizational change; and (2) the organizations were exempt as literary and scientific institutions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Maine law consistently places the burden on the taxpayer to prove entitlement to a tax exemption, even when an exemption has been granted in prior years, if the assessor challenges the exemption; and (2) the commissioners did not err in determining that Humboldt and Eagle Hill did not meet their burden to prove entitlement to an exemption. View "Humboldt Field Research Inst. v. Town of Steuben" on Justia Law

Larry Hilderbrand, a law enforcement officer employed by the police department, was working with the Maine Drug Enforcement Agency (MDEA) when the county sheriff received a video of Hilderbrand behaving crassly. The sheriff then publicly announced that his department would discontinue working with the MDEA because Hilderbrand was assigned to it and stated that his decision was based on the video. Hilderbrand subsequently filed a three-count complaint against the county commissioners and the sheriff alleging slander per se, invasion of privacy, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the commissioners and sheriff, concluding that the sheriff had discretionary function immunity and the commissioners could not be liable for the sheriff's conduct because he was not their employee. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that application of the factors set forth in Darling v. Augusta Mental Health Inst. to the undisputed facts indicated the sheriff's allegedly tortious activities were within the Maine Tort Claim Act's discretionary function immunity provision, and the superior court did not err in dismissing the suit against him on that basis. View "Hilderbrand v. Washington County Comm'rs" on Justia Law

The town planning board (Board) granted a dredge-and-fill permit for two culverts on property owned by the Berdeens. Scott Marquis, who owned property abutting the Berdeens' property, (1) appealed the Board's decision, and (2) filed an appeal with the Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA), which the ZBA denied. Marquis's main contention was that an illegal subdivision had been created on the Berdeens' property, which he claimed the Board should have addressed in determining whether to approve the application for the dredge-and-fill permit. The superior court consolidated Marquis's appeals and remanded them. In their decisions, the Board and the ZBA each determined that the Berdeens' property did not qualify as a subdivision pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 30-A, 4401(4) and local law. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the judgment of the superior court affirming the Board's decision to grant a dredge-and-fill permit; (2) vacated the judgment of the superior court and remanded with instructions to vacate the Board's and ZBA's decisions applying the subdivision law because those determinations were not ripe for review; and (3) instructed the superior court to dismiss the appeal of the ZBA decision as premature. View "Marquis v. Town of Kennebunk" on Justia Law

Employer, an employment agency, hired Employee and assigned him to work at a facility owned by a client company (Client). Employer paid Employee's salary, and Client paid Employer a fee for his services. Employee was injured while working at the Client plant, after which Client ended Employee's assignment at its facility. Employee filed petitions to remedy discrimination against Employer and Client. A workers' compensation board hearing officer denied the petitions to remedy discrimination against Employer and Client. Employee appealed, contending that the hearing officer erred by denying the petition against Client on the ground that Employee was not in an employer-employee relationship with Client. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the hearing officer did not misconceive the legal standard when focusing on whether a contract for hire existed between Employee and Client; (2) the hearing officer did not err in concluding that Employee had a contract for hire only with Employer; and (3) therefore, Employee did not have a right of action for discrimination pursuant to 39-A Me. Rev. Stat. 353 against Client. View "Doughty v. Work Opportunities Unlimited" on Justia Law

The Witham Family Partnership challenged two decisions of the Town of Bar Harbor's Zoning Board of Appeals (Board) in connection with North South Corporation's application to construct a hotel. The Partnership attended two public hearings before the Board on North South's appeal of the planning board's denial of its application. The Board subsequently reversed the planning board's denial. The Partnership also filed its own appeal challenging the portion of the planning board's decision finding that North South's proposed project conformed to certain criteria for obtaining a building permit. The Board affirmed the planning board's decision. The Partnership then filed a Me. R. Civ. P. 80B complaint challenging the Board's decisions in both North South's appeal and in the Partnership's appeal. The superior court dismissed the complaint on grounds that the Partnership lacked standing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Partnership had standing to challenge the Board's decision in both appeals in a Rule 80B review of those decisions. View "Witham Family Ltd. P'ship v. Town of Bar Harbor " on Justia Law

The Town of Millinocket appealed and Mary Walsh cross-appealed from a judgment of the superior court following a jury trial finding that Walsh, the former town recreation director, had engaged in activities protected by the state whistleblowers' protection act and that those protected activities were a substantial motivating cause for the Town's decision to eliminate her position. At issue on appeal was whether discriminatory animus expressed by one member of the town council could be found to be a cause or motivating factor for an adverse employment action or whether the lack of evidence of discriminatory animus by any other member of the town council insulated the Town from liability in Walsh's discrimination action. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding (1) an improper motive or discriminatory animus of one member of a multi-member council may create an actionable claim against the governmental entity if a plaintiff proves, and the jury finds, that the improper motive or discriminatory animus was a motivating factor or a substantial cause for an adverse employment action taken against a plaintiff who has engaged in a protected activity; and (2) evidence in the record supported the jury's verdict in this case. View "Walsh v. Town of Millinocket" on Justia Law

Peter Miller injured his lower back in 1992, 1995, and 1996 while working for S.D. Warren and in 1999 while working for Spinnaker Coating. A Workers' Compensation Board hearing officer awarded Miller sixty-five percent partial incapacity benefits apportioned equally among the four dates of injury. Later, the hearing officer (1) granted S.D. Warren's petition for review requesting permission to cease payment for the 1992 injury because it had made all payments to which Miller was entitled for that injury; (2) granted Spinnaker's petition to reduce its benefit payment accordingly; and (3) denied Miller's petition for review seeking an increase to total incapacity benefits, determining that Miller had not demonstrated a change in medical or economic circumstances. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing officer did not improperly expand the Court's holding in Cust v. University of Maine to allow for a reduction in benefits when the durational limit has expired on the first of multiple injuries. View " Miller v. Spinnaker Coating" on Justia Law