Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

On February 17, 2012, John Deschenes fell down stairs at Sanford City Hall. On August 13, 2012, 178 days after his fall, Deschenes appeared at City Hall and spoke to the Finance Assistant and the Finance Director regarding his fall and medical treatment. On September 1, 2012, 197 days after his accident, Deschenes provided the City Manager with written notice of a claim against the City based on his fall. On January 28, 2014, Deschenes filed a complaint with the superior court. The City moved for summary judgment, asserting that Deschenes’s written notice was sent after the Maine Tort Claims Act’s 180-day deadline for submitting a written notice of claim against a governmental entity. The trial court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that Deschenes failed to substantially comply with the notice requirement of the Act. Deschenes appealed, arguing that he substantially complied with the statute because the City was aware of his accident and was not prejudiced by his failure to file a written notice before the 180-day deadline. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a person cannot substantially comply with the Act if he provides only oral notice of his claim. View "Deschenes v. City of Sanford" on Justia Law

Arthur Murdock, then a lieutenant with the Maine State Police, was injured when his cruiser was struck by another vehicle after Martin Thorne indicated that Murdock could turn in front of him into an intersection. Murdock filed a four-count complaint alleging negligence against Castigliola and Thorne and seeking uninsured motorist coverage from the Maine Department of Public Safety (DPS). The superior court granted the motions for summary judgment filed by both DPS and Thorne. Murdock appealed, and DPS cross-appealed. The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the superior court improvidently granted Murdock’s motion to enter final judgment on Murdock’s claims against Thorne and DPS pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 54(b)(1). View "Murdock v. Thorne" on Justia Law

After Sloan’s Cove, LLC executed a power of sale foreclosure on Armand Vachon’s property, Vachon and Oceanic Inn, Inc. (collectively, Oceanic) filed suit claiming that Sloan’s Cove improperly conducted the sale. The trial court (1) dismissed Oceanic’s claims for breach of fiduciary duty and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and (2) granted summary judgment against Oceanic on its claims for breach of contract and accounting and in favor of Sloan’s Cove on its counterclaim seeking a declaration that its foreclosure by sale of the Oceanic Inn property was legal and effective. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed as amended, holding that the trial court did not err in its judgment, but that the judgment must be amended to correct a clerical error. View "Oceanic Inn, Inc. v. Sloan's Cove, LLC" on Justia Law

William Googins committed an intentional assault of Eric Benson, which resulted in Benson’s death. Benson’s estate sued Googins in tort. Googins consented to a judgment in favor of the Estate and assigned to the Estate all rights he may have had against Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company, whose potential liability stemmed from a homeowner’s policy it issued to Goggins’s grandmother that was active at the time of the assault. Pursuant to the agreement, the superior court entered a judgment against Googins, after which the Estate filed a reach-and-apply action against Metropolitan. Metropolitan filed a complaint for declaratory judgment seeking a determination as to its obligation to indemnify Googins. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Metropolitan, declaring that it had no contractual obligation to indemnify Googins. Specifically, the court found that the claim was precluded by an intentional loss exclusion because Googins intentionally assaulted Benson. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the superior court did not err in determining that Googins’s conduct was within the scope of the intentional loss exclusion. View "Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Estate of Benson" on Justia Law

Paul Gagnon was helping his neighbor, Keith Anthony, to fell a rotted tree at Anthony’s residence when the tree “exploded,” causing Gagnon to sustain several injuries. Gagnon filed a complaint against Anthony, alleging negligence. After a trial, the jury found that both Anthony and Gagnon were negligent and that Gagnon was at least as negligent as Anthony in causing his injuries. Gagnon’s Estate appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was sufficient credible evidence to support the jury’s finding that Gagnon was at least as negligent as Anthony; and (2) the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Estate’s motion for a new trial. View "Estate of Gagnon v. Anthony" on Justia Law

Wife was a passenger on a motorcycle operated by Husband when she was injured in an accident. At the time, Wife and Husband were named insureds on a motorcycle insurance policy from Insurer. Wife filed a complaint against Husband alleging negligence in connection with the accident. A jury found Husband negligent and awarded Wife $50,000 in damages. Husband moved to amend the judgment to obtain a credit for the amount in prejudgment payments that the Insurer had made to Wife. The superior court granted Husband’s motion to amend the judgment. Wife appealed, arguing that the court erred in interpreting Me. Rev. Stat. 24-A, 2426 to allow Husband a credit against the judgment for the medical payments maximum coverage of what Insurer had already paid to Wife’s medical providers before this action was commenced. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order amending judgment, as the court did not determine whether the payments Insurer paid Wife’s medical providers were medical or liability payments. Remanded for a factual determination of the type of prepayments Insurer made, whether liability payments pursuant to Husband’s policy, medical payments pursuant to Wife’s policy, or some other type of payment. View "Wood v. Wood" on Justia Law

Melanie Steadman was the biological daughter of Steven Pagels. After Steadman left her family’s home she commenced this action, asserting claims for sexual assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. After a trial, the district court found Pagels liable to Steadman for all three tort claims alleged in her complaint and awarded Steadman both compensatory and punitive damages. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) even if the district court committed error in admitting evidence of Pagels’ prior bad acts, any error was harmless; and (2) the district court properly found Pagels liable for both intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. View "Steadman v. Pagels" on Justia Law

The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiff’s claims for wrongful use of civil proceedings and abuse of process. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in concluding that Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case for each element of both causes of action. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed but noted that the trial court would have been well within its discretion to have granted a summary judgment in favor of Defendant based solely on Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the requirements of Me. R. Civ. P. 56(h), or to have denied summary judgment altogether based on the manner in which both parties availed themselves of the summary judgment process. View "First Tracks Invs., LLC v. Murray, Plumb & Murray" on Justia Law

During a party hosted by Delta Tau Delta’s (DTD) Gamma Nu chapter at its DTD fraternity house located on the University of Maine’s Orono campus, Plaintiff was sexually assaulted by Joshua Clukey and prevented from leaving his room for several minutes. Plaintiff filed a civil complaint against DTD and Delta Tau Delta National Housing Corporation (DTDNHC), alleging vicarious liability, negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and premises liability. The trial court granted DTD and DTDNHC’s motion to dismiss with respect to the issue of vicarious liability and then granted summary judgment for DTD and DTDNHC on Plaintiff’s remaining claims, concluding that DTD and DTDNHC did not owe Plaintiff a duty of care. The Supreme Judicial Court (1) affirmed dismissal of the vicarious liability claims; (2) vacated summary judgment in favor of DTD on the premises liability claim, holding that DTD had a duty to exercise reasonable care and take reasonable steps to provide premises that are reasonably safe and reasonably free from potential sexual misconduct by its members for all social invitees to chapter-sponsored events; and (3) affirmed summary judgment on the remaining counts. Remanded. View "Brown v. Delta Tau Delta" on Justia Law

After hearing what he described as a diesel-powered dump truck pass by his home one snowy morning in November, Plaintiff discovered that his mailbox had been damaged. Plaintiff filed a small-claims action against P&K Sand and Gravel, Inc., the town’s snowplow contractor, seeking $450 for the damage to his mailbox. The district court entered judgment in favor of P&K, concluding that Plaintiff had not met his burden of proof. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) because Plaintiff’s appeal raised only issues of fact, the Court would not reach the merits of his arguments; and (2) the trial court acted within its discretion in denying Plaintiff’s motion for recusal. View "Yarcheski v. P&K Sand and Gravel, Inc." on Justia Law