Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2013, Plaintiffs filed a complaint for statutory nuisance against Defendants, their neighbors, alleging that Defendants’ 2004 construction of a new home and garage resulted in damage to Plaintiffs’ home. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiffs’ complaint was barred by the statute of limitations. The superior court granted Defendants’ motion on statute of limitations grounds without conducting a hearing. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the unopposed summary judgment record established that Plaintiffs’ complaint was barred by either the six-year limitations period for civil actions or the three-year limitations period for statutory nuisance claims. View "Halliday v. Henry" on Justia Law

Robert and Carol Rice filed a complaint against their neighbors, James and Carol Cook, alleging, inter alia, breach of contract regarding the parties’ shared boundary line and seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. The Cooks counterclaimed, seeking similar relief. After a jury-waived trial, the court entered judgment in favor of the Cooks and granted injunctive relief and monetary damages. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the superior court did not err in (1) finding that the parties never reached an agreement regarding their common boundary line; (2) finding that the Rices’ fences were “unnecessarily high” or “unreasonably interfered” with the Cooks’ use and enjoyment of their property pursuant to a common law theory of nuisance; and (3) enjoining the Rices from building a fence of any height along a portion of their boundary with the Cooks based on its determination that the Rices built their fences with the intent to annoy the Cooks and to interfere with the Cooks’ use of their property. View "Rice v. Cook" on Justia Law

Defendant, an attorney practicing in Maine, was counsel to Plaintiff, and then to his estate, in a suit against Plaintiff’s conservator and Plaintiff’s brother. The suit resulted in a judgment against Plaintiff. Defendant obtained a turnover and sale order for Plaintiff’s residence. In the meantime, a limited liability company of which Plaintiff was a member sold a piece of commercial real estate. Before the closing, Defendant sent a letter to the attorney handling the closing advising that Plaintiff owed a judgment debt to his brother’s estate. As a result, the attorney withheld Plaintiff’s share of the proceeds from the sale pending further court order. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant asserting that the letter and its attachments constituted abuse of process. The superior court entered summary judgment for Defendant. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case for either of the elements of his claim for abuse of process. View "Jennings v. MacLean" on Justia Law

When Mark Chartier and Lisa Heward were married, Chartier purchased an annuity policy from Farm Family Life Insurance Co. for which he named Heward as primary beneficiary. Heward later requested the cash value of the annuity to Farm Family by signing Chartier’s name on the form. Farm Family issued a check payable to Chartier in the requested amount, Heward deposited the check into her and Chartier’s joint account with Gorham Savings Bank, and then withdrew $40,000 from the joint account. That same day, Heward informed Chartier that she wanted a divorce. Chartier filed a complaint against Farm Family, Gorham Savings Bank, and Farm Family’s sales agent, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and negligence. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants as to all counts. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that summary judgment was properly entered in the defendants’ favor as to all counts. View "Chartier v. Farm Family Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Robert Nadeau filed a complaint for protection from harassment against Lynnann Frydrych, alleging that Frydrych had engaged in acts of harassment against him since the end of their personal relationship. Frydrych moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim and sought attorney fees on the basis that the complaint was frivolous and contained unwarranted personal attacks on her. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that Nadeau had not sufficiently alleged harassment, and awarded Frydrych attorney fees and costs. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that the allegations in the complaint were sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss, and because the complaint was not frivolous, the court abused its discretion by awarding Frydrych attorney fees and costs. View "Nadeau v. Frydrych" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the boundary separating the parties’ parcels of land and the ownership of an eleven-acre triangular area of land. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint seeking to quiet title to the disputed area and alleging claims of trespass and slander of title. Defendants counterclaimed. The trial court entered judgment (1) in favor of Plaintiff on her claims of adverse possession and acquiescence, on Plaintiff's common law trespass claim, and on all of Defendant’s counterclaims, and (2) in favor of Defendants on each of the remaining claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) determining that Plaintiff had established the elements of adverse possession; (2) rejecting Plaintiff’s slander of title claim and statutory trespass claim pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 7551-B; and (3) refusing to award treble damages pursuant to 14 Me. Rev. Stat. 7552(4)(B). View "Harvey v. Furrow" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sustained injuries when she collided with a bus owned and operated by Defendant. Believing the bus would drive straight, Plaintiff, who was riding a bicycle, began to pass the bus on the right when the bus turned right. Plaintiff hit the side of the bus and then fell under it. A jury found that Defendant was seventy-five percent negligent and that Plaintiff was twenty-five percent negligent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) 29-A Me. Rev. Stat. 2070 does not protect a motorist from liability merely because a cyclist passes on the right, and therefore, section 2070 did not entitle Defendant to judgment as a matter of law; and (2) the court did not err in declining to instruct the jury on the provisions of 29-A Me. Rev. Stat. 2063(2), which prescribes the circumstances when a cyclist must ride on the right side of a way, as the statute was inapplicable in this case. View "Semian v. Ledgemere Transp., Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal arose from two suits. Kelly, Remmel & Zimmerman (KRZ) filed suit alleging that Raisin Memorial Trust fraudulently transferred property to Samsara Memorial Trust. Samsara sued KRZ alleging slander of title and tortious interference with prospective economic advantage. The superior court entered a judgment awarding damages to KRZ, concluding that the transfer of property from Raisin to Samsara was a fraudulent transfer. The trusts appealed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court and remanded for a determination of damages with respect to the trusts, holding (1) the trusts’ argument that the justice who presided over their case violated the Maine Code of Judicial Conduct because he did not recuse himself from the case or disclose to the parties that he had formerly served on the superior court with an individual who is now an attorney at KRZ was without merit; and (2) the court erred in awarding damages in the amount of $340,000 against the trusts pursuant to Maine’s Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. View "Samsara Memorial Trust v. Kelly, Remmel & Zimmerman" on Justia Law

When Douglas Going did not inherit land owned by his parents, Going sent a notice of demand to his cousin, Alayna Laprel, and her husband, Neal Smith, who had lawfully purchased the land from Going’s father. In the notice, Going called Laprel a “thief.” Going then purported to place and record a “commercial lien” on the property. Laprel and Smith filed a complaint seeking a declaration that the purported lien was baseless and alleging claims for, inter alia, slander, libel, and slander of title. The superior court entered summary judgment in favor of Laprel and Smith on their declaratory judgment claim and on their claim for slander of title. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the superior court did not lack jurisdiction to act in this case; and (2) the superior court did not err in failing to dismiss without prejudice Laprel’s and Smith’s own slander of title claim. View "Laprel v. Going" on Justia Law

Janet Howe and Rajesh Mandekar (together, Howe) owed a condominium in the River Knoll Farms Condominium. The condominium association (Association) sued Howe for negligence, nuisance, and keeping a dangerous dog. MMG Insurance Company, which had issued a homeowner’s policy to Howe, declined to defend Howe in the litigation. The trial court subsequently declared that MMG had no duty to defend in the suit, concluding that the policy issued to Howe did not provide coverage because the Association’s suit sought only equitable relief. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that MMG had a duty to defend Howe in the suit because the complaint alleged facts that would support claims potentially falling within the coverage of the policy. View "Howe v. MMG Ins. Co." on Justia Law