Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant asserting multiple intentional torts and alleging that Defendant sexually assaulted Plaintiff in the early 1970s when Plaintiff was a child and Defendant was a Roman Catholic pastor. On remand, the superior court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendant, concluding that Plaintiff’s complaint was time-barred. At issue on appeal was whether the statute of limitations was tolled due to Defendant’s move to Massachusetts during the applicable time frame. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant established, without dispute of material facts, that he was amenable to service because Maine’s long-arm statute permitted service of the complaint in Massachusetts and that Plaintiff could have located him through reasonable effort and served him by any means other than publication. View "Angell v. Hallee" on Justia Law

In 2004, Paula Bratton and Daniel Hills and their children (“the Brattons”), moved into a house that they rented from Halsey McDonough. In 2008, the Department of Health and Human Services notified McDonough that he was required to relocate the Brattons because of numerous lead hazards throughout the rental property. The Brattons subsequently filed twelve-count complaint against McDonough. The trial court granted McDonough’s motion for judgment as a matter of law as to some of the Brattons’ claims and in favor of McDonough based on a jury verdict on the remaining claims. The Supreme Court vacated the jury’s verdict and remanded the case for a new trial, holding (1) the trial court clearly erred in excluding the Brattons’ qualified expert witness; (2) the trial court erred in entering judgment as a matter of law for McDonough on the negligence claims of the two older children, as well as the intentional infliction of emotional distress and punitive damages claims of all three children; (3) the trial court improperly shifted the burden of proof onto the Brattons to disprove McDonough’s independent causation theories and erred in refusing to give the jury a proper and requested instruction; and (4) the trial court’s errors created a fundamentally unfair trial. View "Bratton v. McDonough" on Justia Law

Thirteen-year-old Timothy Bell suffered serious injuries when he skateboarded out of Randall and Rose Dawson's driveway and was struck by a moving vehicle on the roadway. Teresa Bell, on behalf of her son, filed an action against the Dawsons for negligent supervision and negligently creating or allowing dangerous topographical conditions - specifically, vegetation growth - on their property. The superior court entered judgment in favor of the Dawsons, concluding (1) the Dawsons owed no duty of care to Timothy because Timothy was not in a custodial relationship with the Dawsons when the accident occurred, and (2) there was no indication that growth of trees or bushes on the Dawsons' property contributed to the accident. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the superior court did not err in finding Timothy did not have a custodial relationship with the Dawsons the morning of the accident; and (2) the Dawsons did not have a duty to Timothy to have provided an unobstructed view of the driveway on their premises from the roadway. View "Bell v. Dawson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an unsworn notice of claim with the superior court pursuant to the Maine Health Security Act (MHSA) alleging that Defendants were negligent in providing her medical care. The statute of limitations on Plaintiff's claim subsequently expired. Thereafter, Plaintiff served her unsworn notice of claim to Defendants. Plaintiff then filed a sworn notice of claim. The superior court subsequently dismissed Plaintiff's unsworn notice of claim on the ground that the defective notice failed to toll the applicable statute of limitations. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded, holding that Plaintiff should be permitted to amend her notice of claim pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 15 and to have the amendment relate back to the original filing date. View "Frame v. Millinocket Reg'l Hosp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an action against the Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, alleging, among other things, that the Diocese improperly concealed its knowledge of improper interactions with minors by Plaintiff's abuser. After the Supreme Court remanded the case, the only claim against the Diocese was the intentional tort of fraudulent concealment. Upon remand, the superior court granted summary judgment for the Diocese. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the superior court correctly concluded that Plaintiff failed to set forth facts that could establish a breach of any duty to disclose a known material fact; and (2) consequently, Plaintiff did not meet his burden of establishing that the Diocese had fraudulently concealed material facts that, if known by Plaintiff or his parents, would have prevented Plaintiffs injuries. View "Picher v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland" on Justia Law

Defendant leased a single-family dwelling to Tenants pursuant to a lease agreement in which Tenants were permitted to keep pets but would be responsible for any property damage or disturbance caused by their pets. Three times in one month, a dog owned by Tenants allegedly attacked Plaintiff. Plaintiff sued Defendants seeking damages on a common law theory of negligence. The superior court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because there were no triable issues as to whether Defendants were ever in possession of control over Tenants' dog, the superior court did not err in its judgment. View "Fields v. Hayden" on Justia Law

The City Council authorized the City Manager to sell a parcel of oceanfront property known as "the Boat School." Plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that the sale agreement was invalid due to the City's failure to advertise in accordance with its charter, and moved for a temporary restraining order to prevent the sale of the property. Defendants counterclaimed against Plaintiffs for slander of title and tortious interference with a contract. Plaintiffs filed a special motion to dismiss the counterclaims of Defendants pursuant to Maine's anti-SLAPP statute because Defendants' counterclaims were based on Plaintiffs' petitioning activity. The district court (1) declined to address the merits of Plaintiffs' special motion to dismiss because it was filed after the sixty-day period provided by the statute; (2) granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' complaint; (3) granted in part and denied in part summary judgment for Plaintiffs on Defendants' counterclaims. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of Plaintiffs' special motion to dismiss, holding that the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to consider the merits of Plaintiffs' untimely special motion. View "Bradbury v. City of Eastport" on Justia Law

Plaintiff maintained a homeowners insurance policy with Insurer that excluded from coverage any claims for "injury arising out of the business pursuits" of Plaintiff. In 2011, a third party filed a complaint against Plaintiff, contending that Plaintiff published false and defamatory statements regarding the third party. In response to the complaint, Plaintiff tendered defense of the suit to Insurer, which declined to defend Plaintiff. Plaintiff then filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that Insurer had a duty to defend him in the pending action by the third party. The superior court granted Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded for entry of a summary judgment in favor of Insurer, holding that Insurer had no duty to defend Plaintiff because the third party suit was based entirely on activity falling within the policy's exclusion for Plaintiff's "business pursuits." View "Hardenbergh v. Patrons Oxford Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs purchased property from Charles Johnson. During the pendency of the sale of the property, Johnson misrepresented the condition of the property and failed to disclose its prior use as a junkyard. Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Johnson alleging various causes of action and seeking damages for loss of investment, undisclosed physical problems with the property, and emotional distress. While he owned the disputed property, Johnson maintained a homeowners insurance policy with Allstate Insurance Company. Allstate refused to defend or indemnify Johnson on Plaintiffs' complaint. Plaintiffs and Johnson subsequently reached an agreement resolving the underlying complaint, and the superior court entered a judgment against Johnson for $330,000. Plaintiffs then initiated a reach and apply action against Allstate. The trial court granted summary judgment for Johnson, determining that the policy did not cover the damages Plaintiffs suffered. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs' damages did not constitute covered "bodily injury" or "property damage" pursuant to the Allstate homeowners insurance policy. View "Langevin v. Allstate Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Bernard Quirion, a Canadian citizen, was driving in Quebec when some plywood came off the truck Bryan Veilleux was driving and struck the windshield of Quirion's truck. Quirion sustained serious injuries. Veilleux was employed by S.M. Transport at the time. Quirion and his wife, Nancy Dulac, filed a complaint against Veilleux and S.M. Transport, claiming negligence and loss of consortium. The trial court determined that the laws of Canada and Quebec would apply to the determination of damages. Appellants filed an interlocutory appeal, contending that Maine law should govern determination of their damages. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that this interlocutory appeal was not subject to an exception to the final judgment rule and that the final judgment rule barred the Court's reaching the merits of the appeal. View "Quirion v. Veilleux" on Justia Law