Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Department of Health and Human Services filed a child protection petition against D.P.'s parents, alleging that the parents placed D.P. in jeopardy. Mother filed a petition to terminate her own parental rights without a jeopardy hearing. In the petition, Mother agreed to a finding of jeopardy based on her substance abuse but sought to avoid a jeopardy hearing involving evidence of her sexual abuse of D.P. The court dismissed mother's termination petition, concluding that Mother did not have a statutory or constitutional right to petition to terminate her own parental rights or to forgo a full jeopardy hearing. After a jeopardy hearing, the court found jeopardy as to both parents based on domestic violence, abandonment, and sexual abuse of D.P. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court did not err in holding the jeopardy hearing despite Mother's desire to terminate her parental rights on grounds of her own choosing, as (1) Mother was not statutorily authorized to petition to terminate her own parental rights; and (2) the lack of such statutory authority did not violate the U.S. Constitution. View "In re D.P." on Justia Law

While working at Devereux Marine, Employee was electrocuted when the mast he was lowering came into contact with an overhead high-voltage power line owned by Central Maine Power Company (CMP). Employee received workers' compensation benefits through Devereux and separately sued CMP for negligence. The court awarded Employee $4,890,631 in damages. After paying the judgment, CMP brought this claim for indemnification against Devereux. Accompanying CMP's complaint was a motion for ex parte real estate attachment. The business and consumer docket denied CMP's motion for attachment, interpreting the Maine Overhead High-voltage Line Safety Act as creating a statutory right of contribution as opposed to a right to indemnification. The Supreme Court vacated the denial of the motion to attach, holding that full indemnification from an employer is required when (1) an employee is injured after bringing materials into contact with an overhead high-voltage power line; (2) the employer is determined to have violated the Act; and (3) the owner of the high-voltage line becomes liable to the employee. Remanded. View "Cent. Me. Power Co. v. Devereux Marine, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was employed by a Hospital for nineteen years. In 2009, Plaintiff was deposed in connection with a wrongful death lawsuit against the Hospital. The day after Plaintiff signed her deposition transcript, the Hospital terminated Plaintiff's employment on the ground that a medical record entry Plaintiff described in her deposition constituted a falsification of a patient medical record. Plaintiff filed a complaint against the Hospital, alleging that it violated Me. Rev. Stat. 26, 833(1)(C) because it discharged her in retaliation for her deposition testimony in the wrongful death lawsuit against the Hospital. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Hospital. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether her deposition was a substantial factor motivating her dismissal. View "Trott v. H.D. Goodall Hosp." on Justia Law

Employee suffered an injury to his left hand while working for Employer. Later, Employee's left index finger had to be amputated. Employee subsequently filed a petition for specific loss benefits. The parties agreed Employee was entitled to specific loss benefits because of the amputation for a period of thirty-eight weeks. At issue was whether Employer was entitled to an offset for the incapacity benefits it paid before the amputation. The Workers' Compensation Board granted the petition for specific loss benefits and determined that Employer was allowed to offset the incapacity benefits paid before the amputation. The Supreme Court vacated the Board's decision, holding that Employer was not entitled to offset the incapacity benefits paid during the months after Employee's initial injury but before the amputation of his finger. View "Scott v. Fraser Papers, Inc. " on Justia Law

D.S., who had several disabilities and disorders, was admitted to the Spurwink School for the provision of "necessary emotional, psychological and other therapeutic services and education." In 2004, D.S., then sixteen years old, arrived at school. An educational technician came outside when D.S. arrived, but D.S. shortly thereafter left the property on foot. D.S. was not located, and D.S. later alleged that, after leaving the school property, she was sexually assaulted by two strangers. In 2010, D.S.'s mother, on behalf of D.S., filed a five-count complaint against Spurwink Services. Spurwink Services moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting that the case was governed by the Maine Health Security Act (MHSA) and D.S. failed to comply with the requirements of the MHSA. The superior court entered summary judgment in favor of Spurwink Services, finding that it lacked jurisdiction over D.S.'s claims pursuant to the MHSA. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded, holding that the provisions of MHSA did not apply in this case, as D.S.'s action did not constitute an "action for professional negligence" as defined by the MHSA. View "D.S. v. Spurwink Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an action in the U.S. district court against a Maine police officer, alleging that the officer used force in arresting Plaintiff in violation of state and federal law. A jury found the officer liable on Plaintiff's state law negligence claim and awarded Plaintiff $125,000 in damages. The district court amended the judgment to reduce the damages award to $10,000 pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 14, 8104-D. Plaintiff appealed to the First Circuit Court of Appeals. The First Circuit certified two questions for the Supreme Court's review. The Court answered only the first question by holding that whether or not an insurance policy is available to cover a judgment against a government employee sued in his personal capacity, the applicable limit on the award of damages is $10,000 pursuant to section 8104-D rather than $400,000 or the policy limit pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 14, 8105(1) and 8116. View "Fortin v. Titcomb" on Justia Law

This appeal resulted from a high-speed chase involving Patrick Smith, who was driving a motorcycle, and Andrew Feeney, a Cumberland County Sheriff's Deputy. After Feeney observed Smith's motorcycle traveling above the speed limit, Feeney pursued Smith until Smith crashed and fell off the motorcycle. Smith's Estate sued the County, former Sheriff Mark Dion, and Feeney for negligence. The superior court granted summary judgment for the County and Feeney, concluding that they were entitled to discretionary function immunity pursuant to the Maine Tort Claims Act. The Supreme Court affirmed but for different reasons, holding that because the record did not contain any evidence to support a finding that Defendants' actions were a cause of Smith losing control of his motorcycle, the Estate could not maintain its claim of negligence. View "Estate of Smith v. Cumberland County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint for protection from harassment against his former landlord (Defendant). Defendant moved for the entry of judgment as a matter of law after Plaintiff had presented his case. The court granted the motion, concluding that, even accepting all of Plaintiff's testimony as true, Plaintiff failed to demonstrate abuse or harassment within the meaning of the relevant statute. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the court should not have reached its decision without affording Plaintiff the opportunity to play certain audio recordings and that the court should not have entered judgment as a matter of law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court did not err in proceeding based on the evidence that was presented at trial after it was clear the recordings were unavailable at the time of trial; and (2) because the evidence presented at trial failed to establish harassment, the lower court did not err in entering judgment as a matter of law. View "Chapman v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Relying on a licensed forester's markings of property boundaries, a company removed trees from 17.9 acres of Plaintiff's property. Plaintiff sued the forester, the company, and the owner of the neighboring property. The trial court awarded Plaintiff $67,180 in damages based on Defendants' timber harvest trespass. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the court erred in its damages award and in declining to grant her motion to add the owner of the company as a party. The Supreme Court modified the judgment to double the district court's award of damages and affirmed the judgment as modified, holding (1) the district court erred by not doubling Plaintiff's damages as required by 14 Me. Rev. Stat. 7552(4)(A); and (2) the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiff's motion to add the owner as a party. View "Woodworth v. Gaddis" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a motor vehicle collision involving Roger Linton and James Carey that resulted in Carey's death. At the time of the collision, Linton was driving a truck owned by Jonathan Jennings, for whom Linton worked as an independent contractor. Jennings's insurer, State Farm, filed a declaratory judgment action against Carey's Estate and Linton to determine whether it was responsible for liability coverage and obligated to defend and indemnify Linton for claims arising from the collision. The superior court entered a judgment in favor of State Farm, concluding that Linton was not an insured covered by Jennings's policy because his use of the truck was not within the scope of Jennings's consent. At issue on appeal was whether the superior court erred in its application of the minor deviation rule in determining that Linton's use of the truck exceeded the scope of Jennings's consent. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, clarified the applicable burdens associated with the minor deviation rule, and remanded for the superior court to apply the minor deviation rule as clarified. View "State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Estate of Carey" on Justia Law