Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

J. Cole and P. Daphne Harris filed a complaint against The Woodlands Club and The Woodlands Homeowners Association (collectively, the Woodlands), alleging that the Woodlands tortiously discharged surface water onto their property causing flooding and an increase in wetland. The superior court granted a partial summary judgment in favor of the Woodlands on the Harrises' statutory trespass and negligence claims and concluded that disputes of material facts precluded a summary judgment on the common law trespass claim. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) concluding that the Woodlands was not liable for trespass; (2) entering judgment in favor of the Woodlands on the Harrises' negligence claim; and (3) entering a pretrial order excluding certain testimony. View "Harris v. Woodlands Club" on Justia Law

Nancy Ramsey filed a complaint against Baxter Title Company and the company's owner, James Lemieux, for breach of fiduciary duty and duty of care and for punitive damages arising from a real estate transaction. The superior court dismissed Ramsey's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Ramsey's complaint did not allege the kind of close, confidential relationship necessary for a court to find the existence of a fiduciary duty; and (2) Baxter Title and Lemieux did not owe Ramsey a duty of care to explain to her that the loan she secured was more favorable to the lender than to her. View "Ramsey v. Baxter Title Co." on Justia Law

In this appeal, the question presented to the Supreme Court based on the facts of this case was: "[w]hen a physician is alleged to have acted as an apparent agent of a hospital, does the Maine Health Security Act require that the alleged negligent acts or omissions of that physician be evaluated by the mandatory prelitigation screening and mediation panel before a claim may be brought in court against the hospital based on that physician’s conduct? The Court answered that question in the affirmative: "[b]ecause Maine law requires that a prelitigation screening panel evaluate a physician's alleged professional negligence before consideration at trial, and because that did not occur in the instant case," the Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Levesque v. Central Maine Medical Center" on Justia Law

Alisa Morgan appealed the superior court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Robert and Ann Marquis on her complaint alleging that she was entitled to damages on theories of common law strict liability, common law negligence, and statutory liability after she was bitten by the Marquises’ dog. Because the Supreme Court concluded that genuine issues of material fact remained concerning Morgan’s common law negligence and statutory liability claims, it vacated the judgment as to those counts. View "Morgan v. Marquis" on Justia Law

The Estate of Stanley Pinkham appealed a superior court judgment granting Cargill, Inc.’s motion for summary judgment on the Estate’s complaint. In 2004, Mr. Pinkham consumed a boneless turkey sandwich that contained a piece of bone. The turkey was "manufactured" by Cargill, Inc. The bone caused an esophageal tear requiring surgery (Mr. Pinkham died several years later after sustaining his injury. He did not sue for wrongful death). Three affidavits that the Estate relied on to defeat Cargill's motion for summary judgment were held inadmissible at trial. After consideration, the trial court granted Cargill's motion noting that Maine had not established the requisite test to use when evaluating a strict liability claim for allegedly defective food pursuant to its strict liability statute. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Estate argued that it provided sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact, thereby rendering summary judgment inappropriate. The Estate further argued that the court erred in concluding that the Estate failed to meet its burden of proof to establish facts from which a fact-finder could infer that Cargill’s boneless turkey product was defective. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that summary judgment was not proper given the facts presented in this case, and vacated the superior court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Estate of Stanley Pinkham v. Cargill, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant's mother (Miller) opened a checking account with Bank. Appellant alleged that Miller added him as joint owner of the account with right of survivorship. After Miller died, Appellant withdrew all of the funds in the account. Miller's Estate brought an action against Appellant, alleging that the funds Appellant had withdrawn from the account belonged to the Estate. The probate court determined that Miller was the sole owner of the checking account and that the funds Appellant had withdrawn were the property of the Estate. The Supreme Court affirmed. Appellant later sued the Bank, seeking damages for breach of contract and negligence for failing to retain the records that would show his ownership of the account. Appellant also sought punitive damages. The superior court dismissed the action based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel, concluding that the precise issue of ownership was common to both proceedings. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed as to the breach of contract and punitive damages claims; but (2) vacated as to the negligence claim, holding that Appellant's negligence claim against the Bank was not barred by collateral estoppel, as the probate court did not adjudicate the factual issues related to this claim. View "Gray v. TD Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Appellant Timothy Daniels appealed a superior court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants Narraguagus Bay Health Care Facility and North Country Associates, Inc. Appellant contended that the court erred in concluding that Narraguagus and North Country were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on his disability discrimination and retaliation claims made pursuant to Maine's Human Rights Act. Appellant suffered a work-related injury to his right shoulder in 2007 and thereafter was given work restrictions by his physician that prevented him from performing all of the work duties he had previously handled. In 2008, Appellant underwent surgery and then began a leave of absence. A few months later, Appellant notified his employer that he was applying for more leave at her insistence. In that letter, Appellant also reported that he had been cleared for light duty work, accused his supervisor of refusing to accommodate his disability, and asked for light duty work. No work was afforded to Appellant as a result of that letter. Appellant suffered another work-related injury to his right shoulder in 2009, and, although he did not lose any time from work as a result of that injury, he was restricted to modified duty for the next three months. During that period Appellant was disciplined for performance issues. Early in November 2009, when Daniels no longer had any work restrictions, a new Narraguagus administrator gave Appellant a performance improvement plan for failing to complete some tasks at all and failing to complete other tasks on time. In November, 2009, in response to the complaint that he filed in 2008, the Commission issued Appellant a right-to-sue letter pursuant to the Human Rights Act. When state regulators visited Narraguagus to conduct a licensing inspection, they uncovered issues that resulted in fines to the facility. Narraguagus blamed Appellant for the negative inspection and terminated his employment on January 29, 2010. After his termination, Appellant filed a two-count complaint against Narraguagus and North Country. On appeal, Appellant advanced two theories of liability against North Country: (1) that it can be liable because it is part of an integrated enterprise with Narraguagus, and (2) that it acted in Narraguagus’s interest in discriminating against him. Finding multiple issues of disputed facts regarding North Country's involvement in the actions that Appellant claimed constituted discrimination and retaliation, the Supreme Court vacated the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Daniels v. Narraguagus Bay Health Care Facility" on Justia Law

Michael Joyce, who was frequently exposed to airborne asbestos while working, died of lung cancer. His last documented exposure to asbestos dust was while working for Commercial Welding. A Workers' Compensation Board hearing officer later awarded the estate of Joyce benefits on a petition for an award of compensation and ordered benefits paid to Mary Joyce, Michael's widow, on a petition for death benefits. Commercial Welding appealed the hearing officer's decision as well as the hearing officer's determinations that (1) it had not cured a previously established violation of the Board's "fourteen-day-rule" because it had not paid interest on the required payment imposed for the violation, and (2) it was not permitted to offset the amount of the death benefits ordered to be paid to Mary by the amount of the payment for the fourteen-day rule violation. The Supreme Court vacated in part and affirmed in part the hearing officer's decision. The Court (1) disagreed with the hearing officer's decision that interest was due on the required payment to the Estate, but (2) agreed that the required payment amount could not be used to offset the death benefits ordered to be paid to Mary. View "Estate of Joyce v. Commercial Welding Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was seriously injured at an intersection when he lost control of his motorcycle as he was attempting to avoid a vehicle driven by former defendant Charlotte Small. At issue was whether there was prima facie evidence that the location of a sign advertising Gibson's Apple Orchard at the intersection required Small to either pull into Plaintiff's lane of traffic to see around the sign or maneuver her car in a way that made Plaintiff believe she was pulling into his lane of traffic. The superior court entered a summary judgment in favor of Gibson's, concluding that a jury would have to engage in speculation to find that the sign proximately caused Plaintiff's accident. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that a jury could rationally find that the sign proximately caused the accident. Remanded. View "McIlroy v. Gibson's Apple Orchard " on Justia Law

Kristin Cummings, a twenty-five-year-old mother of two, committed suicide in her parents' home thirty-six hours after she had been discharged from Stephens Memorial Hospital, where she was acknowledged to have severe depression. The Estate of Kristin Cummings sued Kristin's parents, James and Jadzia Davie for negligence for failing to prevent Kristin's self-injurious behavior. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the Davies. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that no special relationship existed between Kristin and her parents such that the law would impose upon the Davies a duty to prevent or inhibit their daughter's suicide, either by virtue of those special relationships that the Court had previously recognized in its duty of care jurisprudence or by the existence of a custodial relationship. View "Estate of Cummings v. Davie" on Justia Law