Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Michael Bryant, an owner and employee of Prime Cut Meat Market, assaulted another motorist, Francis Latanowich, in an apparent incident of road rage. Prime Cut and its employees were insured by a policy issued by The Travelers Indemnity Company. Latanowich and his wife sued Bryant and Prime Cut. Prime Cut successfully moved for summary judgment, and Bryant and the Latanowiches agreed to a settlement that included Bryant assigning all of his rights related to potential insurance coverage to the Latanowiches. Travelers later filed a complaint against Bryant and the Latanowiches seeking a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to indemnify Bryant for claims arising from the altercation because Bryant was not an insured under its policy issued to Prime Cut for purposes of that conduct. The superior court concluded that the policy language did not cover the incident, and it granted Travelers's motion for summary judgment. The Latanowiches appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, pursuant to the unambiguous language of the policy, the court correctly concluded that Bryant's assault of Latanowich was not covered by the policy and properly entered summary judgment. View "Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bryant" on Justia Law

Employee suffered a work-related stroke, after which the Workers' Compensation Board awarded Employee 800 weeks of total incapacity benefits for the permanent and total loss of industrial use of one leg and one arm. After paying total incapacity benefits for the 800-week period, Employer filed petitions for review and for determination of offset rights. A Board hearing officer granted Employer's petitions and determined that because Employee had received 800 weeks of permanent incapacity benefits pursuant to the conclusively presumptive time period established in Me. Rev. Stat. 39-A, 212(2)(G), Employer could prospectively take statutory offsets against Employee's benefits pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 39-A, 221. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that although Employee remained totally incapacitated from work, after 800 weeks, Employer was entitled to reduce the total benefit by amounts authorized by Me. Rev. Stat. 39-A, 221. View "Mitton v. Verizon" on Justia Law

Christine Angell filed a complaint against Renald Hallee and the Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, alleging that Hallee sexually abused her during her childhood while he was a priest. Hallee and the Bishop asserted the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense and moved for judgment on the pleadings. The superior court granted the motions and entered judgment in Hallee's and the Bishop's favor. The Bishop was later dismissed, and Angell appealed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that the court erred in imposing on Angell a burden to allege and prove that the statute of limitations was tolled while Hallee was absent from and resided out of state but was potentially amenable to service of process by means other than publication. View "Angell v. Hallee" on Justia Law

Employee suffered a gradual injury while working for Employer. After Employee retired, he underwent spinal fusion surgery. Employee subsequently filed a petition for award. A Workers' Compensation Board hearing officer granted him the protection of the of the Workers' Compensation Act for his gradual injury but awarded no additional incapacity benefits. Employee appealed, arguing, among other things, that the hearing officer erred when determining that Employee did not rebut the retiree presumption in Me. Rev. Stat. 39-A with evidence that he was unable to perform suitable work for a discrete period of time after retirement. The Supreme Court vacated the decision in part, holding that the hearing officer's decision provided an inadequate basis for appellate review. Remanded for further proceedings. View "Downing v. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

Fore LLC, a Maine entity, purchased a Maine business from a New Hampshire client of William Benoit, a Massachusetts-based accountant. Fore sued Benoit, alleging that Benoit fraudulently misrepresented that the tax returns he prepared for the Maine business were accurate. The superior court granted Benoit's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court vacated the superior court's judgment, concluding that Fore made the requisite prima facie showing that Benoit's contacts with Maine were related to the claims in this case and that they were sufficient for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Remanded to determine whether it was reasonable to require Benoit to defend this action in Maine. View "Fore, LLC v. Benoit" on Justia Law

Edwin Mitchell, a lobster fisherman, was sued by Victor Ames, who alleged that a group of lobster fishermen had conspired to prevent him from fishing for lobster in the area. The Ames complaint alleged that Mitchell had, among other things, converted Ames's personal property. Mitchell held a homeowners policy with Allstate Insurance Company. By the policy's terms, Allstate agreed to provide a defense if the policyholder was sued for such damages. Allstate, however, declined to provide coverage to Mitchell on the Ames litigation, after which Mitchell sued Allstate for breach of contract. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Allstate, concluding that Allstate had no contractual duty to defend Mitchell because a policy exclusion for certain intentional acts applied. The Supreme Court vacated the superior court's judgment, holding that Allstate did have a duty to defend because the liability alleged in the Ames complaint had the potential to result in covered liability. View "Mitchell v. Allstate Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Larry Hilderbrand, a law enforcement officer employed by the police department, was working with the Maine Drug Enforcement Agency (MDEA) when the county sheriff received a video of Hilderbrand behaving crassly. The sheriff then publicly announced that his department would discontinue working with the MDEA because Hilderbrand was assigned to it and stated that his decision was based on the video. Hilderbrand subsequently filed a three-count complaint against the county commissioners and the sheriff alleging slander per se, invasion of privacy, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the commissioners and sheriff, concluding that the sheriff had discretionary function immunity and the commissioners could not be liable for the sheriff's conduct because he was not their employee. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that application of the factors set forth in Darling v. Augusta Mental Health Inst. to the undisputed facts indicated the sheriff's allegedly tortious activities were within the Maine Tort Claim Act's discretionary function immunity provision, and the superior court did not err in dismissing the suit against him on that basis. View "Hilderbrand v. Washington County Comm'rs" on Justia Law

Employer, an employment agency, hired Employee and assigned him to work at a facility owned by a client company (Client). Employer paid Employee's salary, and Client paid Employer a fee for his services. Employee was injured while working at the Client plant, after which Client ended Employee's assignment at its facility. Employee filed petitions to remedy discrimination against Employer and Client. A workers' compensation board hearing officer denied the petitions to remedy discrimination against Employer and Client. Employee appealed, contending that the hearing officer erred by denying the petition against Client on the ground that Employee was not in an employer-employee relationship with Client. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the hearing officer did not misconceive the legal standard when focusing on whether a contract for hire existed between Employee and Client; (2) the hearing officer did not err in concluding that Employee had a contract for hire only with Employer; and (3) therefore, Employee did not have a right of action for discrimination pursuant to 39-A Me. Rev. Stat. 353 against Client. View "Doughty v. Work Opportunities Unlimited" on Justia Law

Edgar and Sheryl Peters owned a parcel of land that abutted and was uphill from oceanfront property owned by Richard O'Leary. After a series of disputes with the Peterses, O'Leary planted a row of at least seventy-four trees near the parties' boundary, which obstructed ocean views from the Peterses' newly constructed home. The Peterses sued O'Leary. The superior court found that O'Leary had created a nuisance pursuant to Maine's spite fence statute and the common law and granted injunctive relief to the Peterses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in finding that O'Leary created a nuisance pursuant to the spite fence statute because (1) the plantings created a structure in the nature of a fence, and (2) the evidence was adequate to support a finding that O'Leary maintained the structure for the purpose of annoying the Peterses. View "Peters v. O'Leary" on Justia Law

While away for a competition in a school-supported event, students caused damage to a motel where they were lodging. The motel's property insurer paid to repair the damage then exercised its right of subrogation pursuant to its insurance contract with the motel to seek to recover compensation for those responsible for the loss. The insurer filed a complaint against the school district, alleging it was liable for breach of contract based on its failure to protect and safeguard the property from damage during the period of occupancy and to refrain from activities that would damage the property. The superior court granted the school district's motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the school district did not undertake to be responsible to pay damages in a subrogation action, the insurer's action against the school board was barred. View "Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co. v. Me. Sch. Admin. Dist." on Justia Law