Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Employee filed a complaint against Employer alleging employment discrimination based on numerous factual allegations. After a jury trial, the jury found (1) Employer had taken adverse employment action against Employee in violation of the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA), but (2) Employer had not failed to provide Employee with reasonable accommodations for his hearing impairment or the shoulder injury he received while working for Employer. Employee appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the superior court erred in instructing the jury on the statute of limitations, but the error did not prejudice Employee; (2) the court did not err in declining to give Employee's proposed instruction, as the instruction did not state the law correctly; and (3) the superior court did not abuse its discretion by awarding attorney fees less than the amount Employee requested. View "Kezer v. Cent. Me. Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

Employee suffered a work-related stroke, after which the Workers' Compensation Board awarded Employee 800 weeks of total incapacity benefits for the permanent and total loss of industrial use of one leg and one arm. After paying total incapacity benefits for the 800-week period, Employer filed petitions for review and for determination of offset rights. A Board hearing officer granted Employer's petitions and determined that because Employee had received 800 weeks of permanent incapacity benefits pursuant to the conclusively presumptive time period established in Me. Rev. Stat. 39-A, 212(2)(G), Employer could prospectively take statutory offsets against Employee's benefits pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 39-A, 221. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that although Employee remained totally incapacitated from work, after 800 weeks, Employer was entitled to reduce the total benefit by amounts authorized by Me. Rev. Stat. 39-A, 221. View "Mitton v. Verizon" on Justia Law

Employee suffered a gradual injury while working for Employer. After Employee retired, he underwent spinal fusion surgery. Employee subsequently filed a petition for award. A Workers' Compensation Board hearing officer granted him the protection of the of the Workers' Compensation Act for his gradual injury but awarded no additional incapacity benefits. Employee appealed, arguing, among other things, that the hearing officer erred when determining that Employee did not rebut the retiree presumption in Me. Rev. Stat. 39-A with evidence that he was unable to perform suitable work for a discrete period of time after retirement. The Supreme Court vacated the decision in part, holding that the hearing officer's decision provided an inadequate basis for appellate review. Remanded for further proceedings. View "Downing v. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

Employer, an employment agency, hired Employee and assigned him to work at a facility owned by a client company (Client). Employer paid Employee's salary, and Client paid Employer a fee for his services. Employee was injured while working at the Client plant, after which Client ended Employee's assignment at its facility. Employee filed petitions to remedy discrimination against Employer and Client. A workers' compensation board hearing officer denied the petitions to remedy discrimination against Employer and Client. Employee appealed, contending that the hearing officer erred by denying the petition against Client on the ground that Employee was not in an employer-employee relationship with Client. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the hearing officer did not misconceive the legal standard when focusing on whether a contract for hire existed between Employee and Client; (2) the hearing officer did not err in concluding that Employee had a contract for hire only with Employer; and (3) therefore, Employee did not have a right of action for discrimination pursuant to 39-A Me. Rev. Stat. 353 against Client. View "Doughty v. Work Opportunities Unlimited" on Justia Law

Employee brought an employment discrimination claim against Employer pursuant to the Maine Human Rights Act, alleging that Employer discriminated against him based on his sexual orientation. A jury entered a verdict for Employee and awarded Employee compensatory and punitive damages. Employer appealed, arguing, among other things, that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on liability. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the record contained sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that actions of Employer made it futile for Employee to apply for a promotion, and thus, Employee's failure to apply for the position fell under the futility exception to the rule that an individual must apply for a position before he can claim he was denied that position; (2) the court applied the proper statutory cap to the jury's award; and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Employer's motion for a new trial or remittitur of damages. View "Russell v. ExpressJet Airlines" on Justia Law

The Town of Millinocket appealed and Mary Walsh cross-appealed from a judgment of the superior court following a jury trial finding that Walsh, the former town recreation director, had engaged in activities protected by the state whistleblowers' protection act and that those protected activities were a substantial motivating cause for the Town's decision to eliminate her position. At issue on appeal was whether discriminatory animus expressed by one member of the town council could be found to be a cause or motivating factor for an adverse employment action or whether the lack of evidence of discriminatory animus by any other member of the town council insulated the Town from liability in Walsh's discrimination action. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding (1) an improper motive or discriminatory animus of one member of a multi-member council may create an actionable claim against the governmental entity if a plaintiff proves, and the jury finds, that the improper motive or discriminatory animus was a motivating factor or a substantial cause for an adverse employment action taken against a plaintiff who has engaged in a protected activity; and (2) evidence in the record supported the jury's verdict in this case. View "Walsh v. Town of Millinocket" on Justia Law

Paul Davis was struck and seriously injured by a truck driven by Edwin Rodriguez. Rodriguez was driving while intoxicated soon after he and Davis exited a chartered bus at the conclusion of a business promotion trip. Rodriguez later pleaded guilty to reckless endangerment, aggravated assault, and DUI. Davis filed claims against the business that organized the trip, its employee, the chartered bus company, and its employee (Defendants) for common law negligence. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. At issue on appeal was whether Defendants owed Davis a common law duty of care. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court, holding (1) the chartered bus company and the employee who drove the bus did not owe Davis a duty to ensure his safety by preventing Rodriguez from driving his truck after the bus trip ended, and (2) the business that organized the trip and its employee did not have a fiduciary duty to Davis because the employee organized and led the excursion. View "Davis v. Dionne" on Justia Law

Peter Miller injured his lower back in 1992, 1995, and 1996 while working for S.D. Warren and in 1999 while working for Spinnaker Coating. A Workers' Compensation Board hearing officer awarded Miller sixty-five percent partial incapacity benefits apportioned equally among the four dates of injury. Later, the hearing officer (1) granted S.D. Warren's petition for review requesting permission to cease payment for the 1992 injury because it had made all payments to which Miller was entitled for that injury; (2) granted Spinnaker's petition to reduce its benefit payment accordingly; and (3) denied Miller's petition for review seeking an increase to total incapacity benefits, determining that Miller had not demonstrated a change in medical or economic circumstances. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing officer did not improperly expand the Court's holding in Cust v. University of Maine to allow for a reduction in benefits when the durational limit has expired on the first of multiple injuries. View " Miller v. Spinnaker Coating" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Scott Hackett aggravated a pre-existing low back injury while working as a long distance truck driver for Western Express. After Hackett was terminated for reasons unconnected to his injury, Hackett filed a petition for award to the Workers' Compensation Board and was awarded ongoing partial incapacity benefits for a gradual injury to his lower back. When calculating Hackett's weekly wage, the hearing officer (1) excluded the nine cents per mile Hackett received as per diem pay, concluding that it was paid to cover special expenses, and (2) concluded that the per diem payments were not a fringe benefit that could be included to a limited extent in average weekly wage. Hackett appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the hearing officer's decision but remanded for a recalculation of Hackett's fringe benefits pursuant to Me. W.C.B. R. ch. 1, 5(1). View "Hackett v. Western Express, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2004, Matthew Doucette injured his back while working for Sysco. Doucette did not lose any earnings as a result of his injury and had no further problems with his back until 2008 when he reinjured it while working for a different employer. In 2009, Doucette filed a petition for award against Sysco for the 2004 injury, alleging entitlement to compensation from 2004 to the present. Doucette also asserted a fourteen-day rule violation against Sysco for failing to file a notice of controversy (NOC) within fourteen days of receiving the petition. Although there was some disagreement over the date of the filing, the Workers' Compensation Board hearing officer found the NOC was filed on the fifteenth day and determined Sysco was in violation of the fourteen-day rule. Sysco appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the hearing officer did not err in determining a fourteen-day rule violation occurred, (2) the hearing officer did not err in awarding total benefits from the date of the injury when the employee suffered no loss of earnings as a result of the injury, and (3) the award was not excessive and unfair. View " Doucette v. Hallsmith/Sysco Food Services, et al." on Justia Law