Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2007, Petitioner pleaded guilty to ten counts of burglary. Because of a pending federal sentence, Petitioner was classified as a medium security inmate by the Department of Corrections (DOC). In 2011, Petitioner filed a grievance with the DOC contending that he should have been receiving two days of good time per month pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 17-A, 1253(10)(B), which gives the chief administrative officer of a prison the discretion to deduct up to two days per month from an inmate's sentence for satisfactory performance in "community work, education or rehabilitation programs." The DOC denied relief. The superior court denied Petitioner's petitions seeking post-conviction relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the DOC properly construed section 1253(10)(B); and (2) the DOC's policy implementing section 1253(10)(B) was validly adopted in accordance with the Maine Administrative Procedure Act. View "Roderick v. State" on Justia Law

D.S., who had several disabilities and disorders, was admitted to the Spurwink School for the provision of "necessary emotional, psychological and other therapeutic services and education." In 2004, D.S., then sixteen years old, arrived at school. An educational technician came outside when D.S. arrived, but D.S. shortly thereafter left the property on foot. D.S. was not located, and D.S. later alleged that, after leaving the school property, she was sexually assaulted by two strangers. In 2010, D.S.'s mother, on behalf of D.S., filed a five-count complaint against Spurwink Services. Spurwink Services moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting that the case was governed by the Maine Health Security Act (MHSA) and D.S. failed to comply with the requirements of the MHSA. The superior court entered summary judgment in favor of Spurwink Services, finding that it lacked jurisdiction over D.S.'s claims pursuant to the MHSA. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded, holding that the provisions of MHSA did not apply in this case, as D.S.'s action did not constitute an "action for professional negligence" as defined by the MHSA. View "D.S. v. Spurwink Services, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was Town Landing Road, which was bordered to the west by property owned by the Bayberry Cove Childrens' Land Trust (Trust) and bordered to the east by property owned by Paul and Pauline West. After a dispute about with the Town about access to the road, the Trust filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment as to the ownership of the road, which the Wests later joined. The trial court declared that the Trust and Wests owned Town Landing Road free and clear of any interests claimed by the Town on behalf of the public in general. The Town appealed, arguing that the court erred in rejecting its contention that it acquired a public way by prescriptive use. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Town failed to sustain its burden to prove continuous use of the road for the required period. View "Bayberry Cove Childrens' Land Trust v. Town of Steuben" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of seven counts of unlawful sexual contact (Class C) and three counts of unlawful sexual contact (Class B). Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he made to a detective because he was not advised of his Miranda rights prior to his custodial interrogation and because his statements made prior to and after his arrest were involuntary. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of conviction and remanded, holding (1) Defendant was not in custody for purposes of the Miranda requirements; but (2) the district court clearly erred in finding that Defendant's statements were voluntary. View "State v. Wiley" on Justia Law

Decedent, an employee of the Salvation Army, died at his home, part of which served as his office. Decedent's spouse filed a petition for death benefits with the Workers' Compensation Board (Board), which issued an award in favor of the Estate. The Salvation Army filed notices of appeal with the Supreme Court and with the Workers' Compensation Board Appellate Division. At issue before the Court was whether the appeal was properly before the Appellate Division or the Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the Salvation Army's petition, holding (1) for all workers' compensation cases without final decision before September 1, 2012, the initial review must go to the Appellate Division; and (2) because the Board declined review on or after September 1, 2012, the appeal from the hearing officer's final decision was not properly before the Supreme Court. View "Estate of Sullwold v. Salvation Army" on Justia Law

Decedent died testate, devising her estate in equal shares to her two surviving children, Daughter and Son. Daughter paid the estate's bills with her personal funds for several years. In April 2010, Daughter filed Decedent's will and petitioned to be named the personal representative. The probate court allowed the will, denied Daughter's request, and named an attorney as personal representative (PR). The PR caused a creditor's notice to be published in the newspaper beginning October 16, 2010. On January 19, 2011, Daughter filed a reimbursement claim against the estate for $40,871. The PR disallowed the claim, but the probate court allowed the majority of Daughter's claim, disallowing only her claim for reimbursement of telephone bills. Son appealed, arguing that Daughter's claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the probate court and remanded, holding that the probate court erred in (1) finding that because Daughter's claim was filed within four months of first publication of the creditor's notice in the newspaper, it was timely; and (2) failing to consider Son's claims of waiver and unjust enrichment. View "Estate of Gray" on Justia Law

The Scarborough Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) granted a setback variance to property owners in the Higgins Beach neighborhood of Scarborough. The property abutted land owned by Summerwind Cottage, LLC. Peter and Libby Cassat owned the land directly across the street. The superior court affirmed the decision of the ZBA. Summerwind Cottage and the Cassats appealed, arguing that the superior court erred in relying on the Official Shoreland Zoning Map to conclude that the property was in the buildable Shoreland Overlay District and in concluding that the property met the requirements for a variance. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Summerwind's arguments failed to establish that the ZBA erred in relying on the Official Shoreland Zoning Map in determining that the property was in the buildable Shoreland Overlay District; and (2) there was substantial evidence in the record to support the ZBA's decision to grant the ordinance. View "Summerwind Cottage, LLC v. Town of Scarborough" on Justia Law

The Town of Madawaska foreclosed on Jeffrey and Jeanne Stoops' property after the Stoops failed to pay municipal taxes. The Town then conveyed the property to Richard and Betty Nelson by municipal quitclaim deed. The Stoopses subsequently filed a complaint against Richard Nelson seeking to quiet title to the property and asking the court to declare the respective rights of the parties to the property. The superior court granted the Nelsons' motion for summary judgment. The Stoopses appealed, arguing (1) the Town failed to give the Stoopses proper notice of the pending foreclosure in violation of their due process rights, and (2) the Town failed to adhere strictly to the requirements of the statutorily outlined steps a municipality must take to foreclose on a municipal tax lien. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the Town complied with the requirements of the statutory scheme and gave the Stoopses sufficient notice, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the Nelsons. View "Stoops v. Nelson" on Justia Law

The Department of Environmental Protection approved an application of Saddleback Ridge Wind, LLC for a permit to construct the Saddleback Ridge Wind Project, a wind energy development. The Board of Environmental Protection affirmed. Friends of Maine's Mountains, Friends of Saddleback Mountain, and several individuals appealed, arguing, among other things, that the Board abused its discretion when determining which nighttime sound level limit to apply to the applications. The Supreme Court vacated the Board's order related to nighttime sound requirements and remanded, holding that the Board failed to meet its statutory obligation to protect the health and welfare of the Project's neighbors and thus abused its discretion in approving Saddleback's permit applications. View "Friends of Maine's Mountains. v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were sex offenders who were all initially required to register as sex offenders under Maine's Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) of 1999. Some Plaintiffs were later relieved of the registration requirement, but others remained on the registry and had viable claims. Plaintiffs filed actions against several State defendants, alleging, among other things, that SORNA of 1999 was an unconstitutional ex post facto law. The trial court granted the State defendants' motion for summary judgment, concluding that the cases of the Plaintiffs who successfully petitioned to be relieved from the duty to register were moot and that SORNA of 1999 as amended after State v. Letalien was constitutional. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision that SORNA of 1999 as amended following the Court's decision in Letalien did not violate the constitutional rights of the litigants. View "Doe v. Williams" on Justia Law