Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This appeal resulted from a high-speed chase involving Patrick Smith, who was driving a motorcycle, and Andrew Feeney, a Cumberland County Sheriff's Deputy. After Feeney observed Smith's motorcycle traveling above the speed limit, Feeney pursued Smith until Smith crashed and fell off the motorcycle. Smith's Estate sued the County, former Sheriff Mark Dion, and Feeney for negligence. The superior court granted summary judgment for the County and Feeney, concluding that they were entitled to discretionary function immunity pursuant to the Maine Tort Claims Act. The Supreme Court affirmed but for different reasons, holding that because the record did not contain any evidence to support a finding that Defendants' actions were a cause of Smith losing control of his motorcycle, the Estate could not maintain its claim of negligence. View "Estate of Smith v. Cumberland County" on Justia Law

After the State brought a criminal proceeding against Mark Strong, the court initiated jury selection through a process that had the practical effect of excluding the public, including the media, from voir dire. After Maine Today Media, Inc.'s request that the court open the voir dire process to the public was denied, Maine Today filed a motion to intervene, which the trial court denied. Maine Today filed an interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court (1) vacated the denial of the motion to intervene and allowed intervention for the limited purpose of the matters addressed in this appeal; and (2) vacated the court's order barring the public from the entirety of the voir dire process. Remanded to the trial court to conduct the remaining voir dire in a presumptively public manner. View "State v. Strong" on Justia Law

In 2008, the Public Utilities Commission approved a merger between FairPoint Communications-NNE (FairPoint) and Verizon Maine (Verizon). The merger order committed FairPoint to expanding DSL availability in Maine to certain percentages within certain periods of time. The merger order incorporated an amended stipulation presented by FairPoint and other parties. Approximately twenty months later, FairPoint filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The Commission agreed to reduce FairPoint's ultimate broadband buildout obligations from ninety percent addressability to eighty-seven percent. Fairpoint subsequently notified the Commission that it had expanded broadband buildout to the level of eighty-three percent. The Commission disagreed, concluding that FairPoint had used the wrong measure of addressability and therefore overstated its results. At issue on appeal was how "addressability" would be measured when calculating FairPoint's broadband buildout commitments in Maine. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the merger order was an order of the Commission and not a consent decree, and therefore, the Commission did not err by failing to interpret the merger order in a manner consistent with the intent and understanding of the parties to the stipulation; and (2) the Commission did not err in its definition of "addressability." View "N. New England Tel. Operations LLC v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of intentional or knowing murder for killing a sixteen-year-old girl, who was found buried with her wrists bound in duct tape, behind Defendant's mother's home. Defendant was sentenced to forty-seven years' incarceration. The Supreme Court affirmed. Defendant subsequently moved for additional DNA analysis and a new trial, claiming that a trace amount of male DNA previously found in a clipping from the duct tape had been further analyzed, and that Defendant was excluded as the source of that DNA. The post-conviction court denied Defendant's motion for a new trial, holding that the newly discovered DNA evidence did not make a different verdict probable due to the strong evidence of Defendant's guilt and the limited nature of the additional DNA test results. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court did not err in its findings of fact, misapply the relevant statute, or abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial. View "State v. Reese" on Justia Law

During her employment with Employer, Appellant applied to open a registered medical marijuana dispensary. Appellant was later terminated from her employment. Appellant filed a complaint against Employer, alleging in count I of her complaint that her termination was a violation of the Maine Medical Use of Marijuana Act (Act). Appellant argued that her application for a license to operate a medical marijuana dispensary was authorized conduct within the meaning of the Act and her subsequent termination was thus a penalty prohibited by the Act. The superior court granted Employer's motion to dismiss with respect to several counts, including count I. The parties later stipulated to the dismissal of the remaining counts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Act does not create a private right of action against private employers, but rather, protects against prosecution and penalties by governmental regulatory entities. View "Savage v. Me. Pretrial Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff purchased title insurance for a condominium unit she had recently purchased. Plaintiff's neighbor subsequently initiated a lawsuit against Plaintiff alleging that Plaintiff's property was subject to a view easement. Plaintiff tendered the complaint to her title insurance company (Insurer) requesting a defense pursuant to her title insurance policy. Commonwealth denied Plaintiff's request based on certain exclusions in the policy. Plaintiff sued Insurer alleging a breach of contract and requesting a declaratory judgment that Insurer had a duty to defend Plaintiff against her neighbor's complaint. The superior court granted Insurer's motion for summary judgment, finding that the policy specifically excluded the view easement from coverage. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that due to the broad nature of the duty to defend and the law's requirement that insurance-policy interpretation be focused on the insured, Insurer had a duty to defend Plaintiff in the underlying litigation. View "Cox v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Prime Motor Cars sold Seacoast RV, Inc. a car. The car had modifications that voided the manufacturer's warranty and caused mechanical problems that may not have been apparent when the car was sold because the "check engine" light was covered with opaque tape. Seacoast filed a complaint against Prime, alleging breach of contract, breach of warranty, fraud, violation of the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA), and punitive damages. The district court granted Prime's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the UTPA and punitive damages claims. The court then concluded that Prime's conduct constituted breach of contract and breach of warranty, but found against Seacoast on the fraud claim. The court rescinded the contract and ordered Prime to refund Seacoast and Seacoast to return the vehicle to Prime. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in its judgment. View "Seacoast RV, Inc. v. Sawdran, LLC" on Justia Law

The Superintendent of Insurance found that a Bankers Life and Casualty Company agent engaged in deceptive insurance sales practices in multiple transactions with an elderly woman. Bankers Life and its agents functioned as insurance producers at the relevant time. The Superintendent ordered Bankers Life to pay restitution and a civil penalty of $100,000. The business and consumer docket affirmed the Superintendent's decision. Bankers Life appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Superintendent did not err in her statutory interpretation or factual findings and did not abuse her discretion by imposing restitution and a penalty on Bankers Life based on the evidence presented in the administrative record. View "Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Superintendent of Ins." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of theft by unauthorized taking or transfer and criminal mischief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the jury rationally could have found every element of the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt, as (1) the evidence presented was sufficient to support the jury's findings that Defendant obtained and intended to deprive the State of possession of property with a value greater than $1,000; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's findings that Defendant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly damaged or destroyed property of the State without reasonable grounds to do so. View "State v. Reed" on Justia Law

First Franklin Financial Corporation and Jason Gardner attended foreclosure mediation. The parties disputed the outcome of the mediation. Gardner argued that the parties reached a binding agreement requiring First Franklin to offer a trial loan modification plan to Gardner and subsequently filed a motion for sanctions. The district court granted the motion and ordered First Franklin to pay monetary sanctions and to enter into a loan modification with Gardner on the terms agreed upon by the parties at foreclosure mediation. First Franklin filed an interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court granted the appeal and held that the motion court did not err (1) in finding that Gardner and First Franklin entered into a binding agreement requiring First Franklin to offer the loan modification to Gardner; and (2) in finding that First Franklin did not mediate in good faith and in granting Gardner's motion for sanctions. View "First Franklin Fin. Corp. v. Gardner" on Justia Law