Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Maine Public Employees Retirement System (the System) appealed a superior court judgment reversing a decision of the System’s Board of Trustees that denied Petitioner Ellen Goodrich basic life insurance coverage under the group life insurance plan administered by the System. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court's judgment in part and remanded the case for entry of a judgment: (1) vacating the decision of the Board; and (2) remanding to the Board with instructions to provide Goodrich with prospective basic life insurance coverage after she paid back premiums accrued to date. View "Goodrich v. Maine Public Employees Retirement System" on Justia Law

Ed Friedman and others (collectively, Friedman) appealed the Maine Public Utilities Commission's dismissal of their complaint against Central Maine Power Company (CMP) regarding CMP's use of smart-meter technology. Friedman also appealed the Commission's dismissal of those portions of the complaint that were directed at the Commission and raised constitutional concerns regarding orders previously issued by the Commission. Friedman asserted, among other issues, that the Commission erred because its dismissal of his complaint ignored the Commission's statutory mandate to ensure the delivery of safe and reasonable utility services. The Commission and CMP contended that the complaint was properly dismissed in all respects. Because the Supreme Court agreed with Friedman that the Commission should not have dismissed the portion of the complaint against CMP addressing health and safety issues, the Court vacated that portion of the judgment and otherwise affirmed. View "Friedman v. Public Utilities Comm'n" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant Colin Koehler was found guilty of the intentional or knowing murder of a young woman he had known for less than a day, for which the court sentenced him to life in prison. On appeal, Defendant challenged several rulings on evidence, procedure, motions, and jury instructions. He also challenged his sentence primarily on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence of premeditation, that he has no substantial criminal history, and that his mental health evaluations failed to reveal any significant psychological or psychiatric disorders linked to criminality. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no error in the trial court’s rulings and concluded that the court acted within its sentencing authority in imposing a life sentence. View "Maine v. Koehler" on Justia Law

Defendant Jacklyne S. Poole appealed her conviction on domestic violence assault following a bench trial. Defendant's charge arose from an incident in which she assaulted her boyfriend. She was sentenced to 180 days in jail, all suspended, and one year of probation. On appeal, Defendant argued: (1) that the court erred by denying her motion to enlarge time to file a jury trial request after the twenty-one-day deadline imposed by M.R. Crim. P. 22 because she did not knowingly and intelligently waive her right to a jury trial at arraignment; and (2) the application of different procedural rules for accessing the jury trial right in courts with and without Unified Criminal Dockets violated the federal and Maine constitutional guarantees of equal protection. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no error in the trial court's decisions, and affirmed the judgment. View "Maine v. Poole" on Justia Law

Petitioners David F. and Jeannette A. D'Alessandro appealed a superior Court judgment that affirmed a Town of Harpswell Board of Appeals decision. The Board had denied the D'Alessandros' appeal of a permit issued by the code enforcement officer to several subdivision landowners to install a seasonal stairway for shore access over an easement that burdens land the D'Alessandros own in the same subdivision. The D'Alessandros opposed the permit, arguing that the Harpswell Shoreland Zoning Ordinance allowed for only one stairway to the shore in this subdivision and there was an existing stairway providing shore access in another location within the subdivision. Upon review, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded for further proceedings: The Board's finding that "the location of the proposed stairs is reasonable under the ordinance" did not apply the standard as it is set forth in the ordinance and provided no finding regarding the actual question presented by the ordinance: did a reasonable access alternative exist? Thus, although the Supreme Court reviewed the Board's factual findings under a deferential standard of review, here the Board erred because it failed to make a finding as to whether there was no reasonable access alternative. View "D'Alessandro v. Town of Harpswell" on Justia Law

Defendant Kevin Jones appealed a district court's judgment following a bench trial at which he was found guilty of carrying a concealed weapon. On appeal, Defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that knives he carried were statutorily prohibited from being concealed. Because the statute's prohibitions applicable to knives are limited to those knives that, in their design or primary function, constitute a "dangerous or deadly weapon usually employed in the attack on or defense of a person," the Supreme Court vacated the conviction. View "Maine v. Jones" on Justia Law

Defendant Bradley Lemay appealed his convictions of felony gross sexual assault; criminal threatening with a dangerous weapon' eluding an officer; attempted escape; and tampering with a victim. The charges stemmed from three events that occurred on three different dates. Defendant argued that the court abused its discretion by joining the matters for trial pursuant to M.R. Crim. P. 8(a), and by subsequently denying his motion for relief from prejudicial joinder pursuant to M.R. Crim. P. 8(d). Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: "The record makes clear that the court carefully considered and thoroughly evaluated Lemay’s arguments. The court also took care to give relevant instructions to the jury to reduce the potential for prejudice resulting from the joinder. Lemay failed to prove that any inadmissible evidence would be or was admitted due to the joinder, or that his choice not to testify interfered with his ability to present his defense. Given that the trial court has wide discretion to join and sever trials, on this record it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to ultimately conclude that the balance in this case tipped in favor of joinder." View "Maine v. Lemay" on Justia Law

The Estate of Stanley Pinkham appealed a superior court judgment granting Cargill, Inc.’s motion for summary judgment on the Estate’s complaint. In 2004, Mr. Pinkham consumed a boneless turkey sandwich that contained a piece of bone. The turkey was "manufactured" by Cargill, Inc. The bone caused an esophageal tear requiring surgery (Mr. Pinkham died several years later after sustaining his injury. He did not sue for wrongful death). Three affidavits that the Estate relied on to defeat Cargill's motion for summary judgment were held inadmissible at trial. After consideration, the trial court granted Cargill's motion noting that Maine had not established the requisite test to use when evaluating a strict liability claim for allegedly defective food pursuant to its strict liability statute. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Estate argued that it provided sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact, thereby rendering summary judgment inappropriate. The Estate further argued that the court erred in concluding that the Estate failed to meet its burden of proof to establish facts from which a fact-finder could infer that Cargill’s boneless turkey product was defective. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that summary judgment was not proper given the facts presented in this case, and vacated the superior court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Estate of Stanley Pinkham v. Cargill, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner Steven R. Danzig appealed a superior court order that affirmed the Maine Board of Social Worker Licensure’s denial of his application to become a licensed clinical social worker (LCSW). The Board denied Danzig’s application after concluding that he was “self-employed” during his requisite clinical internship, which is prohibited pursuant to Board rules. Petitioner argued that the Board's decision was based on an error of law and was not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Finding substantial evidence in the record, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decision. View "Danzig v. Board of Social Worker Licensure" on Justia Law

Richard Hurlbert, Audrey McGlashan, and Hurlbert-McGlashan, LLC (collectively, Hurlbert) had record title to property abutting Andrew and Melinda Weinstein's (collectively, Weinstein) property. This action arose from the parties' dispute about ownership of certain property. The superior court declared that Weinstein held title to the disputed land through adverse possession. Hurlbert appealed, arguing that the trial court erred because Weinstein failed to satisfy his burden of establishing the required elements of an adverse possession claim. The Supreme Court agreed and vacated the judgment, holding that Weinstein's use of the property was not sufficiently hostile and notorious to put the true owner on notice that the land in question was actually, visibly, and exclusively held by Hurlbert in antagonistic purpose. View "Weinstein v. Hurlbert" on Justia Law