Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Land Use Regulation Commission (LURC) approved the issuance of a permit to TransCanada Maine Wind Development, Inc. to construct a wind energy facility. Friends of the Boundary Mountains (FBM) appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that LURC (1) did not abuse its discretion in denying FMB's request to reopen a public hearing on TransCanada's original application or to conduct a new hearing on the amended application; (2) did not violate its own procedural rules; (3) properly handled consideration of several issues raised by FMB during the administrative proceedings; and (4) did not err in finding that TransCanada's wind energy project would provide significant "tangible benefits" under 12 Me. Rev. Stat. 685-B(4-B)(D). View "Friends of the Boundary Mtns. v. Land Use Reg. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Judith Kehl and Port of Call, LLC filed a motion to modify an order of prejudgment attachment and attachment on trustee process that had been entered in favor of Centrix Bank and Trust, following a contested hearing, ten months earlier. The superior court denied the motion. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without reaching its merits, concluding that the final judgment rule barred the appeal because (1) Appellants' motion raised arguments that should have, and could have, been raised before the attachment order was issued and on direct appeal from that order, and therefore, Appellants waived any rights by failing to challenge the attachment order through proper procedural avenues; and (2) no exception to the final judgment rule applied in this case. View "Centrix Bank & Trust v. Kehl" on Justia Law

Sharon and Nathan Weston divorced in 2005 pursuant to a divorce decree stating that Nathan would provide child support for the couple's adult disabled son, Alex, as long as Alex was unemancipated, which was defined as domiciled with Sharon and "principally dependent upon Sharon for support." In 2008, Alex and Sharon began participating in a program that provided Sharon about $30,000 annually. The district court granted Nathan's subsequent motion to modify child support, concluding that Alex was emancipated pursuant to the terms of the divorce decree because Alex was financially supported by the state and the Social Security Administration. The Supreme Court vacated the order terminating Nathan's child support obligation, holding that notwithstanding the government benefits he received, Alex was principally dependent on Sharon's financial contribution, and therefore, Alex was not emancipated. View "Weston v. Weston" on Justia Law

J. Russell Tarason sought injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment declaring that he held an easement over a portion of Wesson Realty's property. The superior court concluded that Tarason did not hold an easement over a portion of Wesson Realty's property because the 1925 deed that created the easement conveyed only a life estate in a right-of-way that terminated upon the death of the original grantee. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that although the superior court erred in concluding that section 772 of the Short Form Deeds Act did not apply to this case, the court properly concluded that the language of the 1925 deed demonstrated a clear intention to create an easement in gross that terminated upon the death of the original grantee rather than to create an appurtenant easement. View "Tarason v. Wesson Realty, LLC" on Justia Law

Robert Stanton filed a complaint against Michael Strong alleging nuisance and trespass and requesting injunctive relief, declaratory judgment, and punitive damages. Stanton requested that the superior court permanently enjoin Strong from engaging in any act that obstructed Stanton's access to his property from any point along an easement over property owned by Strong. After a nonjury trial, the court issued a judgment finding for Stanton on his trespass claim and granting Stanton's request for a permanent injunction. Strong appealed the portion of the judgment granting the permanent injunction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the facts as found by the trial court supported the permanent injunction, and the court did not abuse its discretion in making its determination. View "Stanton v. Strong" on Justia Law

In this property dispute, Robert Spickler (Robert) filed claims for declaratory judgment and to quiet title, and Adah Ginn (Adah) filed a claim for adverse possession. After a jury made findings of fact, the superior court entered judgment awarding ownership of the property to Robert. The court declared that, between Adah's and Robert's competing deeds to the same property, Robert was the rightful owner of the property. The Supreme Court affirmed after reaffirming and applying Hill v. McNichol, a case issued more than a century ago, to the instant case, holding that the superior court did not err in concluding that Robert was the owner of the disputed property as against Adah. View "Spickler v. Ginn" on Justia Law

R.M. appealed from a judgment entered in the probate court denying his petition to establish his parental rights to Tobias D. and granting the petition of the child's current guardians to terminate R.M.'s parental rights to the child. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the probate court and remanded the matter for entry of an order requiring DNA testing, as the child's actual parentage was not resolved. If, as the probate court assumed, R.M. was the child's biological father, the probate court would need to decide R.M.'s petition to establish parental rights and the guardians' petition to terminate R.M.'s parental rights in accordance with this opinion. View "Adoption of Tobias D." on Justia Law

MacImage of Maine and its principal asked six Maine counties to provide to them, in a specified digital format, copies of every document contained in the counties' registries of deeds, including the indexes to the recorded documents. The counties agreed to provide electronic copies of the registries' recorded documents, but disputes over the fees that the counties could charge for the requested electronic information precipitated this litigation. The superior court determined that the counties could not charge the fees that they proposed in their responses to the requests. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, which entered its judgment before recent legislation was passed. The Court held that the recent legislation was applicable to the dispute and that the responses of all but two of the six counties agreeing to provide the requested records in bulk and setting the costs for transferring the data fell within the law's parameters for reasonable fees. Remanded for entry of judgment in favor of those four counties and for further proceedings regarding the remaining two counties. View "MacImage of Me., LLC v. Androscoggin County" on Justia Law

Kristin Cummings, a twenty-five-year-old mother of two, committed suicide in her parents' home thirty-six hours after she had been discharged from Stephens Memorial Hospital, where she was acknowledged to have severe depression. The Estate of Kristin Cummings sued Kristin's parents, James and Jadzia Davie for negligence for failing to prevent Kristin's self-injurious behavior. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the Davies. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that no special relationship existed between Kristin and her parents such that the law would impose upon the Davies a duty to prevent or inhibit their daughter's suicide, either by virtue of those special relationships that the Court had previously recognized in its duty of care jurisprudence or by the existence of a custodial relationship. View "Estate of Cummings v. Davie" on Justia Law

Beginning in 2007, the City of Lewiston assessed stormwater fees on Robert Gladu's property, which contained a small shopping mall and parking lot, pursuant to the City's stormwater ordinance. The ordinance at issue created the Stormwater Management Utility and gave it the authority to assess and collect fees for stormwater management system and facilities. Gladu did not pay the fees, and in 2010, the City filed a civil complaint alleging that Gladu owed the City for unpaid stormwater fees. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. In his motion, Gladu argued that the stormwater assessment was a tax, not a fee, and that the Utility was not authorized to impose a tax. The superior court granted the City's motion and denied Gladu's motion and ordered that Gladu pay the delinquent stormwater fees, interest, attorney fees, collection costs, and a penalty. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under the test set forth in Butler v. Supreme Judicial Court, the stormwater assessment is a fee and not a tax; and (2) the superior court did not err in awarding a civil penalty, attorney fees, and other costs. View "City of Lewiston v. Gladu" on Justia Law