Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Wife and Husband divorced pursuant to a judgment entered in April 2009. The trial court subsequently granted Wife's motion to modify and motion for contempt. Husband appealed, arguing that the court erred when it (1) modified the divorce judgment to order Husband to continue making payments toward the mortgage on the home that had been awarded to Wife, as Wife had unilaterally refinanced the home in her name only, thereby extinguishing the second mortgage for which Husband was responsible; and (2) found Husband in contempt of the divorce judgment when he discontinued making payments to Wife comparable to the payments he was to have made on the second mortgage after Wife refinanced the home. The Supreme Court vacated the portions of the court's order granting Wife's motion to modify and motion for contempt, holding that although Wife's unilateral action in refinancing the property caused the intended distribution of debt in the divorce judgment to be complicated, her action did not absolve Husband of his responsibility for paying an amount equivalent to the principal indebtedness on the now-extinguished second mortgage. Remanded. View "Lewin v. Skehan" on Justia Law

The town manager of the Town of Freeport signed a contract transferring the Town's emergency dispatch services to another town. Plaintiffs, two Town residents, filed an amended complaint requesting a declaratory judgment that the contract was void because it was inconsistent with section 6.10 of the Town's charter, which provides that multi-year contracts must be "made or approved by ordinance," and seeking an injunction. The Town Council later voted in favor of an ordinance that ratified the contract. The superior court subsequently dismissed the complaint, finding that the case was moot because the Town had approved the outsourcing contract by ordinance, thereby complying with section 6.10. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and held (1) the court erred by dismissing the amended complaint because the passage of the ordinance ratifying the transfer of dispatch services contract did not render the case moot, as the contract did not conclude until the year 2016; but (2) the passage of the ordinance did satisfy the "made or approved by ordinance" requirement of section 6.10 of the charter. Remanded for entry of a judgment in favor of the Town on the merits of the amended complaint and denying the request for an injunction. View "McGettigan v. Town of Freeport" on Justia Law

This dispute centered around the status of Steele Road. The Fred D. Gay Revocable Trust claimed title by deed or by adverse possession to a triangular piece of property (the triangle) bordering Steele Road and to a fee interest in the road. The Dubes and Whitneys claimed title by deed to the triangle and a fee interest in the road. The Trust filed a complaint against the Dubes and Whitneys, alleging trespass and nuisance, among other claims. The Dubes and Whitneys counterclaimed. The superior court entered partial judgment finding (1) Steele Road was a public road classified as a town way that had not been abandoned by the public; (2) the Dubes and Whitneys held record title to the triangle; but (3) the Trust owned the triangle by adverse possession. It also determined that the Dube and Whitney counterclaims were moot and entered final judgment in favor of the Dubes and Whitneys on all remaining undecided claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court did not err by (1) concluding that the road was a town way and had not been abandoned; and (2) concluding that the Trust was the triangle's current owner by adverse possession. View "Gay v. Dube" on Justia Law

April Casale filed a complaint for protection from abuse against her then-husband, Randall Casale, on behalf of herself, her child, and Randall's three minor children. The district court issued a final protection order, specifically prohibiting Randall from having any contact with April and all four children. Thereafter, the divorce court issued a divorce judgment awarding the parties shared parental rights as to their three children and placing residence of the children with April. Randall later moved to modify the protection order. Without holding a hearing, the court issued an amended final protection order prohibiting Randall from having contact with April and the four children but indicating an exception to the no-contact provision to coordinate exchanges for contacts and incidental contact during those exchanges pursuant to the terms of the divorce judgment. April appealed, contending that the court erred in modifying the protection order to allow Randall to have some contact with her without conducting a hearing. The Supreme Court vacated the amended final protection order, holding that the court's decision not to conduct a testimonial hearing on Randall's motion was error. Remanded to the district court for it to conduct the required hearing. View "Casale v. Casale" on Justia Law

Galen Porter was the sole shareholder in County Forest Products. Porter began operating a fuel delivery business as Porter Cash Fuel but never registered that name with the Secretary of State. Porter ordered fuel and gas from A.E. Robinson in a series of transactions that continued for three years. Ultimately, the business relationship deteriorated, and A.E. Robinson refused to deliver any more products. A.E. Robinson sued County Forest and Porter seeking payment on the account. Following a non-jury trial, the court entered judgment for A.E. Robinson jointly and severally against County Forest and Porter in the amount of the invoices plus financing charges and attorney fees. The Supreme Court modified the judgment to remove the award of attorney fees and affirmed as modified, holding that the trial court (1) properly held Porter and County Forest jointly and severally liable; but (2) erred in awarding attorney fees to A.E. Robinson pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 2-207. View "A.E. Robinson Oil Co. v. County Forest Products, Inc. " on Justia Law

Chuck Starbird submitted an application for a building permit for the construction of a home on a lot abutting a public easement portion of a road in the Town of Minot. The Town denied the application. The Board of Appeals ultimately granted Starbird's appeal, concluding that the parcel had a private right-of-way because the the term "right-of-way," as used in section 4-501.8 of the Town's Land Use Code, included a public easement. The superior court affirmed but remanded to the Board for further factual findings on whether Starbird's application met all of the factors listed in section 4-501.8(A)-(G). The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court but vacated the portion of the court's judgment remanding the matter, holding (1) the unique circumstances of the matter caused the interlocutory appeal to fall within the judicial economy exception to the final judgment rule; and (2) the Board did not err by granting Starbird's appeal of the denial of his application. View "Town of Minot v. Starbird" on Justia Law

The district court found that Michael Dee committed the civil violation of possessing a useable amount of marijuana. The Supreme Court affirmed. Dee subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that Maine's prohibition against the possession of marijuana unconstitutionally infringed on his due process rights. The Court again affirmed, holding that the Legislature's prohibition met the rational basis standard, as (1) the statute provided for the public welfare because there was evidence that marijuana is harmful; (2) the legislative means employed were appropriate to achieve the ends sought; and (3) the manner of exercising the police power, by imposing a civil fine for the possession of marijuana, was not arbitrary or capricious. View "State v. Dee" on Justia Law

Timothy Robbins entered a conditional plea of guilty to and was convicted of operating under the influence (OUI), with two prior convictions, and operating after suspension. Robbins appealed, contending that the trial court erred in denying his motion to strike two prior uncounseled misdemeanor OUI convictions, which reflected that he appeared pro se but were silent as to the procedures taken to ensure that his constitutional right to counsel was satisfied. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, holding that Robbins could not prevail on the record because, as no evidence was presented to the contrary, the Court presumed the regularity that attaches to the final judgment of a conviction. View "State v. Robbins" on Justia Law

Joshuah Farrington struck a moose while driving a vehicle loaned to him by Darling's Rent-a-Car, causing damages. Philadelphia Indemnity, Darling's insurer, compensated Darling's pursuant to the property damage provision of its commercial insurance policy. Philadelphia Indemnity, as Darling' subrogee, subsequently filed a complaint against Farrington, asserting that he breached the rental contract by damaging the vehicle. The Business and Consumer Docket entered judgment in Philadelphia Indemnity's favor. Farrington appealed, contending that he was insured by Darling's insurance policy with Philadelphia Indemnity and that Maine's anti-subrogation rule prohibited Philadelphia Indemnity to bring a claim against him. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in concluding that Farrington was not included as an insured within the meaning of the property damage portion of the contract Darling's made with Philadelphia Indemnity. View "Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co. v. Farrington" on Justia Law

Christopher McCormick filed a complaint against Lawrence Crane alleging breach of warranty because the warranty deed by which Crane and his wife conveyed oceanfront property to McCormick inaccurately specified the location of an easement across the land. The superior court granted McCormick's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because the alleged confusion about the easement's boundaries did not disrupt McCormick's possessory rights in a way that constituted a functional eviction from a portion of his property, McCormick failed to state a claim for relief based on the breach of the covenant of warranty; and (2 )because the deed from the Cranes fully disclosed the existence of an easement that provided certain nearby parcels with ocean access, McCormick failed to state a claim for breach of the warranty of freedom from encumbrances. View "McCormick v. Crane" on Justia Law