Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The town planning board (Board) granted a dredge-and-fill permit for two culverts on property owned by the Berdeens. Scott Marquis, who owned property abutting the Berdeens' property, (1) appealed the Board's decision, and (2) filed an appeal with the Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA), which the ZBA denied. Marquis's main contention was that an illegal subdivision had been created on the Berdeens' property, which he claimed the Board should have addressed in determining whether to approve the application for the dredge-and-fill permit. The superior court consolidated Marquis's appeals and remanded them. In their decisions, the Board and the ZBA each determined that the Berdeens' property did not qualify as a subdivision pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 30-A, 4401(4) and local law. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the judgment of the superior court affirming the Board's decision to grant a dredge-and-fill permit; (2) vacated the judgment of the superior court and remanded with instructions to vacate the Board's and ZBA's decisions applying the subdivision law because those determinations were not ripe for review; and (3) instructed the superior court to dismiss the appeal of the ZBA decision as premature. View "Marquis v. Town of Kennebunk" on Justia Law

After Tenants failed to pay rent for the last four months of living in a home owned by Landlord, Landlord commenced a forcible entry and detainer action against Tenants. Landlord did not respond to Tenants' request for a return of their security deposit. Tenants subsequently commenced a small claims action against Landlord seeking to recover double damages for their security deposit. Landlord, in turn, filed a small claims action against Tenants seeking damages for unpaid rent and late fees. The district court awarded Landlord four months of unpaid rent and late fees and awarded Tenants the amount of their security deposit. The superior court affirmed. Tenants appealed, contending, inter alia, that Landlord's competing small claims action should not have been permitted to proceed until she returned their security deposit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because neither the security deposit statute nor the lease prohibited Landlord from bringing a separate claim for breach of other terms of the rental agreement, the district court did not err in considering Landlord's small claims action simultaneously with Tenants' claim; and (2) the district court did not err in refusing to impose double damages, attorney fees, and costs. View "Lyle v. Mangar" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Daniel Fortune was found guilty on eleven counts related to the attempted murder of a five-member family in their home. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and resulting sentences, holding (1) the trial court did not err when it instructed the jury that it could find Fortune guilty of attempted murder if the jury found that the State had proved attempted murder as to one of three victims named in a single count of the indictment; (2) the evidence was sufficient to support Fortune's convictions of the aggravated attempted murders of two of the victims; (3) the aggravated murder statute does not violate the state or federal Constitution; (4) the sentencing court did not err in its application of the sentencing analysis, resulting in the imposition of concurrent life sentences for two counts of aggravated attempted murder, and the court did not err concluding that a split sentence was not available to Fortune; and (5) the fact that the sentencing court did not clearly articulate on the record the three-step sentencing analysis in determining the concurrent sentences imposed on the remaining nine felony counts was harmless, assuming it was error at all. View "State v. Fortune" on Justia Law

Employer, an employment agency, hired Employee and assigned him to work at a facility owned by a client company (Client). Employer paid Employee's salary, and Client paid Employer a fee for his services. Employee was injured while working at the Client plant, after which Client ended Employee's assignment at its facility. Employee filed petitions to remedy discrimination against Employer and Client. A workers' compensation board hearing officer denied the petitions to remedy discrimination against Employer and Client. Employee appealed, contending that the hearing officer erred by denying the petition against Client on the ground that Employee was not in an employer-employee relationship with Client. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the hearing officer did not misconceive the legal standard when focusing on whether a contract for hire existed between Employee and Client; (2) the hearing officer did not err in concluding that Employee had a contract for hire only with Employer; and (3) therefore, Employee did not have a right of action for discrimination pursuant to 39-A Me. Rev. Stat. 353 against Client. View "Doughty v. Work Opportunities Unlimited" on Justia Law

This case arose from an investigation by the Board of Overseers of the Bar in into the actions of six law firm attorneys who were involved in the discovery and reporting of the misconduct of a former partner in the law firm. The Board, acting through bar counsel, appealed from a prehearing discovery order entered by a single justice of the Supreme Court granting the six attorneys' motion to quash a subpoena and also appealed from a judgment entered by a single justice determining that none of the six attorneys violated the Maine Bar Rules in responding to the former partner's misconduct. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the order granting the motion to quash the subpoena, but (2) vacated the judgment finding no violation of the Maine Bar Rules because the six attorneys, who were partners in the firm who were acting as the firm's executive committee and were the only lawyers within the firm who knew of Duncan's actions, violated Me. Bar R. 3.13(a)(1), which requires law firm partners to make efforts to enact procedures that will deter unethical behavior. View "Board of Overseers of the Bar v. Warren" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant David Churchill was found guilty of one count of unlawful sexual contact. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting in evidence a printout of an online chat between Defendant and the victim, a twelve-year-old girl, because the printout was not authenticated pursuant to Me. R. Evid. 901(a). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court properly concluded that testimony of a police detective was sufficient to authenticate the chat log, and (2) other evidence established that Defendant was the person with whom the victim was chatting, so no greater showing was required. View "State v. Churchill" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted for aggravated trafficking in scheduled drugs. The superior court denied Defendant's motion for a new trial. Defendant appealed, arguing that he was entitled to a new trial because he was denied effective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to advise him of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court properly denied Defendant's motion for a new trial because post-conviction review was the exclusive avenue for judicial review of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim; and (2) because Defendant did not avail himself of the post-conviction review process, the Court could not decide if, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, the post-conviction review procedure was unconstitutional as applied to Defendant's circumstances. View "State v. Ali" on Justia Law

Employee brought an employment discrimination claim against Employer pursuant to the Maine Human Rights Act, alleging that Employer discriminated against him based on his sexual orientation. A jury entered a verdict for Employee and awarded Employee compensatory and punitive damages. Employer appealed, arguing, among other things, that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on liability. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the record contained sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that actions of Employer made it futile for Employee to apply for a promotion, and thus, Employee's failure to apply for the position fell under the futility exception to the rule that an individual must apply for a position before he can claim he was denied that position; (2) the court applied the proper statutory cap to the jury's award; and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Employer's motion for a new trial or remittitur of damages. View "Russell v. ExpressJet Airlines" on Justia Law

Fannie Mae instituted foreclosure proceedings against Nicolle Bradbury for residential property she owed in Maine. Fannie Mae named GMAC Mortgage, the loan servicer, as a party-in-interest. During a deposition, a GMAC employee testified that he did not read the affidavits he signed or execute the affidavits before a notary. Fannie Mae subsequently filed a motion for a protective order to prevent the public disclosure of the deposition, which the district court denied. The district court ultimately dismissed without prejudice the complaint after finding Fannie Mae submitted a bad faith affidavit for purposes of summary judgment. As sanctions, the court ordered Fannie Mae to pay Bradbury for the attorney fees and costs she incurred in demonstrating the bad faith of the affidavit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in (1) declining to find GMAC in contempt even though the affidavit was executed by a GMAC employee; and (2) failing to award Bradbury attorney fees and costs in defending against the motion for a protective order. View "Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Bradbury" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court received a report from the Committee on Judicial Responsibility and Disability recommending that Probate Judge Lyman Holmes be sanctioned for certain violations of the Maine Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(B)(8), which requires that judges dispose of all judicial matters promptly. Judge Holmes conceded a pattern of unacceptable delays in managing and resolving at least five cases entrusted to him, the most egregious of which involved a delay of nearly five years in the resolution of a matter involving family contact with a child. The Supreme Court concluded that the pattern of delays constituted of violation of Canon 3(B)(8) and ordered that Judge Holmes be sanctioned for the violations. View "In re Holmes" on Justia Law