Justia Maine Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Witham Family Partnership challenged two decisions of the Town of Bar Harbor's Zoning Board of Appeals (Board) in connection with North South Corporation's application to construct a hotel. The Partnership attended two public hearings before the Board on North South's appeal of the planning board's denial of its application. The Board subsequently reversed the planning board's denial. The Partnership also filed its own appeal challenging the portion of the planning board's decision finding that North South's proposed project conformed to certain criteria for obtaining a building permit. The Board affirmed the planning board's decision. The Partnership then filed a Me. R. Civ. P. 80B complaint challenging the Board's decisions in both North South's appeal and in the Partnership's appeal. The superior court dismissed the complaint on grounds that the Partnership lacked standing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Partnership had standing to challenge the Board's decision in both appeals in a Rule 80B review of those decisions. View "Witham Family Ltd. P'ship v. Town of Bar Harbor " on Justia Law

Edgar and Sheryl Peters owned a parcel of land that abutted and was uphill from oceanfront property owned by Richard O'Leary. After a series of disputes with the Peterses, O'Leary planted a row of at least seventy-four trees near the parties' boundary, which obstructed ocean views from the Peterses' newly constructed home. The Peterses sued O'Leary. The superior court found that O'Leary had created a nuisance pursuant to Maine's spite fence statute and the common law and granted injunctive relief to the Peterses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in finding that O'Leary created a nuisance pursuant to the spite fence statute because (1) the plantings created a structure in the nature of a fence, and (2) the evidence was adequate to support a finding that O'Leary maintained the structure for the purpose of annoying the Peterses. View "Peters v. O'Leary" on Justia Law

The district court appointed Karen Wolf as referee to hear the divorce case of Wife and Husband. After a hearing conducted by Wolf, the district court entered a divorce judgment incorporating the referee's report. After the divorce judgment was entered, Wife filed two motions for post-judgment relief and moved to have the motions heard before the same referee that conducted the earlier hearing. The court referred the motions to the referee over Husband's objection. The Supreme Court dismissed Husband's interlocutory appeal, holding that no exception to the final judgment rule, including the death knell exception, the collateral order exception, nor the judicial economy exception, applied in this case. View "Bond v. Bond" on Justia Law

After Dorothy Leighton failed to pay taxes on her property and the Town of Blue Hill recorded a tax collector's lien certificate on the property, the Town filed a complaint against Leighton for forcible entry and detainer (FED), seeking possession of the property and costs. The district court entered judgment in Leighton's favor. The superior court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded with instructions to issue a writ of possession in favor of the Town. On appeal, Leighton contended that the Town was required, as a matter of law, to prove that it held current title to the property in the FED action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the Town produced evidence that it held title superior to Leighton by virtue of the statutorily-foreclosed tax lien mortgage on the property, the Town presented sufficient evidence that it was entitled to possession of the property. View "Town of Blue Hill v. Leighton" on Justia Law

Janelle Gabay defaulted on a promissory note secured by a mortgage of her real property. HSBC Bank USA, the holder of the mortgage, filed a complaint for foreclosure and sale against Gabay. The district court granted HSBC's motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the district court, holding that entry of judgment as a matter of law was precluded where (1) HSBC's statement of material facts failed to properly present proof of ownership of the mortgage note; (2) HSBC's statement of material facts did not contain an adequate description of the mortgaged premises including a street address; (3) a genuine issue of material fact existed as to the order of priority and amounts due to other parties-in-interest; and (4) the amount of costs due as part of the amount due on the mortgage was not included in the summary judgment record as required. Remanded. View "HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Gabay" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Luis Pabon was convicted of elevated aggravated assault and attempted murder for the stabbing of his girlfriend and housemate at the time. Pabon's defense was partially built around the claim that he was so intoxicated that he had stabbed the victim in self-defense. On appeal, Pabon contended that the trial court erred by failing to include a dwelling-place exception to the duty to retreat in its self-defense instruction to the jury. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, holding that the court's omission of the dwelling-place exception from its self-defense instruction was not obvious error. View "State v. Pabon" on Justia Law

The Town of Millinocket appealed and Mary Walsh cross-appealed from a judgment of the superior court following a jury trial finding that Walsh, the former town recreation director, had engaged in activities protected by the state whistleblowers' protection act and that those protected activities were a substantial motivating cause for the Town's decision to eliminate her position. At issue on appeal was whether discriminatory animus expressed by one member of the town council could be found to be a cause or motivating factor for an adverse employment action or whether the lack of evidence of discriminatory animus by any other member of the town council insulated the Town from liability in Walsh's discrimination action. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding (1) an improper motive or discriminatory animus of one member of a multi-member council may create an actionable claim against the governmental entity if a plaintiff proves, and the jury finds, that the improper motive or discriminatory animus was a motivating factor or a substantial cause for an adverse employment action taken against a plaintiff who has engaged in a protected activity; and (2) evidence in the record supported the jury's verdict in this case. View "Walsh v. Town of Millinocket" on Justia Law

Defendant Ryan Preston was found guilty of criminal threatening with a dangerous weapon. On appeal, Preston argued (1) that the statutory provisions defining deadly force and discussing defense of premises were unconstitutionally vague, and (2) the trial court did not adequately instruct the jury on the charge of criminal threatening with a dangerous weapon. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) the definition of deadly force was not unconstitutionally vague as it interacted with the definition of defense of premises in this case, and (2) the trial court's jury instructions did not constitute obvious error. View "State v. Preston" on Justia Law

Defendant Malcolm LaVallee-Davidson killed a man by putting a gun to his head and pulling the trigger during consensual sexual activity. At trial, Defendant argued that he did not know that the gun was loaded. The trial court convicted him of manslaughter. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court committed obvious error in its jury instructions and that the evidence was insufficient for a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant caused the death of the victim either recklessly or with criminal negligence. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding (1) the court's jury instructions correctly explained the mistake-of-fact statute and contained neither error nor obvious error, and (2) there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant caused the death of the victim and acted either recklessly or with criminal negligence. View "State v. LaVallee-Davidson" on Justia Law

Benjamin Cook pleaded guilty to gross sexual assault and unlawful sexual contact. The superior court imposed an aggregate sentence of twelve years' imprisonment followed by thirty years of supervised release pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 17-A, 1231. Cook appealed, contending that the court abused its discretion (1) in determining a maximum and final sentence pursuant to the sentencing analysis required by Me. Rev. Stat. 71-A, 1252, and (2) in imposing a thirty-year term of supervised release because its separate analysis concerning that component of the sentence was insufficient. On appeal, the Supreme Court announced for the first time the analysis a sentencing court is required to undertake before imposing a term of supervised release pursuant to section 1231. In this case, because the superior court did not have the benefit of the full analysis announced and only briefly articulated the case-specific factors leading it to impose a thirty-year term of supervised release, the Court vacated the term of supervised release and remanded for resentencing. The Court affirmed the sentences in all other respects. View "State v. Cook" on Justia Law